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SUMMARY 
This research is about land: it is about land that was bought, was taken away, was 
reclaimed and eventually given back. It is also about two rural South African 
communities, their ties to their land and in particular, how they were affected by 
planning in the first five years after the end of apartheid (1994 - 1999). 
The thesis gives an overview of the history of planning in South Africa before the 
1994 change in government, and of far-reaching changes to planning legislation, 
procedures and structures since then. It uses as its theoretical foundation the 
extensive literature on participation in planning, and follows a case study 
methodology to tell the stories of the communities. 
It set out to examine the changes that occurred in rural development planning practice 
in South Africa; whether the democratic processes sweeping the country led to a 
greater awareness of participation in planning; and the extent to which participation 
was incorporated into the rural development planning process. In addition, it 
discusses how planners involved in planning in the two case studies viewed their roles 
and responsibilities. 
Considerable participatory attempts were made to ascertain the communities' 
priorities for development. The research concludes, however, that institutional 
problems and political interests continued to dominate planning. The complete 
overhaul of planning legislation and the restructuring of local and provincial 
government provided a unique planning context. But these also meant that even 
where the political will might have existed, structures and appropriately skilled staff 
were not in place to facilitate or support meaningful participation by communities. 
Perhaps most significantly, conflicting rationalities meant that where there was a 
community-initiated participatory planning process, institutional priorities placed on 
planning officials by government meant that the communities' inputs were 
overridden. 
In spite of this, in the case where the community did plan and initiate planning. that 
community has shown a commitment to long-term involvement in planning for its 
future. In the case where participation was formulaic, it occurred sporadically and 
selectively. That community was - and remains - essentially disengaged from the 
planning process. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND LIST OF ACRONYMS 
!Xu and Khwe The name of the San, or Bushmen who were relocated from 
Namibia after independence, to South Africa. They were settled in tents 
on the land at Schmidtsdrift. 
ACLA 
ANC 
Advisory Commission on Land Allocation, the body set up to deal with 
the restitution of State land, in terms of the Abolition of Racially based 
Land Measures Act 108 of 1991. See section 3.3.1. 
African National Congress, who formed the government after the first 
democratic elections in 1994. 
ANCRA Association for Northern Cape Rural Advancement, an NGO affiliate of 
the National Land Committee (NLC), see section 7.6. 
ASCH Consulting Engineers, nominated by the BaThlaping of Schmidtsdrift to 
undertake the work necessary for the drawing up of the Schmidtsdrift 
Master Plan. A director of ASCH consultants chaired the Schmidtsdrift 
Community Consortium. See section 7.11 ff. 
Bakwena ba Mogopa The name of the Tswana speaking people who originally 
occupied the land at Mogopa 
BaThlaping The name of the Tswana speaking people who originally occupied 
Schmidtsdrift 
Bantustans In terms of apartheid policies, each of the ten 'Bantu' ethnic groups was 
allocated one or more specific native reserve areas, which became known 
as bantustans. These in tum became known as homelands as the policy 
evolved, presenting an image of places that were the traditional 'home' of 
each of the specific ethnic African people in South Africa. Homelands 
were granted 'self-determination' or 'self-governing' status as national 
states (in terms of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959), 
although none was economically viable as such. The apartheid 
government encouraged the national states to opt for 'independence' in 
the 1970s. Four of the ten (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) 
did so, but none was recognised internationally, and all were 
reincorporated back into the country after the 1994 change in government. 
Black Notive, Blo.ck, African, Bantu: Everybody in South Africa was classified 
according to their 'race' as defined by the Population Registration Act of 
1950, the four major classifications being 'white', 'native' (subsequently 
Bantu, subsequently 'black'), 'coloured' and 'Indian'. Over the years, 
many authors chose to use the term 'black' to include all those that were 
disenfranchised by not being classified 'white', thereby including in the 
term 'black' those officially classified as 'coloured' and 'Indian', and used 
the term 'African' to refer to those classified as 'Bantu'. 
Black Sash The Black Sash was a women's anti-apartheid movement founded in 
1955. At its height, had a membership of over 10,000 mostly middle-
class, English-speaking women. Protests took the form of marches and 
all-night vigils and demonstrations, during which members wore black 
sashes, from which the organisation took its name. Black Sash 
demonstrations were banned in 1976. But the organisation continued to 
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exist, setting up a number of Advice Offices which provided legal and 
human rights related advice to Black and Coloured people. Since the 
change in government in 1994, the organisation has continued to monitor 
and draw attention to racial inequalities and human rights issues in South 
Africa. 
Bophuthatswana The reserve area to which both case study communities were 
removed. Bophuthatswana opted for 'independence' in the 1970s. See 
also bantustans, above. 
CPA Communal Property Association, see section 3.6.2. 
DET Department of Education and Training, a provincial level department, 
discussed in section 6.10. 
DFA Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995. This was promulgated by the 
new government to 'fast-track' development projects. In terms of the Act, 
local authorities were required to consult with local stakeholders in the 
preparation of Local Development Objectives (LDOs). See section 3.6.3. 
DLA Department of Land Affairs, the national government department 
responsible for planning. 
DP ASA Development Planning Association of South Africa, the association set up 
in opposition to the SAITRP in 1993, see section 2.3. 
GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution, the government's policy that 
replaced the RDP in 1996. See section 3.4. 
Griqua The name given to a group of people of mixed racial origin that arose after 
the Dutch settled in the Cape, and area then occupied by the Hottentot 
people. Historically, the puritanical Dutch expelled all those of mixed 
race and they migrated inland. They took on the name "Griqua" after a 
Hottentot tribe the "Gurirgiqua". See section 7.7. 
Homelands See bantustans, above. 
IDP 
IDT 
ISRDS 
Kgotla 
Integrated Development Plan, set up in terms of the Local Government 
Transition Act in 1996. IDPs were an important tool for the integration of 
planning activities at local government level. See section3.5. 
Independent Development Trust, a state institution set up in 1990 to 
support the then government to meet its development goals. It was seen 
as a vital body during the reform period, and funded and facilitated a 
range of poverty relief and infrastructure projects. After 1994, it became 
one of the conduits for the spending of RDP funds in rural areas. See 
section 6.8. 
Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy, published by the 
government in 2000, which presented its "new stage of concerted effort to 
improve opportunities and well-being for the rural poor". It drew together 
and superseded all previous rural development strategies. 
This is literally a Setswana word meaning 'meeting place'. It was, and 
still remains, the meeting place where headmen and elders come together 
to decide on matters concerning the community. Traditionally, elders 
reached their position by virtue of the respect they had from their people. 
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LDO 
LRPP 
MDF 
MEC 
Today, they tend to be elected representatives. The kgotla is therefore an 
ancient form of democracy, and embraces the right to be heard. 
Theoretically, anyone can come to the gathering at the kgotla to present 
their case, and discussion and debate are allowed to continue until 
consensus is reached. Issues such as the sale of a cow, the quantity and 
quality of grain being sold, whether a neighbour's boundary had been 
extended too far were typical of disputes resolved by a traditional kgotla. 
Land Development Objectives were intended to provide the basis of 
integrated and co-ordinated planning and development. Once LDOs had 
been set for a local government body, all decisions and policies, by all 
government bodies, had to be consistent with them. See also the 
Development Facilitation Act (DFA) above, and section 3.6.3. 
Land Reform Pil ot Programme, launched by the Department of Land 
Affairs in 1994 to 'kick-start' land redistribution and as a means to launch 
a long-term programme of sustainable land reform. See section 3.3.3. 
Mogopa Development Forum. This was initially an informal grouping of 
organisations involved in a range of development project proposals at 
Mogopa, and which comprised representatives of a range of government 
departments, statutory agencies, non-governmental organisations, 
development practitioners and members of the community. It lasted from 
1993 to 1997. See section 6.8. 
Member of the Executive Committee (Provincial level). 
Native reserves, reserves See bantustans above. 
NGO 
NLC 
Non-governmental organisation. 
National Land Committee - an affiliation of 8 NGOs that aims to actively 
assist poor black rural people to access land rights and development 
resources. It originated in 1985, when 4 land rights organisations (one of 
which was TRAC) joined forces to form the National Committee Against 
Removals. It was renamed the NLC in 1990 and concentrated on policy 
issues and helping displaced communities to reconstitute themselves and 
participate in the new government's land reform programme. TRAC and 
ANCRA are both NLC affiliates. See section 7.10. 
NWDET North West Province Department of Education and Training (section 
6.10). 
PLP Presidential Lead Project, a concept included in the White Paper on 
Reconstruction and Development, 1994 and meant to launch the 
implementation of the RDP. Each provincial administration was to 
identify one urban and one rural PLP, which would fast-track and pilot 
development in the area. See section 3.2. 
PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal, a set of methods designed to include groups 
that had previously been marginalised from the planning process. See 
section 4.3.3. 
PSC Provincial Steering Committee, set up after the re-organisation of 
provincial and local government. Planning functions were devolved to the 
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provinces after 1994, and PSCs took on the role of overseeing 
development in their areas. See sections 6.12 and 7.17. 
RDF Rural Development Framework, 1997, sought to contribute to GEAR by 
proposing a number of anti-poverty measures for rural areas. See section 
3.6.3. 
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme, the ANC's political 
manifesto and the new government's framework for the complete 
reordering of politics, the economy and society in South Africa after 1994. 
See section 3.2. 
RDS Rural Development Strategy, 1995. At the time, it set out a 25 year vision 
for the country's rural areas. This was replaced by the ISRDS in 2000. 
See section 3.6.1. 
RSA Republic of South Africa. 
RSC Regional Services Councils, part of the government's industrial 
decentralisation programme in the 1970s. The RSCs had the power to 
impose taxes on industries and to use the income to develop infrastructure 
in less developed parts of the region. It was therefore a system of 
redistributing wealth from industrial areas to 'decentralised' areas. Some 
time after the change in government and reorganisation of the Provinces, 
the function of the RSCs was taken over by the District Councils. See 
section 6.11. 
SADF South African Defence Force (pre-I994). 
SAITRP South African Institute of Town and Regional Planners, established in 
1954 to replace the South Mrican Branch of the British Town Planning 
Institute. The RTPI severed it relations with the SAITRP in 1978 in 
protest against government policies. The SAITRP joined with the 
DPASA to form SAPI in 1996. 
San The terms San, Khwe, Bushmen, and Basarwa have all been used to refer 
to peoples of hunting and gathering origin in Southern Africa. 
SANDF South African National Defence Force (post-1994). 
SAPI South Mrican Planning Institution, formed by the amalgamation of the 
SAITRP and DPASA in 1996. 
SDMC South District Municipal Council, the municipality in North West 
Province that took over the local government function at Mogopa after 
1997. See section 6.12. Siyancuma Municipality in Northern Cape fulfils 
a similar function for the Schmidtsdrift community. See section 7.19. 
SIDA A Swedish NGO that was appointed to support the development of the 
provincial administration in Northern Cape, and with it the new approach 
to land reform. See section 7.17. 
SWAPO South West African People's Organisation, who fought against the South 
African government in the war of liberation in Namibia and formed the 
new government. See section 7.5. 
TP A Transvaal Provincial Administration, the provincial arm of government in 
the old Transvaal Province. See sections 6.8, 6.10. 
xi 
TRAC Transvaal Rural Action Committee, a rural service non-governmental 
organisation providing legal, advocacy and organisation-building support 
for communities in the old Transvaal Province that historically struggled 
against state apartheid policies in South Africa. Much of the work carried 
out by TRAC in the late 1980s also involved building up women's groups 
to articulate women's need and views in community forums traditionally 
dominated by men. This was important work, for it brought the concept 
of participation in community decision-making to the fore, helping to lay 
the foundations of the Rural Women's Movement and subsequently of 
democracy in rural South Africa. It also focussed on the critical issue of 
land and land rights in the country. In 1999 TRAC underwent major 
changes, including a change in name - to become The Rural Action 
Committee - reflecting the fact that the old provincial boundaries in the 
country had changed (the Transvaal no longer existed). See sections 5.6, 
6.4. 
Tswana Tswana, also kno-wn as Setswana, is a Bantu language. 
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PROLOGUE 
"Umlhaba. The land Our purpose is the land. That is what we must achieve. 
The land is our whole lives, we plough it for food, we build our homes from the 
soil, we live on it and we are buried in it. When the whites took our land away 
from us we lost the dignity of our lives, we could no longer feed our children... In 
everything we do we must remember that there is only one aim and one solution, 
and that is the land, the soil, our world" 
(Opening remarks by Petros Nkosi at a meeting to discuss the fonnation of a regional 
committee representing 17 different rural communities in south eastern Transvaal, South 
Africa, in July 1989) 
Physical planning is about land and about control over the use of land. In South Africa, 
physical planning has been characterised by control, more particularly, state control, and 
nowhere is this more evident than in the historic designation of some areas in the 
country for ownership and occupation by one particular group, and the subsequent 
removal of members of another group from that land. Colin Bundy, writing about land 
and forced removals in South Africa, described the relationship between land and power 
thus: "Certain forms of land ownership confer and concentrate economic and social 
power in the hands of one group or class of people, giving them the ability to 
subordinate and exploit another group or class" (Bundy, 1990:3). So it is that the law 
with respect to land can define and perpetuate power relations, as indeed it has 
throughout much of the history of South Africa: access to land has underpinned political 
domination in that country. 
For many traditional African communities, a threat to the land is more than just a threat 
to land ownership and livelihood. It is a threat to community and to the essence of 
community coherence. In an abstract sense, land is the means the community uses to 
organise itself. It is the focus of community formation, and when there is a threat to the 
land, the community itself can feel threatened. "Land-based organisation of a rural 
community is to a large extent its system of risk insurance ... Being deprived of control 
over land rights means a loss of coherence in the community as well" (Cross, 1990:339-
340). That is why land became the focus of struggles in South Africa's history, for 
control over land has been the primary means of domination. 
1 
This research is about land: it is about land that was bought, was taken away, was 
reclaimed and eventually given back. It is about two communities, their ties to their 
land and in particular, how they and their land were affected by planning in South 
Africa. Elsewhere in Africa, Porter et al (1991) had noted the lack of texts that 
expressed the experiences of development practitioners as they worked in such 
marginalised areas. This was particularly the case for South Africa at the time that this 
research began, and this study thus also sought out the planners and professionals 
involved with those two rural communities. 
In 1993, a time of profound transition in South Africa, Robert Beauregard attended a 
conference of the South African Planning History Study Group. He was surprised (in 
his words, "quite shocked") at the dearth of planning histories that were sensitive to the 
startling differences among racial groups within the country. "Planning histories 
written from the perspective of peoples planned for ... (were) rare", he said, and 
concluded that in writing about planning in South Africa, "these histories would have to 
consider issues of resistance, political strategy, and the hopefulness of alternative 
outcomes" (Beauregard, 1998: 193). The stories that will be presented as part of this 
study consider these issues. The two communities are people who were planned for in 
apartheid's most cynical way. It was not difficult to give consideration (as Beauregard 
urged) to the issue of the communities' resistance to apartheid planning and the 
hopefulness that they and those who worked with them had of an alternative outcome. 
The challenge, as an outsider, was to tell the story from the community's perspective. 
There was encouragement to do so: Leonie Sandercock called for the inclusion of new 
voices into the domain of planning theory, the voices of non-planners, from the 
'borderlands' and margins of planning (Sandercock, 1995:86). She encouraged 
researchers to blur the boundaries between experts and non-experts and in so doing to 
try to understand what planning means to others. 
2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The context of planning in post-apartheid South Africa 
Since 1994, planners and development practitioners in South Africa have found 
themselves working in a post-apartheid context of reconstruction, growth and a 
developing democracy. Soon after the country's first democratic elections in that year, 
the then new government's Department of Land Affairs embarked on a three-pronged 
programme of land reform, land redistribution and the restitution of land rights, while 
the Department of Housing announced its goal of the construction of one million houses 
within the first five years of the new parliament. With such major changes in politics 
and policies in the country came an anticipation on the part of local communities that 
implementation of development projects would rapidly take place, and that they would 
be able actively to participate in these processes. This context of planning reform and 
high development expectations produced exciting opportunities as well as problems for 
the implementation of development projects, as politicians set ambitious development 
goals up to and in the months following the 1994 change in government. 
The new African National Congress (ANC) government's key policy document was the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), described in greater detail below 
(Chapter 3). Essentially, the RDP sought to address the inequalities that had become 
entrenched in the country and to promote economic growth through government 
intervention in the economy. Rapid delivery of services, including education, housing 
and health care were to be used as building blocks to stimulate economic activity and 
job creation. In the spirit of democracy, these and other RDP projects in post-apartheid 
South Africa had actively to encourage the participation and empowerment of local 
communities. People who had been denied any democratic participation in the country 
and in apartheid planning processes now had a right to be included and with this right 
came an expectation that their voices would be heard and listened to. Participation 
became something of a mantra, central to the RDP: as had been the case elsewhere in 
the world, participation became a fundamental part of mainstream development 
thinking, not just a 'good' thing, but also the 'right' thing to do. 
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Great strides were made in some areas, shown through the monitoring and evaluation of 
some measurable quantifiable targets by government departments, aid agencies and 
non-governmental organisations. But not all of the government's RDP targets could be 
met. The early target of one million houses was not achieved, and some rural 
development projects identified by the Department of Land Affairs stalled. The RDP 
itself, and some less easily measurable goals, were amended. While the RDP was not 
entirely abandoned, by 1996 the government's official welfarist macro-economic policy 
had shifted to a more neo-liberal one of Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR). 
"The early growth strategy encapsulated in the RDP strategy relied on significant 
levels of government intervention to both overcome historical inequalities and 
achieve rapid growth. Within two years of democratic rule, this policy had been 
diluted and reoriented in favour of the more orthodox GEAR strategy which 
advocates a more open economy, a reduced role for the state, with the free-market 
responsible for achieving growth and employment creation. GEAR is intended to 
position South Africa to take advantage of globalisation" (pycroft, 2000:157). 
However, while official macro-economic policy may have shifted from RDP to GEAR, 
many people in the country retained the expectation that democratic processes in 
planning and development would prevail and that they would be included, heard and 
listened to in the implementation of government development projects. 
1.2 The Research 
One of the motivations for undertaking this research was thus the desire to investigate 
and document the extent to which these more qualitative aspects of development were 
affected in South Africa's rural areas. Little research had been done on this subject, and 
the work would make a contribution to the country's planning historiography. In the 
literature there was scant focus on issues such as rural communities' own experiences of 
and responses to participation (or lack of it) in planning projects; nor was there any 
examination of the experiences and perceptions of development practitioners whose 
responsibility it was to implement such projects in South Africa. Any development 
project, whether funded locally or internationally, is ultimately going to be only as good 
as those who are assigned the task of implementation: it is only in implementation that 
the intended beneficiaries of such a project stand to gain. 
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The research therefore attempted to 'tell the story' of the two communities, and began 
with an examination of the history of each, focussing in particular detail on their 
experiences of apartheid planning. Tracing this part of their recent history meant 
investigating the memories and experiences of past planning as it had affected the 
communities. The research examined in particular the impact of the reforms that took 
place in South Africa in the late 1990s. It focussed on the changes in the new 
government's policy from RDP to GEAR: how those changes affected rural 
development policy in general from 1994 to 1999 (the first five years of the post-
apartheid government); and the way in which these changes affected the two 
communities under study. It focussed on the new democratic government's emphasis 
on inclusion and participation, and sought to explore the planning problems and 
solutions that emerged as planners tried to find ways of including in the planning 
process those in two communities who had suffered some of the worst effects of 
apartheid. This necessitated a study of theories of and approaches to participation in 
planning that have been expounded in the literature, an application of some of these 
theories and approaches to the specific rural South African contexts, and an examination 
of the circumstances and conditions that facilitated and / or obstructed such participation 
in those contexts. 
'Telling the story' of the two communities and how they were affected by planning 
produced epistemological challenges - "those arising from the existence of multiple 
worldviews rooted in history and culture" (Umemoto, 2001: 17). The different actors 
involved in rural development planning in the two communities held different views 
about the planning process, views that were shaped by their experiences of apartheid 
planning history and their expectations and aspirations for the future. The study would 
therefore have been incomplete without an inquiry into the experiences of planners and 
the development practitioners involved. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured into five broad sections. The first section (chapters 2 and 3) 
gives a brief history of planning in the country up to 1994, as well as a background to 
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the policies of reconstruction and development in post-apartheid South Africa. This sets 
the broad framework for development planning projects and the context in which 
development practitioners found themselves working in that country. It will be noted 
that the principles of democracy and participation were fundamental to the development 
policies of the new government. The section also considers very briefly whether 
"more" participation (in the sense of the democratisation processes and the creation of 
new forms of devolved local government and representation) may have led to "less" 
participation (in that some of the expectations of both development and participation 
were not met, and some of the ambitious targets for the implementation of participatory 
projects were not achieved, perhaps deflected by the new forms of representation). 
This section suggests that while development policies in South Africa since the mid-
1990s were formulated in a context of high expectations of democracy and participation 
in planning projects, the actual implementation of such participatory projects and 
processes may have been hindered by a preoccupation with democratic rights. 
The second section (chapter 4) consists of an investigation of theories of community 
participation in planning. This section explores what community participation is 
construed to be; what it is for; and the various means by which it comes about. Through 
examination of the literature, it shows that the definition of participation varies 
depending upon whose interests are being served. Participation is a complex process, 
one that has the potential not only to benefit communities, but also to disadvantage or 
disempower groups and individuals. Indeed some authors have begun to question and 
to challenge the moral imperative of participatory development. Two criticisms of 
participation from the literature are highlighted. The first is largely conceptual - that too 
often participation remains a peripheral activity, and that a gap exists between the 
theory of participation and the reality of exclusion of people from the planning process. 
The second focuses on the technical limitations of participatory development - that 
despite the fact that participation has been advocated by international and donor 
organisations, by governments and voluntary organisations for decades, it remains by 
and large a set of ad hoc techniques for information extraction. 
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The literature pointed to a need for a change in the social discourse of public 
participation, yet there appeared to be a dearth of evaluative studies of the 
implementation of participatory processes, particularly in 'southern' or low income 
country development contexts. Most of the authors postulated approaches and 
techniques that, in theory, could be used to encourage and incorporate participation in 
planning. Far fewer reported on the application of these approaches in practice. There 
was limited documentation of whether or how the techniques had been applied in a 
range of development contexts, or of the experiences of those involved in implementing 
participatory projects. This suggested the need for further research into the experiences 
and roles of planners and development practitioners, of the relationships between them, 
policy makers and the public, and of the reactions and perceptions of the communities 
in which such projects have been implemented. 
The third section (chapter 5) deals with the research methodology. It begins with a 
statement of the issues that arose from the preceding chapters: the contextual 
background of planning in post-apartheid South Africa and the literature review on 
participation in planning; and develops them into the key research questions that are at 
the heart of this thesis. These questions in turn shaped and determined the approach to 
the research and the methods used in the empirical fieldwork and analysis. The section 
includes an explanation of the way in which the two case studies were selected and a 
reflection on "the peculiar circumstances" confronting social scientists undertaking 
fieldwork in South Africa in the 19905, especially when doing research in communities 
other than their own. 
In the fourth section of the thesis, the two case studies are presented and analysed. The 
first of these (chapter 6) is the story of the Bakwena ba Mogopa, whose land was taken 
by the apartheid government, and who resisted that government's attempts to resettle 
them elsewhere. The community was determined to reclaim and reoccupy their land, 
and with the support of non-governmental organisations (NOOs), refused to be 
intimidated by the apartheid regime and planning policies. Their own plan for their land 
culminated in their invasion of their land and rebuilding the village that had been 
destroyed. One NGO in particular played a fundamental role at Mogopa, both before 
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and after the change of government in 1994. Once the period of resistance and the need 
for advocacy was over, fieldworkers from this NGO continued to work with the 
community using participatory techniques in helping to defme development priorities. 
The Bakwena ba Mogopa established the Mogopa Development Forum to co-ordinate 
the reconstruction work in a democratic manner, and planners and other development 
practitioners were introduced to the community through this forum. However, the 
community appeared to remain wary of official planning procedures even after the new 
government introduced its land reform policies. 
The second case study tells the story of the BaThlaping community at Schmidtsdrift 
(chapter 7). They too were removed from their land and village in terms of apartheid 
planning policies, and the community was scattered to a number of different locations. 
Their land was used as a weapons testing site by the South African Defence Force 
(SADF), and part of it was subsequently used to house the San (!Xu and Khwe) people 
who had fought alongside the SADF in Namibia. It was only as the pace of reform in 
South Africa accelerated in the 1990s that the community began the process of 
reclaiming their land through official channels, assisted by a non-governmental 
organisation. Their initial attempt was unsuccessful, but after the 1994 elections, the 
community re-submitted its claim in accordance with the new government's land reform 
policy. They continued to adhere to the planning requirements contained in that policy, 
which included a number of participatory planning procedures prior to the drawing up 
of a master plan document. The BaThlaping finally resettled on their land in 2001 and 
began the reconstruction of their Village. The outcomes of both of the post-apartheid 
participatory planning processes adopted by these communities, as well as the 
involvement of planning professionals, is examined and compared in this section. 
Section five (chapters 8 and 9) summarises the two case studies and presents an 
interpretation of them. The two stories illustrate how planning in rural South Africa 
disadvantaged the communities both before and after the change in government in the 
country, despite the adoption of the land reform programme. Changes in policies, 
structures and staff were inevitable and necessary, but the delays in implementation and 
the perception that promises of delivery were being broken, led to immense frustration 
and disillusionment on the part of both the communities and planners themselves. More 
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fundamentally, the stories illustrate how too often, planning continued to be used as an 
agent of state control: the views of the communities appeared to count for little. It is 
important that planners in rural areas of South Africa understand and take account of the 
effect of planning's past practices on communities. The section concludes with some 
reflections on the findings of the study, the methods that were used, and on research in 
the context of rural South Africa. 
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2. PLANNING IN SOUTH AFRICA PRIOR TO 1994 
2.1 Introduction 
Land was at the centre of the political and economic struggle in South Africa 
throughout the last century. The land question had a particularly bitter history, whose 
ramifications were felt throughout the country, its institutions and all its communities, 
urban and rural. The disputes about the land described in this study began as early as 
1912, and culminated only after the dramatic change in government in South Africa 
after 1994, when land reform became a key component of government policy. 
2.2 A brief background to planning in South Africa before 1948 
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There is some evidence that a form of planning in South Africa began 
long before the twentieth century: within a decade of their arrival in 
1652, white colonists had, for example, raised the first in a long line of 
apartheid barriers by planting a hedge around their settlement, beyond 
which the original inhabitants of the Cape were forced to stay (Wilson 
and Ramphele, 1989). But it was the discovery of minerals (diamonds in 
1867 and gold in 1886) that transformed the country's economy and in so 
doing, its planning history. 
Large numbers flocked to the gold mines around Johannesburg and the 
diamond mines of Kimberley in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. This rate of in-migration increased after widespread crop 
failures occurred following the devastation of the countryside during the 
Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). There was widespread overcrowding, 
often in poor housing, and a class-like stratification of ethnic groups 
began, manifest in high levels of spatial segregation between the black 
working class and the white entrepreneurs and land owners. This 
segregation became entrenched through restrictive conditions written into 
title deeds. 
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The 1913 Land Act further restricted black land ownership in South 
Africa, by allocating the majority of the land to whites, leaving the 
majority black population the rights to only about 7% of the land area in 
the country (this was increased to 13% in the 1936 Land Act, see Map 1). 
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Map 1: Map of South Africa showing the designation of land in 
terms of the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts 
(Source: Christopher, 1994) 
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Urban townships housing black workers continued to be overcrowded as 
people moved to urban areas in search of work. Following an influenza 
epidemic in 1918, the 1919 Public Health Act enabled the Minister to 
regulate and control the layout, densities and land use of towns and 
townships. The fIrst town planning regulations in the country therefore 
arose out of the health crises that had developed in previously unplanned 
and overcrowded, rapidly urbanising areas, echoing the origins of 
planning in the UK. However, from 1923, with the passage of the Native 
Urban Areas Act, government legislation sought to address some of the 
perceived social problems associated with rapid urbanisation, by 
physically segregating racial groups. 
In both the UK and the USA, positivism and the theory of technical 
rationality had strongly influenced the early development of planning as 
a profession (Schon, 1982). It was believed that planning could bring to 
the problems of the day the benefIts of science, technology, rationality 
and objectivity, in the public interest. This positivist influence was felt 
strongly in South Africa, and the twenty years between 1930 and 1950 
was a period in which control and regulation in urban areas continued to 
increase. Planning was bureaucratised within and by the state, and 
planning decision-makers subordinated themselves to the interests of 
both government policy and business. The political and ideological 
climate of the time was thus seen clearly in planning. Smit commented 
that there was a built-in "provision for ethnic engineering ... The fact of 
the matter is that town planning and ethnic spatial engineering have been 
very closely related from the very beginning, irrespective of whether one 
chooses to work with a narrow or broad defInition of planning" (Smit, 
1989:72). 
In South Africa's (black) rural areas, declining agricultmal production in 
this period resulted in the implementation of so-called 'betterment' 
pJanning, in which attempts were made to rationalise peasant farms and 
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farming methods. This involved large-scale removals within and 
between rural areas in order to achieve the objective of totally 
transforming rural settlement patterns. Not surprisingly, these 
resettlement schemes were at times violently opposed by the local 
populations. 
2.3 South African planning 1948 - 1994: Apartheid planning 
..------, From 1950 to 1974, according to McCarthy and Smit (1984) there was 
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'ideological physical intervention' and 'large scale ethnic spatial 
engineering' in the South African planning. The Group Areas Act of 
1950 was perhaps a watershed, promulgated soon after the Nationalist 
Party, with its separatist ideology, came into power in 1948. Afrikaner 
nationalism was at a p~ and its 'utopian' policy was that black people 
in white urban areas were to be regarded as 'temporary sojourners'. As 
such, they would not be entitled to any political, social or other rights in 
'white' urban areas. These rights would have to be exercised in their 
traditional homelands, or bantustans (see Map 1 and Map 2). 
The Group Areas Act brought about major changes to the structure of 
South African cities, and was an example of physical planning being 
used as a political tool. It required, by law, the complete physical 
separation of ethnic groups in residential areas, and the buffering of these 
areas from each other by means of a physical or man-made barrier (open 
space, commercial or industrial zones). In terms of the Act, adequate 
growth hinterlands were to be provided, and major transportation axes 
were to be planned in such a way that movement could be controlled and 
"where possible each ethnic group (could be) given direct access to work 
places to avoid filtering through areas set aside for other groups ... " 
(Davies, 1976:16). Professionally, state planners found themselves in 
L...-___ ..... positions where they had no option but to plan within this aim. They 
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r------, therefore had to plan for the removal of people, and many justified these 
often large-scale removals as technicist urban renewal exercises. 
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Beauregard (1978:249) described such planners as state agents: "By 
perpetuating the existing class structure through the application of their 
technical expertise, planners are implicated in the inequalities which 
pervade ... society... (Such) planners' actions help to maintain the 
existing pattern of power and privilege ... " 
It was in the 1950s that the state embarked on a massive housing 
programme for black urban residents, seen in the vast, sprawling, 
monotonous townships located outside 'white' towns and cities. Morris 
(1981) stated that between 1950 and 1960, although all long-term 
government policies were aimed at the eventual return of black people to 
the homeland (bantustan) areas, three times as many houses were built 
for black people in Johannesburg than had been provided in the city's 
entire history. 
If the Group Areas Act brought major changes to the structure of urban 
areas, the policy of Betterment Planning changed the face of the rural 
reserve areas. In 1954, the nationalist government, in large measure in 
response "to a crisis in agricultural production in the African reserves" 
(Tomlinson, and Addleson, 1987:31) appointed a commission to 
investigate and plan their future. The Tomlinson Commission's report 
was a milestone in South Africa's planning history: the report and 
subsequent White Paper, together with the Promotion of Bantu Self-
Government Act of 1959, became important 'blueprints' for apartheid. 
This was in spite of the fact that many of the Commission's conclusions 
were not accepted or incorporated into the White Paper, rejected by the 
government as too radical and too expensive. 
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Map 2: Map showing the 1973 consolidation proposals for 10 
homeland areas 
(Source: Christopher, 1994) 
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The Commission sought to bring together the concepts of agricultural 
reform and industrial decentralisation, thereby offering the reserve 
population a real alternative to working in the 'white' urban areas. It 
proposed the abolition of traditional communal tenure and the reform of 
agriculture in the reserves, through 'Betterment planning' schemes. 
These were introduced by the government in an attempt 
"to control land usage and thus improve and rationalise reserve 
agriculture. Under betterment, tribal areas (were) divided into 
residential and agricultural land and the people living on the land 
.. , moved into rural villages, .. 
Instead of living in scattered homesteads close to fields, people 
(were) clustered into villages on poorer soil such as hilltops, while 
the rest of the land (was) divided into fields suitable for growing 
crops, forestry (wood lots) or grazing. The number of rural people 
affected by this enforced villagisation is not known, but it is 
thought to be massive. It is estimated that more than a million 
people have been moved as a result of betterment planning in Natal 
alone since the 1950s" (platzky and Walker, 1985:9). 
There was widespread resistance around the country, although at the time 
this went relatively undocumented and little studied (Mabin, 1991). 
Johnson later described the Tomlinson Commission proposals as 
'~echnocratic solutions to the political problems of the homelands" which 
reflected the expedient paternalism of the day. Tomlinson himself had 
said that he believed that 
''we (whites) are in Africa for God's purpose. I believe that we 
have an important missionary work to do and I saw the Tomlinson 
Commission Report as part of that work, as part of my Christian 
duty" (Johnson, 1991: 11). 
Muller (1982:251) by contrast, viewed the state's policy with regard to 
L..-___ ...J both urban and rural areas as being 
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"born of political expediency... suggestive of Etzioni' s concept of 
an inauthentic society which provides 'the appearance of 
responsiveness while the underlying condition is alienating' - a 
condi-tion in which persuasion is exercised by the dominant group 
to convince the dominated that their interests are being served". 
Many of the Tomlinson proposals were not implemented, however, 
primarily because Prime Minister Verwoerd rejected the huge financial 
implications of the plan. The policy of the Nationalist Party under 
Verwoerd became one of explicit separate development, ironically a term 
coined by Tomlinson. Legally and professionally, planners had no 
option but to work within this apartheid ideology, and while the policies 
were at times bitterly opposed (the political upheavals of the 1950s 
culminated in the Sharpeville shootings in 1960), there appears to be 
little record of planners voicing their collective or individual professional 
opposition to these policies, which were to constrain and influence their 
professional lives for the next decades. Indeed, Floyd's accounts of 
'Town Planning in South Africa', published at this time and regarded by 
many as the unofficial early history of the profession, openly supported 
the government's ideology, stating that in the complicated work of co-
ordinating the various activities of man, 
"the part played by town planning is that of guiding and controlling 
the siting of various uses. It functions positively to attain a certain 
aim even if some negative means are used and it is both 
administrative and technical in its make up... Control and 
guidance of human relationships and activities are administrative 
matters and town planning is therefore part of the greater function 
of administration" (Aoyd, 1960:7 emphasis added) ... 
''This sound approach on sober lines has resulted in town planning 
being strongly supported by the public generally and by high 
administrative officials in particular" (Aoyd, 1960:9) ... 
"Progress in Town Planning in South Mrica is not retarded by or 
frustrated by our laws, for these permit tremendous, almost 
unbounded scope" (Floyd, 1960:21-22) 
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With fue promUlgation of the Physical Planning and Utilisation of 
Resources Act of 1967, the state's policy regarding the relationship 
between urbanisation, influx control and regional and homeland planning 
shifted slightly. Industrial decentralisation and Betterment policies had 
attempted to lure black labour back into rural homeland areas, but the 
rate of urbanisation had not decreased. The 1967 Act aimed more 
specifically to prevent the establishment of new industries in existing 
urban areas, inter alia through regulating the zoning or rezoning of land 
for industrial purposes. Among others, Glaser (1983) examined the 
impact and consequences of the Act: job creation declined in the major 
urban areas, but did not increase in the homelands - new incentives in 
1968, 1971 and 1975 failed to stimulate industrial development in the 
'border' industry areas, and in consequence, failed to reduce the rate of 
urbanisation. 
The 1967 Act also made provision for the drawing Up of Guide Plans for 
specific areas. These Guide Plans were to allow greater control, at the 
metropolitan scale, over the location of industrial and commercial 
development, as well as the planning of new racially separated residential 
areas in terms of the Group Areas Act. Planning at the metropolitan 
scale was therefore carried out almost exclusively in terms of the Guide 
Plans, which, by the early 1970s, had become an extension of the 'grand 
apartheid' policy of the day. The amendment to the Act in 1975 gave 
statutory status to the Guide Plans, which then became binding on 
planners in both local authorities and the private sector. 
From 1975 onwards, there was a divergence in planning in South Africa 
and two main paths emerged in reaction to the 1976 Soweto riots and 
subsequent country-wide unrest, which focussed world attention on the 
plight of black people living in South Africa: 
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• The state reacted by the imposition of successive states of emergency 
and the launching of a political reform programme, which included 
some changes to its policy on urbanisation. 
• A parallel reaction was seen in the emergence of civic organisations, 
and in the 1980s, the response of progressive planners to these urban 
social movements. The role and profile of non-governmental 
organisations also increased significantly in this period. 
In 1976 the Soweto unrest drew world attention to and gave impetus to 
the substantial urban revolt in black townships across South Africa The 
Cillie Commission of Inquiry into the riots (Cillie, 1980) found that the 
main direct cause of the unrest had been the insistence on the use of 
Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in township schools. But the anger 
of students and the community went much deeper. "The Commission 
stated that the fundamental separate development policies had caused 
frustration and resentment... These policies included black education, 
the homeland system, influx control, the Group Areas Act... Housing 
was a source of major grievance in urban areas" (Morris, 1981:95). The 
protests were against powerlessness, rooted in years of apartheid in all its 
manifestations. 
The government's response, having imposed a state of emergency, was to 
embark on a programme of reform. Changes to planning policies 
included the acceptance of the permanence of black people in urban areas 
(as outlined in the White Paper on Urbanisation). The profession had 
concerned itself primarily with statutory planning in white urban areas, 
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of the Guide Plans, with Structure Plans and Development Plans being 
added to create a hierarchy of statutory planning requirements. However 
most, if not all, the discussions about the creation of new town planning 
L..... ___ -' mechanisms in the early 1980s were made outside the political and 
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At this 1:ime, the debate within the professional institute (the South 
African Institute of Town and Regional Planners, or SAITRP) over the 
appropriateness of the town planning mechanisms to the reform climate 
of the day was limited. At a conference on Planning and the New 
Constitution in 1985, Oakenful stated that "with the social and 
constitut:ional development trends in this country, planning for 
community welfare now has greater priority" (Oakenful, 1985:104), 
adding that the traditional 'physicalist' tools of statutory town planning 
would be unequal to the task of introducing much-needed reforms into 
the town planning profession. However, the institute members refused to 
take a clear stand against apartheid: 
"A resolution, which read that 'apartheid and all its statutory 
manifestations is antithetical to development and our planning 
ethic ... ', was defeated by 93 to 45 votes" (Harrison, 2003:6). 
Opposition to the status quo in the profession had already emerged from 
within the non-governmental (NGO) sector in the country. In the 1960s 
and 1970 s, communities fighting forced removals had turned to legal and 
advocacy NGOs for support. As the sector grew rapidly in the decade 
1984 to 1993 (in part as a result of overseas funding), a number of 
progressive planning organisations were established, largely by 
academics and professionals seeking to provide technical, professional 
and organisational assistance to communities affected by state planning 1. 
1 Many of these NGOs were allied to the United Democratic Front (UDF), a newly formed umbrella 
organization for progressive groups, or to church organisations such as the South African Council of 
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As the government refined its urban policies in the late 1980s, this small 
but energetic group of planners provided the only vocal opposition to 
apartheid planning policies, working to challenge and refute these, and to 
develop alternative policies (some of which were later incorporated into 
the ANC's 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme). 
Harrison noted, however, that government tactics during the states of 
emergency extended to all its opponents, and that "during the mid to late 
1980s ... most of the more liberally inclined planners were intimidated 
into silence" (Harrison, 2003 :6). 
It is perhaps for this reason that voices of resistance within the planning 
profession were seldom heard in formal planning debates. Beauregard 
attended and analysed papers presented at a symposium of the South 
African Planning History Study Group in 1993. He found that the 
dominant style of the planning histories presented was deterministic, with 
planners portrayed "as having had little influence over the content and 
form of the laws under which they toiled" (Beauregard, 1998:190-192). 
He expressed his "shock" at the fact that none of the papers presented 
histories that were sensitive to racial differences in the country, and that 
there was little evidence of professional reflection on planning in the 
apartheid era: 
"Apartheid planning, I am sure, looked quite different from the 
vantage point of blacks or Indians than it did from that of whites, as 
it likely did also from the different positions of men and women as 
these categories crossed racial divisions. Yet most South African 
planning histories and all (except one) that came out of this 
symposium are oblivious to issues of gender ... and make only 
passing reference to racial divisions, although this is unavoidable 
when discussing planning legislation or housing ... 
One would think that the startling transition from a white to an 
'African' government, and the success of the revolutionary 
Churches. These in tum joined forces to form the Kagiso Trust, to act as a channel for all overseas 
development funding for NGOs (Abbott, 1996). 
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movement (in which a number of planners participated), would 
lead the planning profession to reflect seriously and publicly on its 
former complicity" (Beauregard, 1998: 193). 
The profession had indeed begun to reflect on its position. Shortly after 
the government announced a series of dramatic reforms in 1990, 
including the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the 
African National Congress (AN C) and other political organisations, a 
committee of the SAITRP had called for 
"proactive moves in response to impending changes including: 
expanding the role of black and women planners in the leadership 
of the profession; increased access to membership; contact with the 
'emergent powers to be' (including the ANC); and attention to such 
matters as infonnal settlement upgrading, rural development and 
public participation. The report was accepted by the national 
council of the SAITRP without question, only five years after the 
SAIJRP had refused to condemn apartheid" (Harrison, 2003 :7). 
But over the next few years, some within the profession felt that the 
institute was taking too long to implement the recommendations of the 
report, and after the 1992 annual conference of the SAI TRP , the 
Development Planning Association of South Africa (DP ASA) was 
established. This aimed to draw attention to and stimulate debate about 
the profession and its practices, and to challenge the profession about the 
make-up of its membership (Labum-Peart, 1998:173). The eventual 
outcome was the amalgamation of the two bodies into a single new 
professional organisation which would represent all planners in the 
country, the South African Planning Institution (SAPn. 
The climate of reform and the institutional upheavals should have 
stimulated planners around the country to examine their own positions 
and professional practices. Elsewhere, Sanyal, reflecting on the response 
of American planners to the urban riots in that country in the 19608, had 
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found that the unrest there had challenged the traditionally technocratic 
views of planners. It had awakened them to the "depressing reality of 
poverty and social conflict in a country where increasing affluence and 
social consensus were virtually taken for granted". (Sanyal, 1982:3). But 
the same awakening cannot be attributed generally to South African 
planners, however, most of whom continued to work for and within the 
white urban areas. Where their planning was in and for white local, 
provincial or state authorities, they maintained their roles of technocratic 
regulators and administrators. Where they served the interests of 
property owners and developers, they continued to claim an apolitical 
role, contributing to the increasing affluence of that sector of the 
population (of which most fonned a part). 
Legislative and institutional changes had begun in the early 1990s, but it 
was only in the small but significant progressive planning movement that 
changes in the practice of planning were visible. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This very condensed overview of planning in South Africa up to 1994 has focussed on 
the issue of land, of the control of land, and from 1948, of the attempts of the apartheid 
government to institutionalise this control through its own form of technicist social 
engineering. Figure 1 lists the most important laws that were promulgated by the 
government between 1913 and the mid-1980s in its effort to control the occupation of 
land. The impact of this social engineering on planning was inevitable and 
unequivocal: by the mid-1970s, there were two distinct sorts of planning in South 
Africa Muller (1983: 18) stated that planning had 
"two faces, clearly evident in the marked differentiation in ethical approach in 
planning for Blacks and Whites. Planning for the White group has been 
prescriptively permissive, that for the Black sector has assumed a form of 
puppetry played out under the guiding hand of the state". 
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Planners working within white local, provincial and government authorities performed 
regulatory planning tasks, associated with the administration of town planning schemes, 
which applied to white areas. Issues of power were de-emphasised - a legacy of the 
rational planning model and a reflection of the fact that the profession took refuge in 
"professional protocol" (Roch, 1992:209). This type of planning was carried out by the 
bulk of planners in the country, in technical, system-maintaining activities. Those who 
carried out the very political task of drawing up and administering the apartheid Guide 
Plans, regional and homeland policies, and the implementation of the extensive 
legislation outlined above, typified the other type of planner. 
The progressive planning movement had begun in NGOs and some South African 
universities in the late 1970s, when academics and others involved themselves in the 
activities of local civic organisations. This - largely advocacy - work was an 
opportunity to work outside the traditional planning system, but met with single-minded 
opposition from the state. Progressive planners were the only members of the 
profession attempting to respond to the depressing reality of poverty and social conflict 
in South Africa. On the eve of the 1990 reform period, Dan Smit, a prominent member 
of the movement, observed that the separation of white and black areas, and of planning 
for these, was "the prime determinant of the 'apolitical' and 'technicist' view that most 
planners in South Africa hold, so it follows that reintegration may serve to challenge 
conventional dogma, to politicise planning, and perhaps provide opportunities for 
progressive practices" (Smit, 1989:303). 
The 1985 conference of the South African Institute of Town and Regional Planners was 
a significant one, since it became evident that the technocratic consensus that had tied 
professional planners in the country together had been eroded by the political events of 
the decade since the Soweto riots. But it also became clear that the attitudes of the 
profession as a whole had not fundamentally changed: the majority of the delegates 
rejected resolutions opposing apartheid and the state reforms of the time. Subsequently, 
disaffected progressive planners launched an alternative professional planning 
organisation, the DPASA, which ultimately led to a restructuring of the profession in 
South Africa. 
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The Black: Land Act, No. 27, 1913 
The Black: Administration Act, No. 38, 1927, as amended 
The Native Trust and Land Act, No.18, 1936, as amended 
The Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No.25, 1945, as amended 
The Group Areas Act, No.41, 1950, as amended 
The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, No.52, 1951, as amended 
The Blacks (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act, No.67, 1952 
The Blacks Resettlement Act, No.19, 1954 
The Black: Prohibition of Interdicts Act, No.64, 1956 
The Trespass Act, No.6, 1959 
The Promotion of Black Self-Government Act, No.46, 1959 
The Black Laws Amendment Act, No.76, 1963 
The National States Citizenship Act, No.26, 1970, as amended 
The Nati onal States Constitution Act, No.21, 1971, as amended 
The Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulations Act, No.59, 1972 
The Expropriation Act, No.63, 1975 
The Slums Clearance Act, No.76, 1979 
The Laws on Co-operation and Development Amendment Act, No.83, 1982 
Figure 1: Major laws dealing with black land rights and relocation 
(Source: Platzky and Walker, 1985:141) 
Although writing in the American Planning Association Journal in 1990, Brooks' 
question seemed appropriate to the South African situation: "Is it reasonable to think 
that the planning profession might indeed transform itself in a manner that would 
restore its sense of identity and mission, as well as its legitimacy and influence in the 
public realm?" (Brooks 1990:220). It emerged from this study, however, that while the 
reforms of the 1990s in South Africa began the political reintegration of the country, 
many members of the planning profession remained ill-equipped when these reforms 
culminated in the change of government in 1994. 
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3. PLANNING IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1994 
3.1 Introduction 
While a significant minority of planners who worked within the progressive movements 
embraced and supported the sweeping changes that occurred with the change in 
government in 1994, the majority of planners within the formal mainstream of the 
profession appeared to be less well prepared. The profession was made up primarily of 
white, middle class males, most of whom had gained their only experience of planning 
within the apartheid system. The 1994 election manifesto of the African Nationalist 
Congress had been the Reconstruction and Development Programme, which set the tone 
for profound change in the country, in planning policy as well as in the profession for 
the next five years. The manifesto stressed the need to redress past and present 
inequalities, gave priority to reducing poverty and inequality through a revival of 
economic growth, human resource development, and broadly based ownership of assets 
to achieve growth with equity. The momentum of legislative reform·that had begun in 
the 1990s continued, with both the repeal of discriminatory legislation and policy and 
the promulgation of a large number of new Acts. Under these circumstances, the 
profession was forced to change. While many of the planners who worked in 
government departments retained their posts, the political and policy changes brought 
personnel changes across the board, including to the most senior positions. In some 
cases, newly appointed staff in the new government bureaucracy appeared to lack 
experience, and incumbent professionals or consultants were called upon to play a 
supportive role. A selection of policy documents that sought to fundamentally change 
the way that planning and development took place in the country, is outlined below. 
3.2 The Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994) 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was published by the African 
National Congress early in 1994 (ANC, 1994), as it was about to assume the 
responsibilities of government in South Africa. This original, or Base Document, aimed 
to represent an integrated framework for development that was coherent, viable and had 
widespread support, seeking ''to mobilise all our people and our country's resources 
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toward the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial 
and non-sexist future'" CANC, 1994, para. 1. 1. 1). In other words, the RDP was 
formulated not merely as a political manifesto, but as a development framework and 
further, as a programme for the complete reordering of politics, the economy and 
society in the country. 
Six basic principles, linked together, made up the political and economic philosophy of 
the RDP Base Document: "an integrated progranune, based on the people, that provides 
peace and security for all and builds the nation, links reconstruction and development 
and deepens democracy - these are the six basic principles of the RDP" CANC, 1994 
para. 1.3.8): 
• An integrated and sustainable programme - bringing together resources and 
efforts at various levels of government and society; 
• A people-driven process - people were considered to be the most important resource 
and their involvement and empowerment lay at the centre of the RDP; 
• Peace and security for all - "apartheid placed the security forces, police and judicial 
system at the service of its racist ideology. The security forces have been unable to 
stem the tide of violence ... To begin the process of reconstruction and development, 
we must now establish security forces that reflect the national and gender character 
of our country ... " (ANe, 1994 para. 1.3.4); 
• Nation-building - to overcome the massive divisions and inequalities which are the 
legacy of apartheid; 
• Link reconstruction and development - ''the RDP integrates growth, development, 
reconstruction and redistribution into a unified programme. The key to this link is an 
infrastructural programme that will provide access to modem and effective services 
like electricity, water, telecommunications, transport, health, education and training 
for alL." (ANe, 1994 para.1.3.6); and 
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• Democratisation of South Africa - this includes participation in decision making 
and overcoming minority privilege and control in the country. 
The many proposals, strategies and policy programmes of the RDP Base Document 
were grouped into five major policy programmes: 
• Meeting Basic Needs: Poverty was considered to be the single greatest burden of the 
nation, and a direct result of the apartheid system. Attacking poverty and deprivation 
was the apparent first priority of the new government, and special consideration was 
to be given to affirmative action, the role of women, population policy and the lack 
of accurate statistics to monitor poverty. Priority Basic Needs areas were listed as 
job creation; land reform; housing and services; water and sanitation; energy and 
electrification; telecommunications; transport; environment; nutrition; health care; 
social security; and social welfare. 
• Developing Human Resources: Education and training in South Africa were 
historically fragmented along racial and ethnic lines, and reflected the ideology and 
doctrines of apartheid. In addition, there was unequal access to education and 
training, and a lack of democratic control within the system. The RDP set out to 
rectify these inequalities. 
• Building the Economy: This would need to be based on the strengths that existed, in 
order to address serious weaknesses of inequalities in ownership, employment and 
skills. ''Neither the comandist central planning system nor an unfettered free market 
system can provide adequate solutions to the problems confronting (the country). 
Reconstruction and development will be achieved through the leading and enabling 
role of the state, a thriving private sector, and active involvement by all sectors of 
civil society which in combination will lead to sustainable growth" (ANe, 1994 
para.4.2.1 ). 
• Demoeratising the State and Society: The RDP was consciously built on the 
traditions of the 1955 Freedom Charter of the ANC, one of the rallying cries of 
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which was 'the people shall govern'. "Without thoroughgoing democratisation, the 
whole effort to reconstruct and develop will lose momentum ... " (ANe, 1994 para. 
5.2.1). Non-profit and non-governmental organisations were acknowledged and 
commended for the role they had played inter alia in capacity-building and 
development, service delivery, mobilisation and advocacy. In addition, the role of 
civil society was stressed, as was open debate and accessible information. 
• Implementing the RDP: This would require the restructuring and in some cases the 
establishment of effective structures at all levels of government, the co-ordination of 
planning and implementation, and the rationalisation of the complex, racist and 
fragmented structures that existed as a legacy of the past. In addition, implementing 
the RDP would involve the restructuring of the national budget, careful financial 
planning and management, co-ordination of resources and actions, monitoring and 
evaluation of programmes, and management of conflict over limited resources. 
The RDP Base Document was the starting point for the government's White Paper on 
Reconstruction and Development, published in September 1994 (RSA, 1994a). At the 
time, an important inclusion in the White Paper was the concept of the Presidential 
Projects, or Presidential Lead Projects (PLPs), as they became known. President 
Mandela had announced in his State of the Nation Address to Parliament in May 1994 
that a number of Presidential Projects would launch the delivery of the RDP within the 
frrst 100 days of his tenure of office. These Projects were to be identified by the various 
(second tier) Provincial Administrations to conform to the principles and programmes 
of the RDP, and would also need to meet certain criteria, such as high impact on and 
empowerment of the communities they were to serve; economic and political viability; 
job creation; and the provision of basic needs: 
"The PLPs were set up without the community-led demand and planning that will 
in time be required for all government projects. Nevertheless, they are all 
required to follow development objectives: they have to come under community 
control, they have to involve capacity building, and have business plans that show 
how these will be done, what the projects will achieve, and how they will be 
monitored ... " (RSA, I 995c p.18). 
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There were a number of criticisms of the RDP (Rapoo, 1996). In a general sense, the 
new government favoured a highly centralised implementation and decision-making 
structure. This was understandable in the context of dramatic change in 1994, in which 
the government had to deal with the historical problems of inequality as well as the 
integration of South Africa into an increasingly competitive and volatile global 
economy. More specifically, criticisms included the ambiguous definition within the 
RDP of Basic Needs; the conflict between addressing inequality and exclusion on the 
one hand, and the need for economic growth on the other; the lack of clarity on the role 
of second and third tiers of government; and the need for a clear set of goals for 
development. The goals that had been set in the RDP were seen to be too broad, leaving 
the RDP as an aspiration rather than a plan. 
The RDP had been drawn up as a political manifesto by the ANC and 'workshopped' 
extensively around the country. Once elected, the ANC had a mandate to adopt the 
RDP as policy, and it could well be that the new government assumed that the landslide 
victory it enjoyed at the polls meant that there would be consensus regarding its RDP 
programme. Very little provision was made for debate or conflict resolution regarding 
the RDP outside parliament. 
By 1995, a parliamentary standing committee on the RDP listed a wide range of 
problem areas within the RDP, concluding that a new approach to the RDP was needed, 
based on a redefinition of development planning. It proposed the rearticulation of the 
RDP as a long-term process: 
"Instead of the urgent delivery commitments the RDP programmes emphasised in 
the pre-election period and immediately after the election, ... the RDP is to be 
understood as a 25-year step-by-step vision .... " (Rapoo, 1996:28). 
The RDP had provided for the establishment of a number of Task Teams, located in the 
Office of the Minister without Portfolio, who had powers to implement the RDP 
nationally. This Office became known as the RDP Office. In 1995, the Rural 
-
Development Task Team. formulated the Rural Development Strategy, described briefly 
below. The RDP had set out to reduce poverty and inequality through the revival of 
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economic growth, human resource development, and broadly based ownership of assets, 
and to achieve growth with equity. Within two years of the 1994 RDP White Paper, 
however, the government's macro-economic policies were revised, the RDP Office was 
closed and the Task Teams disbanded. Responsibility for the implementation of the 
RDP was devolved to various Government and Provincial Departments (and indeed 
there was competition between departments for the funding that would come with such 
devolved responsibilities (Harrison, 2001», with the Department of Land Affairs being 
delegated responsibility for rural development. 
3.3 The Land Reform Programme (1994) 
The RDP had stated that land reform was the central and driving force of a rural 
development programme and had identified three key elements of a land reform 
programme as being: the restitution of land to victims of forced removal; the 
redistribution of land to landless people; and tenure reform that would provide security 
of tenure to all South Africans. While the focus of this research was on land restitution, 
land redistribution and land tenure are briefly outlined below. 
3.3.1 Land Restitution 
Some 3.5 million people and their descendants in both urban and rural areas were 
victims of racially based dispossessions and forced removals during the years of 
apartheid (see Map 3). In urban areas, people were moved in terms of the Group Areas 
Act or the Urban Areas Act. In rural areas, removals occurred in terms of the Black 
Land Act No. 27 of 1913, the Development Trust and Land Act No. 18 of 1936 and the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act No. 52 of 1951, among others (see Figure 1). 
After the elections of 1994, one of the first major pieces of legislation passed by South 
Africa's new interim government was the Restitution of Land Rights Act (RSA 1994b), 
which effectively repealed all land-related discriminatory legislation of the past. In the 
lead-up to the change of government, the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights 
had taken over the functions of the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation (ACLA), 
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the body that had initially been established in terms of the Abolition of Racially based 
Land Measures Act 108 of 1991 to deal with restitution in relation to State land. 
The Restitution of Land Rights Act provided for the establishment of two instruments 
for the land restitution process, The Land Claims Court and The Land Claims 
Commission. The Land Claims Court dealt with all cases arising from the actions of the 
state since the enactment of the Natives Land Act of 1913 (Christopher, 1995), while 
The Land Claims Commission's remit was to investigate, mediate and settle land claim 
disputes. Both the Land Claims Court and the Land Claims Commission played a role 
in the case studies that formed part of this research. 
_ Removal 
D Homelands 1910 
o 100 200km 
, . 
Map 3: Forced removals - compiled from reports of the Surplus 
People's Project 
(Source: Christopher, 1994) 
32 
3.3.2 Land Redistribution 
The programme of land redistribution aimed to assist people that had been denied 
access to land in the past, especially the poor, new entrants to agriculture, farm workers, 
labour tenants and women, providing them with enough land to support their needs. 
The government planned to redistribute some 30% of the country's agricultural land 
over a 15 year period" thereby substantially increasing black land ownership. It 
envisaged that land redistribution would also contribute to economic development in 
rural areas through the enhancement of household income security, improvement of 
nutrition and provision of employment. 
3.3.3 Tenure Reform 
Through land tenure reform, the government aimed to restore and ensure equality in the 
law and give secure rights to all South Africans. A rights-based approach was favoured, 
recognising pre-existing rights and interests, which would be used as the basis for 
clarifying and formalising land rights. A framework of a variety of tenure forms was 
created, including communal, group and individual tenure forms. 
The Department of Land Affairs launched the Land Reform Pilot Programme (LRPP) in 
1994 to 'kick-start' land redistribution and as a means to launch a long-term programme 
of sustainable land reform. A review published at the end of the LRPP's two-year pilot 
period conceded that there had been considerable delays in the implementation of land 
reform, that there were 6'too many players and a pervasive lack of clarity about lines of 
responsibility, and decisions [were] too centralised" (DLA, 1996: v). Institutional 
capacity to implement land reform at the local level needed to be built up as a matter of 
urgency. It further concluded that the two-year pilot programme should be closed on 
schedule and that the management of the pilot projects should move to the various 
Provincial Land Affairs offices, which would appoint Land Reform Steering 
Committees to take forward land reform in each Province. 
This effectively meant that new relationships had to be forged and ways of working 
established between on the one hand, communities, non-governmental organisations and 
development practitioners that were working with the pilot projects (which had already 
been started and were at various stages of planning and implementation in both urban 
and rural areas), and Provincial officials and Steering Committees on the other. This 
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was despite the fact that the review had recognised the problem of institutional capacity 
for implementation at the local level. These problems were to become evident in the 
case study communities described below. Nevertheless, the Land Reform Programme 
represented a major commitment on the part of the new government to redress past 
discriminatory practices concerning land in both rural and urban areas, and as a 
cornerstone of the RDP, it formed the context for subsequent legislation and policy that 
was formulated over the next few years, some of which are outlined below. 
3.4 The policy of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (1996) 
In mid-1996, the government modified the RDP and adopted the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy for development. While this represented a strategic 
shift in the implementation of the RDP (from its location in a specialised programme 
office within government - the RDP Office - to a function of other government and 
provincial departments) it was more significantly a shift in the government's macro-
economic policy framework. GEAR was essentially a neo-liberal economic strategy, 
emphasising fiscal discipline and job creation, and was formulated in line with strong 
international pressure and consensus on the efficiency of a market-driven system. Some 
commentators saw GEAR as an alternative to the more welfarist RDP and as an 
abandonment of 'people-driven' reconstruction and development, but South Africa's 
Finance Minister at the time was quoted as saying that GEAR 
"was never meant to be an alternative to the RDP. It cannot in any way displace 
the vast array of very important objects of social transformation; but in the way 
the RDP was formulated, perhaps insufficient attention was paid to the macro-
economic environment" (Matume, 1998: 1). 
One of the major criticisms of the strategy of GEAR was that when it was adopted, it 
did not go through public hearings and debate as had been the case with the RDP, and 
over five years later, many South Africans had yet to grasp the new realities that GEAR 
posed and continued to refer to the RDP as the government's main strategy for 
development. 
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3.5 Integrated Development Planning (1996) 
In 1996, the Local Government Transition Amendment Act was passed. This was a 
significant element in the restructuring of local government in the country, at a time 
when the government was switching its policy from RDP to GEAR, and amendments to 
the constitution gave a developmental mandate to local government (Harrison, 2001). 
Although primarily focussed on restructuring in urban areas, the Act introduced an 
important planning concept to planners in South Africa: Integrated Development 
Planning (lOP). IDP was seen as a tool for integration and in line with GEAR policies. 
It set out a participatory planning process through which local governments 
(municipalities) were required to prepare a 5-year strategic plan. In contrast to 
apartheid planning in which government planners had been able to make decisions with 
little or no consultation with beneficiaries, lOP was intended to ensure that communities 
would be able to arrive at development decisions through systematic and strategic 
consultation. As such, it was an application of some of the democratic principles of the 
RDP specifica1ly to the planning process. A manual prepared for local government 
officials stated: 
"The Integrated Development Planning process presents a fundamental shift from 
a technically-based approach to a participatory planning process. Representative 
participation is an essential element of a democratic planning process. The 
development priorities for the area need to be set with the full participation of all 
the stakeholders in the area. The planning process acknowledges the right of 
people to take responsibility for their own futures and to actively participate in the 
realisation of the vision for their area ... " (Dept. Local Government, undated). 
However, while participation in IDP became a constitutional and legislative 
requirement, detailed mechanisms for this were not set out. Guidelines for lOPs merely 
stated that plans drawn up. in terms of lOP would have to take cognizance of the limited 
capacity that existed in many communities to implement development projects. Despite 
this shortcoming, Integrated Development Planning was generally welcomed by the 
professional planning fraternity and quickly became part of the mainstream of South 
African planning. In his inaugural address at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Philip Harrison stated: 
"Integrated Development Planning is a real and positive contribution to the 
transformation of local government in South Africa .... [However] lOPs still fall 
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far short of a meaningful engagement with the multiple rationalities that are 
shaping our cities, towns and rural areas. ... Many IDPs do little more than 
replicate existing patterns of spatial development rooted in the colonial and 
apartheid eras. They don't engage creatively with ways to shift patterns by 
engaging in an activist sense with investment decisions, and with the ways in 
which people are constructing their own spaces. Participation in IDP process is 
still largely understood in a traditional way ... " (Harrison, 2002:9-10) 
3.6 Changes to the Rural Development Strategy since 1994 
3.6.1 The Rural Development Strategy (1995) 
The 1995 Rural Development Strategy (RDS) outlined the new government's vision for 
the next 25 years in South Africa's rural areas. A number of proposals were made by 
the RDP Office's Rural Development Task Team, including those for building local 
government in rural areas. In the foreword to the strategy, President Mandela wrote 
that: 
"Rural people, and rural women in particular, bear the largest burden of poverty in 
South Africa. If we can change the inequalities and inefficiencies of the past, 
rural areas can become productive and sustainable. Building local government in 
rural areas is the ftrst step in this direction. The Government of National Unity is 
committed to an integrated rural development strategy which aims to eliminate 
poverty and create full employment by the year 2020. Rural people must be at the 
heart of this strategy'!> (RSA 199580 foreword). 
The RDS therefore attempted to set out the mechanisms by which rural people and their 
representatives on rural District Councils and Local Councils might take charge of the 
development processes in their own areas. The concept of participation and democracy 
in development was fundamental to the RDS: rural development had been recognised 
as one of the main objectives of the RDP, and the RDS stressed the need for 
accountability in spending public funds, and for rural people to set the agenda for 
development. 
It envisaged that the main work of local government - of planning, providing services, 
prioritising and implementing infrastructural development, and working with other 
stakeholders to evaluate and plan local economic development - would be carried out 
"at the primary local government level, as the necessary capacity was developed". The 
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strategy recognised that there was a danger in assuming that local structures were 
representative or even competent, that development programmes would have to 
"struggle with the lack of capacity at provincial level", and that the RDP approach 
would require major changes in systems and national departments. 
Of particular relevance to this study was the fact that the RDS anticipated that lessons 
would be learned from rural Presidential Lead Projects (PLPs), since these were 
required to follow development objectives and RDP principles by coming under 
community control. The PLPs were meant to be forging new ways of building local 
community capacity and implementing projects according to a new system of business 
planning. These proposals were not always implemented: of the two PLPs that formed 
the case studies in this research, only one (Schmidtsdrift) followed the guidelines by 
preparing a formal business plan in consultation with the local community. In the 
event, this business plan (and the physical planning proposals accompanying it) was 
subsequently disregarded by the Provincial government and a new plan was drawn up 
by government appointed consultants, with little evidence of community participation 
having been carried out (see below, chapter 7). 
Many of the policies outlined in the Rural Development Strategy were subsumed by the 
policies of Integrated Development Planning (see above) that came into being in 1996: 
District and Local Councils were integrated into the wider planning process, and the 
concept of participation, fundamental to the RDS, took on a less central role in the IDP. 
However the idea that local government would act as agents for delivery of 
development remained. 
3.6.2 Communal Property Association Act (1996) 
The Communal Property Association Act (28 of 1996) formed part of the ongoing land 
reform changes. It was intended to be an early land tenure reform law that would be 
followed by more comprehensive tenure legislation, the Land Rights Bill of 1998. In 
the event, the promUlgation of that Bill was postponed and it was subsequently revised, 
eventually re-emerging as the Communal Land Rights Bill of 2003 (Cousins and 
Hornby, 2(03). 
The Communal Property Association Act aimed 
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"to enable ... disadvantaged communities to ... establish appropriate legal 
institutions through which they may acquire, hold and manage property in 
common" (RSA 1996b). 
Although a land tenure reform, this was important to many of the land restitution cases, 
such as those examined in this study, as it sought to enable groups of people to acquire 
land. In terms of the Act, CPAs - effectively volunteer private land administration 
committees - could be established to act on behalf of communities, and thereby 
"double up as surrogate local authorities ... in order to acquire, hold, determine 
land use, zone and manage property on a basis agreed to by members of the 
community in terms of community rules" (Williams, 2003:4). 
One of the pre-requisites for the formation of Communal Property Associations (CPAs) 
was thus the existence of a group or community that wished to hold land or property in 
common, and "a group of persons, which wishes to have its rights to or in particular 
property determined by shared rules under a written constitution" (RSA 1996b). 
The Act required that the constitution of the CPA be consistent with the following 
principles: 
• Fair and inclusive decision-making processes 
• Equality of membership 
• Democratic processes 
• Fair access to the property of the CPA 
• Accountability and transparency 
In terms of the Act, one of the first things that a CPA had to do was to draw up a 
membership register. This not only established those who had a right to occupy and use 
the land. but crucially, a membership register would form the basis for the application 
for state subsidies and Settlement Grants to which the community would be entitled. 
Ultimately, CPAs were expected to perform many of the administration functions of 
local government. but with little extended support from the state (Cousins and Hornby. 
2(03). while service provision. planning. township establishment and rates collection 
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remained the responsibility of the formal local government structures, the 
municipalities. 
Over 500 CPAs were established in South Africa by 2003, but many of them soon 
became dysfunctional. 
"Constitutions were poorly drafted and misunderstood by members, rights for 
individual members were poorly defined, and infighting has resulted. Members 
have often retained strong ties to their original communities, rather than seeing 
themselves as a new social entity. In some cases traditional leaders have 
contested the authority of elected trustees, and in others elites have captured the 
benefits of ownership. There are notable exceptions of course, but overall the 
experience has been disillusioning for many in the land reform sector" (Cousins 
and Hornby, 2002:2). 
3.6.3 The Rural Development Framework (1997) 
The 1997 Rural Development Framework (RDF) was the outcome of several rounds of 
consultation which had followed the publication of the 1995 Rural Development 
Strategy, the subsequent Green Paper, and the shift in government macro-economic 
policy to one of GEAR and the adoption of Integrated Development Planning. The 
foreword stated that: 
"This document is written from the perspective that rural development is the 
business of everyone in rural areas. It is the business of rural people, and they must 
set the agenda. It is the government's role to support rural people in their 
development efforts .... " (RSA 1997b, para 1.1). 
The Rural Development Framework sought to contribute to GEAR by proposing a 
number of anti-poverty measures for rural areas. However, in keeping with the 
government's stance that it had not abandoned the RDP, the RDF also set out policy 
principles that emphasised the development and upgrading of rural household 
infrastructure as part of a Basic Needs programme. From a planning point of view, 
these infrastructure programmes would need to be compatible with Land Development 
Objectives (LDOs)2. Grants would be available from the government's Department of 
2 In the context of the many challenges facing government planners in the new South Africa. the 
Development Facilitation Act (67 of 1995) had been promulgated to 'fast-track' development projects. 
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Land Affairs to prepare LDOs. However, in order to benefit from the increasing array 
of subsidies and grants proposed by the government, rural communities would need to 
be organised: the RDF introduced facilitation funds that would be made available to 
assist groups to organise themselves into Communal Property Associations. 
The limited capacity of rural communities to benefit from the many policies of the post-
apartheid government was therefore openly recognised. The RDF acknowledged that 
most Local Councils would not have the resources to engage in infrastructure 
development, operation and management, and would require support in the interim from 
Provincial and / or National government (this was to be illustrated in both case studies). 
In fact, the RDF acknowledged that in most rural areas, no institutions of local 
government even existed, apart from traditional structures. This apparent discounting of 
the role played by and relevance of traditional structures was to cause controversy for 
the government. While not explicitly rejecting the authority and validity of these as 
structures through which rural communities had had a voice in the past, implicit in the 
RDF view was that for implementation, operation and management of infrastructure 
development projects, formal local government structures would have to be established 
in rural areas, a process that would take some time. As will be illustrated in both of the 
case studies, conflict and confusion in varying degrees resulted from the imposition of 
these structures on the communities. 
The RDF therefore sought ways of increasing rural local community capacity to plan 
and assemble the essential information for planning. monitoring and evaluating both the 
process and the progress of development. The post-1994 Constitution had shifted the 
responsibility for rural development from National and Provincial to Local Government 
levels, and there was an urgent need to build the planning capacity at least at District 
Council level (the level immediately below Provincial government). However. it 
appears that the RDF did not address the ways in which existing structures and 
It set out to introduce "extraordinary measures to facilitate and speed up the implementation of 
reconstruction and development programmes and projects in relation to land, and in so doing to lay 
down general principles governing land development" (RSA, 1995a). Throughout the country, local 
authorities were required to set out a "development vision" for their area, and to consult with local 
stakeholders in the preparation of Local Development Objectives (LOOs). These would provide the 
basis of integrated and co-ordinated planning and development. In their tum, LDOs would also 
"satisfy most of the requirements of the Integrated Development Plans provided for in section 100(6) 
of the Local Government Transition Act (97 of 1996). Once LDOs have been set for a local 
government body, all decisions and policies, by all government bodies, must be consistent with them" 
(RSA 1997a para 6.4.2.g) 
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organisations might be incorporated into the process of planning at the local level, or of 
the potential role that such organisations might make towards building the capacity for 
local government in rural areas. Indeed, one of the case studies (Mogopa, see section 6 
below) illustrates the tensions that arose between existing organisations and the new 
structures imposed after 1997. 
The RDF's primary focus was on rural infrastructure, public administration and local 
government, although it also stressed the need for the co-ordination of rural 
development in the country. However, in the event, the Framework was not confirmed 
as the government's strategy for rural development. This meant that a wide range of 
initiatives for rural development and local capacity building that emerged from different 
government departments, non-governmental organisations and aid agencies, while each 
attempting in its own way to address important elements of rural development, 
remained unco-ordinated activities. 
3.6.4 . Summary 
The initial rural strategy for South Africa, the Land Reform Programme, was grounded 
within the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), but adapted with 
the shift in policy to Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). This included 
revisions to policies on land redistribution and agriculture, and the publication of the 
RDF discussion document. The result was that the implementation of rural 
development took place in terms of the policies outlined above, as well as a number of 
Acts, including: 
• Abolition of Racially-based Land Measures Act, 108 of 1991 
• Restitution of Land Rights Act, 22 of 1994 
• Development Facilitation Act, 67 of 1995 
• The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 
• The Local Government Transition Act, Second Amendment Act, 97 of 1996 
(Integrated Development Planning) 
Each Province also had its own set of policies and regulations, all of which led to some 
confusion and a lack of co-ordination of development programmes. Some of the 
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problems of the five-year period following the change of government were highlighted 
in later official documents as: problems of communication; complaints that projects did 
not reflect community priorities; were not well maintained; were characterized by poor 
consultation, weak participation, poor data and planning; weak institutional and 
regulatory mechanisms; slow delivery; and weak sustainability. "More than a few 
projects were judged to be white elephants" (RSA 2000: 15). 
It appears that in spite of the increasing number of initiatives designed to facilitate the 
participation of local people in development decision-making, despite the mushrooming 
of work undertaken by non-governmental organisations at this time, and despite the 
rhetoric of government departments regarding capacity building for local government 
and development, there was in reality no significant increase in participation by rural 
communities in the planning process. Where Communal Property Associations were 
established to facilitate such participation, their relationship with local government 
structures and the planning process was at best confusing, at worst, an example of 
conflicting rationalities. In fact, it could be argued that 'more' participation, in the 
sense of an increase in awareness of the need for democracy in planning and an increase 
in the number of structures and initiatives set up for this purpose, may have led to 'less' 
participation, in the sense of the real impact that such structures and such participation 
appeared to have had. Many of the expectations for both development and participation 
were not met; many of the protocols for participation appeared to be empty rituals, as 
real power to influence the outcome of planning remained in the hands of bureaucrats 
and professional consultants. 
The government was committed to decentralisation and democracy, but by 1999, five 
years after the end of apartheid and after the reconfiguration of former homeland and 
provincial boundaries, local government - especially in rural areas - was still evolving. 
While Provincial line ministries were given delegated responsibility to implement 
development projects, staff in offices at district level often lacked experience in co-
ordinating the initiatives of the various ministries, as well as the authority to shift 
resources to reflect local priorities. This meant that in many cases, 
"decisions about what and where to build infrastructure (e.g., where to place a tap, 
which road to surface) were in practice often taken by technical consultants who 
mayor may not have involved local communities in the discussion" (RSA 
2000:16). 
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The new government was under pressure from its constituencies to deliver on its RDP 
promises, but also under pressure in terms of its GEAR policies (and commitments to 
the international community) to be as efficient as possible. In the new South Africa, 
planners and other public service professionals were expected to involve communities 
in defIning development problems and priorities, and there was perhaps 
"an unspoken and ... heroic assumption ... that professionals [would] know what 
to do and how to converse once they convene citizens to tackle such challenging 
tasks" (de Souza Briggs, 1998:3, emphasis added). 
Many officials in local government offices lacked training and experience in working 
with communities. This was recognised in 2000, after the second local government 
elections had taken place in the country, and a capacity building and training 
programme for local government officials was introduced (Harrison, 2001). 
3.7 Conclusion 
This brief outline has attempted to illustrate that while prior to 1994, planners in South 
Africa performed the regulatory, technicist tasks associated with the administration of 
the government's apartheid policies, after 1994 they found themselves working in a 
context of dramatic and fundamental change and even of overt conflicting rationalities 
(Watson, 2003). Planners and developinent practitioners were required to adapt not 
only to the post-apartheid restructuring of government at all levels, but also to new 
political, social, economic and ideological agendas. In addition, there were wide-
ranging and continuing changes of policy as the country adapted to its democratic status 
and the challenges of reintegration into the world economy. Most of these policies were 
set in the context of the RDP, which, after five years, was widely perceived as having 
failed in meeting its initial ambitious welfarist ideals. Land restitution, for example, fell 
far behind schedule: nearly 30,000 claims had been made by the end of 1998, yet only 
about 25 had been resolved, and the goal of redistributing 30 percent of agricultural land 
within five years was reduced to an internal target of 6 per cent (Bond, 2000). 
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Not everyone believed that it was the RDP that had failed. Patrick Bond, examining the 
transition of South Africa's policies since 1994, stated: 
"The RDP - contradiction-ridden as it was - did not 'fail', as conventional 
wisdom would have it: instead, its progressive sections simply were not adopted 
as government policy, and indeed were actually contradicted in large measure, 
beginning with the RDP White Paper and continuing through all the major 
intersectoral policy documents, as well as through most of the new government's 
social policies" (Bond" 2000:89-90). 
Bond went on to illustrate how the RDP had been "fatally undermined by timid 
politicians, hostile bureaucrats and unreliable private sector partners", the RDP's 
moniker soon becoming that of "Rumours, Dreams and Promises". 
After the second general election in 1999, newly-elected President Mbeki renewed the 
government's commitment to rural development by making it one of his six presidential 
initiatives. The official view of the initial five years of rural development was that the 
process needed to be more integrated, and the solution would be achieved through the 
implementation of Integrated Development Planning. resulting in co-ordination of the 
multiple activities of planning at the local level. To achieve this, a major restructuring 
of local government took place, including the redrawing of boundaries to integrate rural 
and urban areas into new local government (municipal) structures (Harrison, 2001). 
In practice, however, and in spite of considerable improvements in some areas, a lack of 
institutional and staff capacity at the local level persisted: 
"The fIrst round of IDPs was prepared in a very difficult context; the newly-
elected councils were inexperienced in matters relating to planning, and 
governance more generally; a confusing array of demands was placed on 
municipalities by national and provincial government; and the resources to 
implement IDPs were very limited (Harrison, 2001: 15). 
The result was that much of the planning work continued to be carried out by planning 
consultants (Harrison, 2001), most of them white, male and urban-based, and 
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participation in planning by those living in rural areas was neither fully integrated into 
the process, nor co-ordinated. 
The next chapter will examine the concept of participation in greater detail. It has been 
a subject in planning literature for many years, and a number of theories have been 
postulated about the nature of participation in planning, and a range of techniques and 
methods suggested for the implementation of participatory approaches. While most of 
these were written within an Anglo / American context, some have attempted to make 
adaptations appropriate to contexts such as those faced by planners in rural South 
Africa. 
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4. PARTICIPATION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE LITERATURE 
4.1 Historical Background 
The right to participation by all in planning might have been something of a novelty in 
South Africa, but in international planning literature, it was not. Much had been written 
on the subject over many years, yet for all that had appeared in the literature, one author 
concluded that "although it has been on top of the agenda for 20 years, it is still far from 
clear what community participation is, how it comes about, and what it is actually for" 
(Dudley, 1993 :8). Similarly, in the field of rural development, participation had been 
described as ''the single most-written-about issue" (Chaufan 1983:9). 
Colonial administrators had advocated participatory techniques as early as the 1920s 
and 1930s (Hardiman 1986:54), but the concept rose to greater prominence from the 
1960s. At that time, demands for the democratisation of the planning process followed 
the abuses of urban renewal and disregard for constitutional civil rights in the United 
States of America (Muller, 1992), while in the United Kingdom, the Planning Advisory 
Group (1965) produced its report which called for greater community involvement in 
planning. 
Writers such as Godschalk and Mills (1966), Bolan (1967), Burke (1968) and Broady 
(1969) had begun the discussion about strategies for, levels of and approaches to citizen 
. participation in planning, while Arnstein's (1969) article remains one of the most 
quoted, and was a significant milestone in the debate. Pateman (1970) and Fagence 
(1977) explored more deeply the concepts of democracy and its implications for the 
planning process at that time, an exploration that was revived in the 1990s, inter alia by 
Clark (1991). Fagence's view (1977:3) regarding participation that "possibly nothing in 
urban and regional planning has previously been the subject of such contention, 
confusion and conflict" is still of some relevance today. 
The early concern of the above-mentioned authors with citizen participation in planning 
processes was, according to Muller (1992) somewhat paradoxical. for it was in the 
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1960s that the modernist planning model was being refined, a model which in a 
positivist tradition favoured the technical expertise of the planner. Planning theory was 
firmly rooted in rationalism as espoused by Meyerson and Banfield (1955): 'good 
planning' was conceived as being 'rational decision-making'. According to this 
modernist tradition, the city was regarded as an object to be managed efficiently and 
rationally by experts, a system of inter-related social and economic variables extending 
over space (Friedmann, 1965 in Muller 1992:22); control of expansion through its 
suburbs was important; as was the redevelopment of slums, the building of new towns 
and the establishment of green belts. Lindblom (1959) used the term 'rational-
comprehensive' to describe the modernist model adopted by planners at this time, a 
model that attempted to apply logical positivism to society and to the planning process, 
and paid little attention to 'public participation'. (In South Africa, the positivist 
approach appears to have been taken by apartheid policy makers to an extreme as they 
sought to control and impose their own form of social engineering through planning 
policies). However, Lindblom was also one of the first to criticise the model, 
highlighting its inadequacies and instead proposing an alternative decision-making 
method of successive limited comparisons, or 'disjointed incrementalism' . 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, governments in the West sought to deregulate, 
deconcentrate and decentralise their activities in the post-Fordist, post-modem era 
(Goodchild, 1990). In this environment of change, decision-makers attempted to meet 
society's conflicts and contradictions with flexibility, and planning theorists began to 
examine the implications of post-modernism for the planning profession (Dear, 1986; 
Beamegard, 1989; Moore Milroy, 1991; Harper and Stein, 1995). The city came to be 
acknowledged as a place of social diversity and pluralism; regeneration through a focus 
on local areas was encouraged; and mixed land use was accepted as a theme in urban 
design. Some authors began to reject the rational-comprehensive model because of its 
perceived inability to recognise and accommodate socio-political reality. Forester 
(1980, 1985, 1989) emphasised the importance of communication in planning, using 
critical theory to focus on the practicalities of human action and political processes. His 
was a reflective theory that posed epistemological challenges, and which struck a chord 
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with those who were concerned with democratic processes in planning. Carmen (1989), 
for example saw communication in planning as an important bridge building exercise in 
these democratic processes, and participation not as something that could be created 
from the outside, but as being based on people's right to decide for themselves. 
Communication was also the theme in a series of papers by Patsy Healey who put 
forward her ideas on a communicative tum in planning theory and on consensus 
building (Healey, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). Although made some 25 to 30 years later, her 
ideas echoed those made decades earlier by Godschalk and Mills (1966) and Fagence 
(1977) regarding the need for participation. These authors, too, had conceived of 
participation as a collaborative exercise, "a process in which there is a genuine 
interchange between citizens and planners .... a decision-forming partnership" (Fagence, 
1977:4). 
4.2 Participation in the 1990s: an epistemological turn 
The 1990s therefore saw a reawakening and a relook at participation in planning as a 
means to effective democratic development, and a move ''towards a more inclusionary 
form of planning" (Hillier and van Looij, 1997:8). This reawakening was brought on in 
part by the recognition of massive problems of world poverty and environmental 
sustainability highlighted by the Rio Summit in 1992, and the failure of mainstream 
models of economic development The 1990s had seemed to be a time when 
"history is racing forward. A truly global economy is in the making. New 
technologies are coming on stream, erasing time and distance. Old agrarian 
economies in Southeast Asia are industrializing, while old industrial regions in 
Eastern Europe and elsewhere are scrambling to modernize and link up with the 
new globalism. With the ... break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
an era of empires is drawing to a close. Central planning and bureaucratic 
direction are yielding to more flexible, decentralized, fme-boned structures of 
decision-making. Universalist epistemologies are being undermined by a 
'postmodern' scepticism about grand theories and supposedly immutable 
structures. Above all, civil society has been stirred to action" (Friedmann, 
1992:vii). 
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This focus on democratisation and the emphasis on civil society and local communities 
led authors to examine the rise of non-governmental and voluntary organisations as 
representative bodies and agents of development (Clark, 1991); and empowerment as an 
alternative approach to development (Friedmann, 1992; Abbott, 1996). In parallel with 
this, a number of authors explored feminist and gender issues, opening up debates about 
the effect of planning on different groups within society. (Beall et ai, 1989; Brydon and 
Chant, 1989; Sandercock and Forsyth, 1992, 1992a; Moser, 1993). 
There were therefore a number of constituencies that one could expect to pay attention 
to the topic of participation and its relationship to development. First there were 
planning theorists, who focused on the way in which participation by communities 
affected and was affected by the planning process. Second, and of special interest to 
this study, there were planners and development practitioners working in the field of 
development planning, who focused on practical ways of including marginalised people 
in the processes of development. This group included the growing number of authors 
who wrote about gender and ethnic and minority group issues in planning. Authors 
from each of these constituencies shared a common concern about people who were or 
appeared to be excluded from decision-making processes that affected their lives. They 
shared this concern with a third group, social theorists and authors in planning-related 
fields who had written extensively on the subject of poverty and social exclusion and 
the importance of citizenship and democratic processes in their fields. This common 
concern about social exclusion led members of these constituencies to explore the range 
of possibilities to redress this, and a common theme of the opening up of decision-
making processes and the provision of choices for people emerged: 
"Taking people seriously, taking their knowledge and wisdom ... seriously and 
accepting their choices is entirely different from wanting to involve people 
because such involvement will make them more easily 'swallow' programmes 
designed to 'produce change' ... in their lives" (Carmen 1989:269). 
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Despite the emergence of this theme, however, there was limited evidence in the 
literature of work that had been carried out specifically to demystify local decision-
making traditions and processes, and encourage active citizenship on the part of those 
who had traditionally been excluded. The exception came in the late 1990s through a 
number of authors who urged planners and policy makers to recognise the limitations of 
the modernist model, to take an approach that acknowledged differences between 
groups, and actively to seek to bridge the gaps created by modernist planning. Among 
these authors was Sandercock (1998a; 1998b; 2003), who described modernist planning 
thus: 
"In ... modernist portraits of planning, the hero, Planning, has no fatal flaws. 
If battles are sometimes, or even often, lost, it is not the fault of the hero but 
of the evil world in which 'he' must operate. Common to these mainstream 
histories are the following characteristics. The role of planning and of 
planners is unproblematic. It is assumed that we know and agree on what 
planning is and who is and is not a planner. It is assumed that planning is a 
'good thing' - a progressive practice - and that its opponents are reactionary, 
irrational, or just plain greedy. It is assumed that planners know or can divine 
'the public interest' and possess an expertise that ought to prevail (in a 
rational society) over politics. It is taken for granted that planners have 
agency - that what they do and think has autonomy and power. It is seen as 
natural and right that planning should be 'solution-driven'.... There is no 
scrutiny of the ideology, class, gender, or ethnic effects of their work. The 
rise of the profession is, simply, a cause for celebration rather than for critical 
scrutiny. There is little soul searching about planning's failures. In other 
words, we are squarely in the modernist tradition - a tradition that equates 
planning with progress:.... not just in terms of subject matter but also in terms 
of historical method." (Sandercock, 1998a:4) 
While she was not describing the South African case, Sandercock's description of the 
modernist portrayal of planning nonetheless could be applied to that context. In South 
Africa prior to 1994, planning historians saw their subject as the profession and the 
professionals, sometimes the agencies in which they worked, but seldom the 
communities in which they mayor may not have worked. 'Planning' was something 
done by and through the state, "a project of state-driven futures, at the expense of that 
whole realm of community-driven and community-based planning (sometimes in 
opposition to the state) which arguably has a significantly longer history than that of the 
profession" (Sandercock, 1998a:7). 
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Sandercock urged planners and policy makers to tum their backs on "the crumbling 
pillars of modernist planning" and advance a "progressive planning practice in the 21 SI 
century, based on the insights of feminist, post-modem and postcolonial thinking" 
(Sandercock, 2003:2). One of the tools for achieving this was to study the histories of 
people who had been planned for, who had been excluded from the modernist planning 
process, and to make visible the planning stories that those in power had kept from 
view. She characterised planning that took place in opposition to the modernist status 
quo as 'insurgent planning', with the study of insurgent planning histories defined as 
"a study of the capacities of ordinary people to plan on their own behalf, in spite 
of, or perhaps because of the forces of exclusion, discrimination, and 
marginalization that characterised professional planning practice and urban 
politics for most of this century" (Sandercock, 1998: 10). 
A number of authors have explored the ways in which epistemological differences 
might shape participation in planning. They argued that planners should search for 
common ground on the one hand, while on the other hand also facilitate the articulation 
of differences between groups. The debates in the literature have included contributions 
from those who have considered the issue of power in planning; institutional structures; 
and communication (de Souza Briggs, 1998; Forester, 1992, 1999; Healey, 1992, 
1996b, 1999; Innes, 1995). Others documented cases of paternalistic good intentions 
that have gone awry (Porter et al, 1991; Umemoto, 2(01), often because planners 
neglected the task of examining culture and power in communication and planning, 
while more recently, Watson (2002, 2003) has drawn attention to the deep differences 
that can emerge in planning contexts, resulting in a real clash of rationalities. 
Karen Umemoto gave particular attention to epistemological issues in planning. In her 
view, planners entering a community different from their own needed to be sensitive to 
the fact that they were entering "a cultural setting at a particular historic moment". 
Their actions were likely to be interpreted by the community, based on what had gone 
before, and if the planner was to understand the present planning context, he or she 
would have to gain insight into the past 
"For communities that have faced oppressive or discriminatory treatment and feel 
they have done so due to their racial or ethnic identification, the memory of past 
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experiences with outside institutions is often saddled with ambivalence toward 
those whom they identify with the dominating group" (Umemoto, 2001:21). 
Planning has not always taken communities seriously. This was particularly the case 
for black people in South African planning in the past, where planning was something 
that was done 'to' them, and was seen as a tool for the white minority and apartheid 
policies (chapter 2). In terms of Umemoto's multicultural planning, such communities 
would need to be convinced that the planner placed value on their past experiences and 
on their perspectives, and the planner would need to establish and build trust between 
himself (or herself) and the community. 
In similar vein, communicative planning (Forrester, 1989; Healey, 1996a, 1996b, 1997) 
required that planners not only recognised and accepted that differences existed between 
groups, historically and culturally, but also that these were differences in systems of 
meaning and interpretation as much as they were differences in economic and social 
positions. Healey encouraged planners to approach their work in multi-cultural contexts 
with a reflective expectation of mutual learning through communication. 
But some questioned the communicative approach to planning as an idealised approach 
and one best suited to 'northern' or Anglo / American planning policy making contexts. 
Abram, for example, examined the communicative approach from the perspective of the 
institutional context in which planning occurs. By 'institutional context' she meant both 
"the thought-world occupied by those in the planning profession, and... the 
collection of policies. procedures, and practices that make up what is commonly 
known as 'the planning system'" (Abram, 2000:353). 
As a 'thought-world'. planning was about the promotion of order over disorder. and this 
was maintained through 'the planning system', which mayor may not include 
mechanisms for participatory planning such as those envisaged by proponents of 
communicative planning. Abram maintained that the ideal of order in planning was 
difficult to achieve in practice, and that too often, the blame for the lack of order in the 
delivery of planning services was placed not on the planners or on the planning system, 
but on communities: 
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"this constant failure to achieve the order that rationalizes the existence of 
planning is then deflected elsewhere. Commonly ... planners explain the failures 
of planning as the failure of the public to conform to its institutions... Planners 
often root the failure of participative approaches in the public's lack of education 
about constraints under which planners work. This is an important argument; it 
reveals that public planners often feel the priorities placed upon them by central 
government are immutable and must override any local differences. They 
therefore rarely accept that they ought to learn from the public. Part of the role of 
the local authority officer is precisely to activate the state's wil1 at the local level, 
so local authority planners often feel that they are stuck between the state's wish 
and local demands"(Abram, 2000:354). 
This very real difficulty, of public planners achieving a state of 'order' through the 
implementation of a collection of planning policies, but also allowing for participation 
in the process by affected communities, is one which became evident later in this study. 
Another who questioned one of the fundamental assumptions of the communicative 
approach - that community divisions could be overcome through consensus building -
was Watson. In her experience in South Africa, 
"a vast gap exists between the notion of 'proper' communities held by most 
planners and administrators (grounded in the rationality of Western modernity and 
development), and the rationality which informs the strategies and tactics of those 
who are attempting to survive, materially and politically, in the harsh environment 
of Africa's cities" (Watson, 2003:401). 
She concluded by encouraging planners to be conscious of the contexts in which they 
worked; in particular, for planning researchers to explore cases which might illustrate 
various rationalities, and how these interact within planning contexts. 
4.3 CIassifyiDg participation In the Bterature 
There are three sub-headings under which the subject of participation might be 
examined, and which will structure the subsequent discussion: 
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1. The fIrst picks up on the fIrst of Dudley's three themes quoted above (see 4.1). This 
reviews the planning literature that has contributed to theories of participation, and 
focuses on what participation is construed to be. The twin ideas of participation as a 
widening of choices for both the public and planners will be explored. 
2. The second examines what participation is actually for, exploring the debate about 
participation as an end in itself or as a means to other ends, as well as returning to 
notions of choice, social exclusion and empowerment. 
3. The third sub-heading looks at how participation comes about; the various 
techniques and methods that have been proposed for the implementation of planning 
approaches that incorporate participation. 
4.3.1 What community participation is construed to be 
A precise and absolute definition of participation is impossible: it is a complex and 
contested subject. 
"It is a term which has been used to justify the extension of control of the state as 
well as to build local capacity and self-reliance; it has been used to justify external 
decisions as well as to devolve power and decision making away from external 
agencies; it has been used for data collection as well as for interactive analysis" 
(pretty, 1995:1251). 
What is being participated in? Who is participating? At what stage of the planning 
process? For whose benefit? At what cost? Measured by whose criteria? These are 
but some of the questions that might arise, and for which there are no easy answers. 
Community participation cannot be described as a concretely defmed set of techniques, 
policies or practices: this would be too restrictive. Any definition of participation must 
be context-specific with regard to both time and place. 
No discussion of participation would be complete without an examination of Sherry 
Arnstein's work, fIrst published in 1969, in which she produced a 'ladder of citizen 
participation' . This described the structure of participation in terms of the degree to 
which people were involved in projects (and therefore had choices about things) that 
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affected them; her now famous and oft-quoted typology ranged from manipulation to 
citizen control (see Figure 2 below). 
Arnstein's ladder was criticised by some as being too simplistic and paternalistic 
(Peattie, 1990). However, her approach to the subject yielded three sub-themes which 
recur throughout the literature on participation in planning, and which are central to a 
discussion of participation in development projects. These are the themes of: 
• a continuum of categories or intensity (' degrees') of participation; 
• duality in participation; and 
• power and its distribution. 
CITIZEN CONTROL 
Degrees of citizen power 
DELEGATED POWER 
PARTNERSHIP 
PLACATION 
CONSULTATION Degrees of tokenism 
INFORMING 
THERAPY Non-participation 
MANIPULATION 
Figure 2: Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation 
(Source: Arnstein, 1969) 
a. Climbing Arnstein". Ladder: Degrees or Categories of Participation 
In describing what she meant by citizen participation, Arnstein highlighted the fact that 
''there are different degrees to which people can become involved in decision-making 
processes" (Abbott 1996:35) and, importantly, Arnstein located these different positions 
or categories within the framework of a continuum. She stated that although she had 
shown eight rungs on the ladder, "in the real world of people and programs there might 
be 150 rungs with less sharp and 'pure' distinctions among them" (Arnstein, 1969:217). 
Those who subsequently took up the theme of degrees of participation include 
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Hollnsteiner (1977) who distinguished six modes of participation based on the locus of 
power in society; Yap (1990) whose examination of participation in low-income 
housing projects led to his developing four key concepts which reclassified and added to 
Arnstein's original eight categories; Pretty (1995) who used a seven-fold typology of 
participation to highlight the fact that the mere use of the term in (agricultural) projects 
would not necessarily lead to action; Choguill (1996), who adapted Arnstein's ladder 
for 'underdeveloped' countries (Pretty's and Choguill's typologies are outlined in more 
detail below); and Checkoway (1995) who proposed six strategies of community 
change. For him, a strategy was something that should involve "choice and sequence, 
staging and timing, and some combination of roles and styles" (Checkoway, 1995:3), 
and that knowledge about several strategies could help to widen choices for people and 
communities. 
Milbrath (in Fagence, 1977) looked at participation not in terms of a range of strategies, 
but more from a behavioural point of view. For him, the involvement of people in the 
planning process ranged from apathy, abstention and disinterest, to what he termed 
"gladiatorial" activities, in which participants became actively and closely involved in 
the political fray. The notion of apathy and disinterest in participation is an important 
and useful one, and yet the causes of participation apathy have not received much 
attention in the literature. When people choose not to participate, it could be for a 
number of reasons: 
• It may simply be a lack of information, or a perception that their participation will 
be insignificant to the process. This links back to Abram's notion that public 
planners too often need to implement the state's will at the local level, and therefore 
may not be able to take into account the demands or wishes of local people. 
• It may be a lack of awareness on the part of planners about the different roles that 
men and women (or different age and ethnic groups) play in society. 
• Different groups within a community may also relate to the planning process 
differently and have different expectations of how they might benefit. As a result, 
some may choose not to participate in the formal process. Watson (2003) very 
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• 
powerfully illustrated the possible consequences of clashes of rationalities which 
can result from conflicting expectations. 
Linked to this point, non participation may result from a sense of exclusion. Jordan 
(1996) approached this issue by exploring the mechanisms that underlie social 
exclusion: people might appear to be disinterested in participating, whereas in fact 
they feel excluded and disenfranchised from the process. 
• Alternatively, if one of the reasons for encouraging participation is to get people to 
express their opinions, then abstinence from participation, or rejection - turning their 
backs on a project - was seen by Desai (1996) as a possible and valid, yet 
overlooked, form of participation. 
b. Duality In Participation: US VB. Them on the Ladder of Participation 
Another of Arnstein's themes was that there was a duality involved: that there were 
'haves' and 'have-nots' in participation and therefore in planning. This is a theme that 
has a strong resonance in South Africa, where for so long the two systems of planning 
supported and were turn supported by apartheid ideology. Dudley (1993) used the idea 
of a duality as he explored the notion of 'effective development'. For him, there were 
intervenors and beneficiaries, 'us' and 'them', and that the reason why so much 
development and development aid appeared to have failed, was because this duality had 
not properly been recognised. He was concerned that use of the concept of duality 
might oversimplify discussion about participation, but noted that the borderline between 
the two groups was not fixed. Arnstein was similarly cautious, but was persuaded in 
favour of the use of the concept, stating that 
''the justification for using such simplistic abstractions is that in most cases the 
have-nots really do perceive the powerful as a monolithic 'system', and the 
powerholders actually do view the have-nots as a sea of 'those people', with little 
comprehension of the class and caste differences between them" (Arnstein, 
1969:217). 
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On the theme of dualities, Hillier and van Looij (1997: 11) found that 
"there are two sides to the much-vaunted buzz-word of 'community', the warm, 
fuzzy notion oftogethemess or inclusion, but there is also inclusion's constitutive 
other, exclusion. There is more to the story of community than a simple feeling of 
'us', there is also 'them'. Who are they? They are the other, strangers, the poor". 
Jordan's (1996) theory of poverty and social exclusion provided a powerful contribution 
to this theme of a duality of participation. He attempted to explain poverty in terms of 
the actions of exclusive groups, whether on a local or national scale, and examined these 
actions from a number of perspectives, including those of democracy and citizenship. 
Exclusion can lead to hostility and fear, and often these become reflected in policy: 
"Official urban discourses ... tend to legitimize and privilege the fears of the 
bourgeoisie, their fears of those Others who might invade or disrupt their homely 
spaces, their habitus. We rarely hear from those folks whom official discourse 
classifies as Other, about their fears: the fear, for example, of being hungry, 
homeless, jobless, of having no future in the city, of being unable to provide for 
one's children ... It is the fears of the haves, rather than the have-nots, which have 
driven [planning] policies" (Sandercock, 2003:124) 
In planning procedures, participation was traditionally about the contribution that 
members of the public could make to the planning process. It was about 'them' 
participating in 'our' process. Recognising this (and the problems that might result), 
Friedmann (1987) called for 'mutual learning', emphasising the 'transactive' nature of 
planning. Muller (1982), in examining the problems of disenfranchised communities in 
South Africa, usefully suggested that what was needed was not public participation in 
the planning process, but rather 'planning participation in the public process'. These 
thoughts reflected those of Fagence (1977) and Godschalk and Mills (1966) who had 
earlier advocated what they called 'collaborative' planning. Pretty's (1995) exposition 
of participatory learning for sustainable development in agriculture similarly 
encouraged planners and development practitioners to create 'a whole new 
professionalism' by participating in the public process and using local knowledge. 
These ideas were aptly summed up by Dudley (1993), who pointed out that 
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participation should not be about 'them' and 'us': there should not be two rival 
participation processes. They should rather be regarded as complementary: 
"community participation in our process is only important in so far as it can help 
us to improve the quality of our intervention in their process. It is their process 
which matters" (Dudley, 1993:164). 
Sandercock also focussed very powerfully on the importance of the practical wisdom of 
local knowledge, and the need for planners to learn how to access these "other ways of 
knowing" (Sandercock, 2003:34) by listening to the stories of those traditionally 
excluded from planning. She urged planners to overcome the dualities that had become 
ingrained in planning: 
"If it seems so obvious today that we need to draw on local knowledge in the 
planning process ... why then is it still the exception rather than the rule, the 
world over? In part, it is because planners believe that 'uncertified' people can't 
understand 'the complexities' ... " (Sandercock, 2003:79) 
c. "Who owns the ladder?" Power and Its distribution 
Arnstein's work highlighted the issue of power and the redistribution of power through 
participation. She stated that participation should be the means "by which the have-nots 
join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources 
are allocated, programs are operated and benefits like contracts and patronage are 
parcelled out" (Arnstein, 1969:216). Her concept of power therefore echoed her notions 
of duality. Other authors also focused on the struggles involved in the redistribution of 
power. Murdoch and Marsden (1995:372), for example, saw power as the outcome of 
collective action in society: 
"Those who are powerful are not those who 'hold' power but those who are able 
to emol, convince and enlist others into associations on terms which allow those 
initial actors to 'represent' all others". 
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Hillier and van Looij (1997) saw the outcome of this type of action as one in which the 
powerful speak for the less powerful 'others' whom they have deprived of a voice by 
imposing their definitions, images and perceptions upon them. 
Murdoch and Marsden's view of representation as power had parallels in the notions of 
exclusion and empowerment. The latter was taken up in detail by Friedmann (1992) as 
well as by Checkoway (1995), whose definition of empowerment assumed that power 
was a present or potential resource in every person or community: empowerment lay in 
the recognition of and acting upon that potential. The concept of empowerment was 
based on the defInition that power was the 
"use of resources, of whatever kind, to secure outcomes. Power then becomes an 
element of action, and refers to the range of interventions of which an agent is 
capable" (Giddens, 1977:348). 
In South Africa, Ramphele noted that there was considerable controversy around the 
validity of the concept of empowerment: 
"Some people argue that it is a fashionable term coined by those bent on 
patronising subordinate people such as women, workers or rural folk. These 
critics contend that people have power in themselves and do not need outsiders to 
come and 'empower' them. This argument echoes the point made by Nyerere that 
people cannot be developed, but have to develop themselves" (Ramphele, 
1993:107). 
However, Ramphele rejected the patronising approach, stressing that empowerment 
meant enabling the powerless to assume greater control over their own lives, and indeed 
enabling them to widen the range of possible choices they had about altering their 
positions in life. She found that many people who were or perceived themselves to be 
excluded from the mainstream of society found that their choices were limited. 
"Empowerment is, in the end, possible only in conditions of freedom and it is not 
possible to learn about freedom without experiencing it. When planning promotes 
just, participatory procedures, providing rich choices for the people, the spirit for 
true freedom can be experienced" (Muller, 1995: 12). 
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But if planning only provided choices for the relatively rich or privileged, then it failed. 
Planners in South Africa (as elsewhere) were in a potentially powerful position, but too 
often planning officials were 
"drawn from the capitalist middle classes, incorporating their interests, and it is 
difficult for planner advocates of the disadvantaged to make their voices heard .... 
Planners clearly need to develop ways of inclusionary argumentation which give 
voice to the silent and non-present.... Planners set rules for the participation 
process. These rules, consciously or unconsciously, encourage participation by 
certain groups and discourage or even prohibit participation by others" (Hillier 
and van Looij, 1997:8-9). 
Jordan recognised that the actions of many individuals and groups to change their 
circumstances continued to be constrained by the participation process, and he sought to 
understand how the processes of social exclusion worked to disempower the poor and to 
limit their choices. He concluded that 
"the social organisation of deprived communities reflects the efforts of their 
members to compensate themselves for the costs of being excluded from more 
desirable areas and from the social interactions that constitute mainstream activity 
in prosperous societies. Some of these are illegal, and impose direct costs upon 
the wider community, which in tum leads to the mobilisation of mainstream 
groups for policies ofenforcement"(Jordan, 1996:36). 
Abbott (1996) drew a distinction between empowerment and conscientisacion, two 
concepts which for him had been mistakenly confused or used interchangeably. 
Conscientisacion, with roots in Latin America and the philosophy espoused by Freire 
(1972 in Abbott, 1996) was seen as a cultural prerequisite for overcoming oppression of 
all forms. It required changes in society that affected everyone and that might be 
threatening to powerholders. In Abbott's view, the notion of empowerment could be 
less threatening, as it could be applied locally without upsetting the status quo. The 
term could have a range of interpretations that could make it politically more 
acceptable, and it could be applied across a wide spectrum of political interests. Abbott 
maintained that it was for this reason that empowerment, rather than conscientisacion, 
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had become an accepted and acceptable objective of community participation for world 
bodies such as the ILO, UNICEF and UNHCS. 
But this 'less threatening' interpretation of empowerment seemed to contradict that used 
by Friedmann. He postulated that empowerment had to be all-inclusive, and was 
fundamental to what he called an alternative development. "Its aim is to ... make it 
possible for disempowered sectors to be included in political and economic processes 
and have their rights as citizens and human beings acknowledged" (Friedmann, 
1992:viii). Such an approach had as its long-term objective a new balance to the 
structure of power in society and echoed Arnstein's concept of citizen control. 
Empowerment, according to Friedmann, was not only a process that shifted the balance 
of power, but also one that shifted the perceptions of powerless people and enabled 
them to assume greater control over their own lives. This included the realm of 
planning, and required "substantial departures from traditional planning practice, which 
is typically imposed from above rather than generated from within the communities of 
the disempowered themselves" (Friedmann, 1992:170). 
4.3.2 What is participation for? Participation as an end or a means 
Linked to the theme of power and empowerment is a theme which was not dealt with 
explicitly by Arnstein, but which subsequently became an important one in the 
literature. This was the distinction between participation pursued as an end in itself, an 
outcome or a fundamental right based on equity and empowerment arguments, and 
participation as a means towards efficiency or some other development end. These 
were notions that held some attraction in this research, where the new government's 
commitment to democratic participation in planning in post-apartheid South Africa 
could have been seen as an end in itself for those who had been denied the right to 
participate for so many decades. But the RDP also appeared to anticipate that 
participation would be a means to development in many communities. 
The means-end distinction was made by among others Paul (1987, who recognised a 
continuum of objectives for participation); Pretty (1995); Abbott (1996); Moser (1989, 
1993); and Mosse (2001). 
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Mosse's contribution highlighted the fact that there may be a number of different 
agendas, 
"clothed in the language of 'participation': government agencies use 
'participation' to reach expenditure targets through enrolling NOOs or community 
institutions in implementation; public works agencies view 'participation' as a 
means to reduce operations and maintenance costs; marketing agencies may see 
'participation' as a means to enhance an organisation's profile, or the 'seed' for 
future markets; while for NOOs participation may mean patronage and reputation-
building" (Mosse, 2001 :29). 
"Where participation is a means, it generally becomes a form of mobilization to 
get things done. This can equally be state-directed, top-down mobilization, 
sometimes enforced, to achieve specific objectives, or bottom-up 'voluntary' 
community-based mobilization to obtain a larger share of resources. Where 
participation is identified as an end in itself, the objective is not a fixed, quantified 
development goal, but a process, the outcome of which is an increasingly 
'meaningful' participation in the development process" (Moser, 1993:101). 
Moser's distinction was confirmed by Abbott, who saw the means-ends debate as a 
duality of community growth versus project success. Moser had focused on the 
participation of women in development projects, noting that while projects frequently 
relied on women's participation as a means to ensure project success, they less 
frequently recognised that for women, participation may be an end in itself, a form of 
personal and community growth. 
The means-end duality held a number of attractions. Its apparent simplicity made it an 
easily understood concept and one that has therefore had a powerful influence in 
participation debates. In addition, it combined rational and moral arguments to give the 
sense that it was morally correct for marginalised people to take responsibility for 
decisions that affect their lives, with empowerment seen as ultimately the only 
acceptable form of participation. However, there remained a range of possible 
participatory techniques available to the planner and to communities. 
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4.3.3 How participation comes about 
The 'techniques toolbox' - the nature and types of action to achieve or encourage 
participation - has changed over the years with different planning contexts, and with the 
changing goals and philosophy both of planning and of participation. 
B. The context of participation 
Where the problem situation was well defmed and uncertainties were low, then a 
positivist approach may have seemed appropriate. This meant that the rational planning 
model was favoured, and familiar techniques - largely public relations or information 
gathering exercises - were used. Public notices, public meetings and enquiries, 
questionnaire surveys and referenda were described in the literature (see for example 
Atkinson, 1992), as was the use of representative committees and groups, in which a 
range of discussion techniques was possible. 
But where the planning problems were poorly defined and there were great 
uncertainties, and where many actors and interests were potentially involved, then a 
more pluralist approach seemed to be more appropriate. This was particularly the case 
in a multi-cultural development context, where it was essential that planners had an 
understanding of both the context of development, and of participation in that process. 
In such a pluralist context, the focus was on more inclusive techniques, notably those 
that involved people who had previously been marginalised by other techniques. This 
accorded with Muller's (1982) notion of 'planning participation in the public process' 
described above. Advocacy and self-help activities, community meetings and co-
operation with voluntary and non-governmental organisations were all seen to be more 
appropriate in those contexts. Fundamental to this kind of approach was the notion of 
empowerment and the belief that people had a right to decide for themselves. 
More recently, authors concerned with citizenship and democratic processes focused on 
the importance and nature of communication in planning. Approaches that incorporated 
the concept of mutualleaming· (Friedmann, 1987) demonstrated this. Pretty noted that 
participation should be not so much a specific strategy, but an approach to learning. In 
terms of this approach, multiple perspectives on a problem could be acquired by 
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ensuring the widest possible involvement of different groups and individuals. Pretty 
was of the opinion that such new systems of learning would have profound implications 
for planners, demanding a "whole new professionalism": participation in the third world 
and development planning, if it was to be appropriate, would need more than just the 
application of new technologies and practices. It would need professionals who were 
willing and able to learn from ordinary members of the public. All of those involved in 
and affected by the planning process would have uniquely different perspectives of what 
the planning problem was, and how it might be resolved. In terms of this essentially 
epistemological approach, there could be "no single 'correct' understanding. What one 
understood to be true would depend on the framework of knowledge and assumptions 
one brought to the situation. Thus for Pretty, it was essential that multiple perspectives 
on a problem situation were pursued "by ensuring the wide involvement of different 
actors and groups" (Pretty, 1995:1250). This theme was taken further by Forrester 
(1989) and subsequently Sandercock (1998, 2003). For them, story telling was a force 
yet to be fully recognised in planning. In telling stories, the context of planning could 
be set, both in time and space, and previously untold stories could provide planners with 
new and alternative perspectives on planning. 
b. The techniques of participation 
Pretty (1995) postulated a typology of participation techniques that echoed the ladder 
proposed by Arnstein, but which in addition attempted to reflect the range of contexts: 
1. Manipulative participation occurred where participation was simply a pretence, 
where at best the public were represented on official boards, but were unelected, 
token members, and had no power. 
2. Passive participation occurred in cases where people were told what had already 
been decided: unilateral announcements made by officials without listening to 
people's responses; knowledge and information being seen as belonging only to 
external professionals ('us' v. 'them'). 
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3. Participation by consultation occurred where people were consulted or whose 
questions were answered. Professionals defined the problem to be tackled or the 
questions to be asked, they designed the information gathering process and the 
analysis, and did not feel under any obligation to consider people's views. 
4. Participation for material incentives occurred where people participated in a project 
or undertaking by contributing resources, e.g. labour to a project At its worst, this 
form of participation could be regarded as exploitation. 
Pretty postulated that in types one to four above, the term 'participation' was used in the 
knowledge that it would not in itself lead to significant action In various ways, these 
four types of participation accorded with Desai's (1996) postulation that 'more' 
participation, in the form of creating representative institutions and forums for 
consultation, actually resulted in 'less' participation, in that actual or meaningful 
involvement by the community members in decision-making did not occur. 
5. Functional participation was the term used by Pretty where participation helped to 
achieve project goals, especially to reduce costs. This linked back to the concept of 
participation as a means, a form of mobilisation to get things done. 
6. Interactive participation occurred when people were able to participate in joint 
analysis of problems, the development of action plans and in the formation or 
strengthening of local institutions. Where this happened, Pretty saw participation as 
a right and an end in itself, not just the means to achieve project goals. Groups took 
control over some or allloca1 decisions and determined how available resources were 
used, and they had a stake in maintaining the participatory structures or practices. 
However, 'they' were still participating in 'our' planning process. 
7. Self-mobilisation: For Pretty, this last technique occurred where local people took the 
initiative for development projects, often with the aim of changing existing systems, 
and did so independently of external agencies and planning organisations. They 
might develop contacts with external organisations for resources and advice, but they 
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retained control over how those resources were used. This achievement of local 
power over the process corresponded with Arnstein's last rung of 'citizen control' . 
Choguill similarly attempted to adapt Arnstein's typology, noting that the transfer of the 
rungs of the ladder of participation to the 'underdeveloped' world was far from perfect: 
"Within the development context ... residents of low-income communities want 
more than power alone. They have dual objectives. They need empowerment to 
influence decisions which affect them. In addition, they want urban services and 
housing from a government which may not have the resources to provide them, or 
the will .... Thus, if an undeveloped country participation ladder were to be 
constructed, the terminology and descriptions used would have to be amended" 
(Choguill, 1996:433, emphasis added). 
She proposed the following as a ladder of community participation for 
'underdeveloped' countries: 
1. Self-management, which occurred when the authorities did nothing to solve local 
problems, or even went so far as to oppose poor people's demands. The community 
was left to plan and control projects, working at best with outside organisations and 
NGOs. 
2. Conspiracy occurred when no participation in the formal decision-making process 
was allowed or even considered, as the government seemed to reject any idea of 
helping the poor, considering their situation of impoverishment little more than an 
embarrassment 
3. Informing, like Arnstein's third rung, consisted of a top-down, one-way flow of 
information from officials to the community, of their rights, responsibilities and 
options, without allowance for, or taking into consideration of, feedback or 
negotiation. 
4. Diplomacy occurred when the government, for lack of interest, lack of resources, or 
for incompetence, expected the community to make the necessary improvements, 
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usually with the 'near-heroic' assistance of an outside organisation. For Choguill, 
diplomacy could take the form of consultation, attitude surveys, public hearings, 
visits to the neighbourhood or meetings with the community. 
5. Dissimulation occurred where members of the community were placed on rubber-
stamp advisory committees or boards. This form of tokenism, corresponding to 
Arnstein's 'placation', was seen where some semblance of participation was sought 
by the authorities, but where the purpose was really to educate the community, or 
more frequently, to engineer their support. 
6. Conciliation came about where the authorities devised solutions that were eventually 
ratified by the community. It could take the fonn of appointing a few representatives 
of the community to advisory groups where they voiced their opinions, but where 
they were frequently forced to accept the decisions of a powerful and persuasive 
elite. In Choguill's view, this approach to participation was frequently top-down and 
paternalistic. 
7. Partnership was the second highest rung of Choguill's ladder, and occurred when 
members of the community, planners, and the authorities agreed to share planning 
and decision-making responsibilities about projects involving community 
participation, using structures such as joint boards and planning committees. 
Finally, 
8. Empowerment took the form of community members having a majority of seats, or 
genuine and specified powers on formal decision-making bodies that presided over 
development projects. In such situations, community members were expected to 
initiate their own improvements, with or without the assistance of NOOs and other 
allies, and demonstrate actual control of the development programme. 
The application of Choguill' s ladder to the South African development planning context 
appeared to hold potential. It could be argued that in terms of the dual planning system 
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that operated historically in South Africa, disadvantaged and black communities were 
subjected only to apartheid-style Conspiracy and Informing. Some communities might 
have been left to Self-management and / or Diplomacy - where they had the benevolent 
advocacy and assistance of non-governmental organisations. But the extent to which 
the new government in South Africa's land reform policies moved participation in 
planning away from a dual system and 'up' Choguill's (or Arnstein's) ladder of 
participation in its first five years of transformation had not been tested. 
Two principle criticisms of participatory techniques were expressed in the literature: 
The fIrst was that in spite of the development of a range of techniques for participation 
in planning, participatory planning remained peripheral and isolated from mainstream 
government planning and policy decision making. It remained at the level of rhetoric. 
The second criticism was that participation in planning continued to be a set of ad hoc 
techniques for information extraction, rather than a structured method for participatory 
project planning and empowerment. In seeking an answer to these criticisms, Warner 
(1996) developed the 'participative community strategic planning method'. This 
approach drew on strategic planning methods and attempted to provide a framework for 
establishing achievable development objectives and practicable development strategies. 
Muller's (1995) community decision model was similarly an attempt to overcome the 
isolation of participatory planning from mainstream planning and policy decision 
making, something which he considered had thus far been appended onto the traditional 
rational planning process. Muller drew on the strategic choice approach postulated by 
Friend and Hickling (1987) to devise his promotive planning model, a 
"collaborative cyclical procedure that progresses in activity loops and can 
incorporate feedback and feed-forward, which suggests, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, that going round in circles can be a productive enterprise" (Muller, 
1995:19). 
The contributions of these authors reflected a shift in the participation paradigm. Using 
Kuhn's (1970, quoted in Muller, 1992) defmition that a paradigm consisted of the 
assumptions and practices of thought and research that a group of people shared among 
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themselves, the work of these and like-minded authors reflected a very practical concern 
to understand and improve participation in planning. They each seemed to reflect the 
pragmatic view expressed by Dudley that "after 20 years at the top of the rhetoric 
mountain, community participation needs to come of age and become a focused tool for 
executing the specific task of research to inform action" (Dudley, 1993:] 64). 
One such tool was Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), which was formulated in 
response to the fact that the experience of planners and other professional development 
workers abounded with stories of projects that did not succeed because of problems of 
participation. It comprised a highly practical set of methods to include and involve 
previously marginalised groups in the planning and development process, and attempted 
to respond to the second criticism of participation techniques mentioned above, that 
they were a set of ad hoc techniques for information extraction. PRA was put forward 
as a methodology that sought to reverse the top-down flow of information and decision-
making in planning, and accommodate people's own knowledge and skills (Chambers, 
1993, 1997, 1997a; Slocum et al, 1995; Holland and Blackburn, 1998). It suggested a 
'menu of tools' from which the planner could select, tools such as time lines, transects, 
mapping, matrices, time trends, pocket chart voting and interviewing. In South Africa, 
many of these tools began to be used by NODs in the work they were doing with rural 
communities. They were of particular use and application in research, the gathering of 
information and documenting of community histories. In addition, they were used to 
help communities to prioritise their development goals. (Attwood and May, 1998; 
Bannister et al, 2002) 
The use of participatory tools did not necessarily guarantee the achievement of mutual 
learning or of a goal of empowerment, however. Dudley (1993) cautioned that while 
participatory research was a highly important and necessary part of a development 
project, it could never be regarded as sufficient - or an end in itself. Processes such as 
PRA needed to go beyond the stage of problem defInition and data collection as a 
contribution to the planning process. 
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4.4 Recent critiques of participation 
As a concept, participation in planning was seldom contested in the literature discussed 
thus far. In recognition of the shortcomings of top-down planning of the past, 
participation was implicitly accepted as both 'the right thing' (methodologically and 
technically), and 'the good thing' (morally and politically) to do. However, in much of 
the writing, there also appeared to be a tacit dissatisfaction with the way in which 
participation had worked (or not worked) in practice and with the benefits that it had 
brought to those involved. This was particularly the case among proponents of 
Participatory Rural Appraisal: 
"We have come full circle: PRA started as a critical response to the inadequacy 
of existing research and planning processes. Yet many of the concerns [of PRA 
practitioners] ... focus precisely on the inadequacy of local participation in the 
process ... " (Guijt and Cornwall 1995:7). 
Cooke and Kothari felt that such criticisms as had been made in the literature had not 
sufficiently challenged either the methods or the concept of participation: 
"the time has come to ask whether the constant methodological revisionism to 
which some of us have contributed ... , has obscured the more fundamental 
problems within the discourse, and whether internal critiques have served to 
legitimise the participatory project rather than present it with a real challenge" 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001:7). 
They questioned the "received wisdom about the overwhelming benefits of participation 
in development", concerned about the "difference between private and public accounts 
of participation" and the need ''to provide an arena where the hitherto marginalised 
voices of practitioners and those outside the orthodoxy" could be expressed (Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001:1-2). They argued that participation in development, far from increasing 
the involvement of excluded communities in decision-making over their lives, may in 
fact have facilitated the unnecessary and "unjust" exercise of power over them: 
participation may have masked "continued centralisation in the name of 
decentralisation". These critics were concerned. not with the need to re-examine the 
application and techniques of participation (as above), but with the politics of the 
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discourse and its conceptual limitations, with what participation in development did as 
much as what it did not do. 
They identified three potential 'tyrannies' of participation: 
• The tyranny of method, where participation had been constrained by bureaucratic 
and institutional requirements, and where, too often, it had followed formulaic 
approaches imposed by governments and aid agencies. Critics questioned whether 
this 'formalisation' of participation had reduced it to a new form of tokenism. 
Participation in planning in the UK had become routine, packaged into a number of 
stages that were controlled and led by planning authorities (Hague et aI, 2003). 
Elsewhere, the process had been characterised as 'Decide, Announce, Defend', with 
the consequences of such processes being a loss of trust, damaged relationships, and 
various parties being unable to resolve disputes (Blakney, 1997). 
Hague et a1 drew a useful distinction between 'public participation in planning' and 
'participatory planning'. In the former, the process was controlled and led by the 
planning authority: 
"The planners try to anticipate the needs of the public and to synthesise them 
into a plan that meets the needs of everyone, while also confonning to national 
policy. Participation fits a timetable that is set ... by the planning authority. It 
involves a series of formal stages beginning with exploration of issues, and 
ending with a plan. The flow of information is mainly from the planners to the 
public, who are given opportunities to comment". 
This echoed the notion of a duality in participation, that there are 'baves' and 'have-
nots' in participation and therefore in planning. By contrast, participatory planning, 
as defined by Hague et aI, was 
"a set of processes through which diverse groups and interests engage together 
in reaching for a consensus on a plan and its implementation... The process is 
rooted in the recognition that society is pluralist and there are legitimate 
conflicts of interest that have to be addressed by the application of consensus-
building methods. Participatory planning is culturally aware and sensitive to 
differences in power, and seeks to ensure that these do not pre-determine 
outcomes ... " (Hague et al, 2003:12). 
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By this definition, participatory planning represented a communicative approach and 
found resonance with calls for the acknowledgement of local knowledge in 
multicultural planning contexts. But as with the communicative approach, 
participatory planning assumed that consensus within a plural society could be 
reached, even if this occurred through a process of mediation. 
In terms of the principles of the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) in South Africa, participation became an essential component of planning at 
all levels of government, and all development priorities were subsequently 
influenced by government and RDP priorities. This public participation in planning 
(by Hague et al's definition) may have had real operational limitations, the methods 
used may have been culturally inappropriate, and may have been seen by critics as a 
means of imposing external control on development ''The structured, formulaic 
nature of the various technologies ensures that power still lies in the hands of the 
facilitators who are seen to represent donor interests" (Hailey, 2001:1(0). 
Hailey contrasted this kind of 'tyrannical' approach to public participation in 
planning with less formal approaches where practitioners had invested time in 
building relationships with groups and individuals in the community, listening and 
learning from them. However, he concluded that methods - participatory planning 
tools and techniques - were "of less consequence than the mainstream development 
literature suggests" (Hailey, 2001:93), and that what was often of far greater 
importance were the characteristics of the practitioners involved, and their ability to 
listen to local people. 
''These include a fundamental belief in participative development, an ethos of 
close collaboration with local communities, and a clear vision based on a 
strongly held, well-articulated set of values" (Hailey, 2001:95). 
• The tyranny of decision-maJcjne and control, in which processes for participation 
introduced by development practitioners had overriden existing community 
decision-making processes. Practitioners were not passive facilitators - they shaped 
and directed the participatory processes. 
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"At the most basic level, project staff 'own' the research tools, choose the 
topics, record the infonnation, and abstract and summarise according to project 
criteria and relevance" (Mosse, 2001:19). 
In this way, 'local knowledge', instead of determining participatory planning 
processes, was often structured by them. Mosse concluded that "whatever the 
rhetoric, the reality is that people participate in agency programmes and not the 
other way round" (Mosse, 2001:22). This reflected Muller's earlier (1982) 
comparison between 'them' participating in 'our' formal planning process, and 'us' 
participating in 'their' process, and once more anticipated Sandercock's (2003) call 
for planners to listen to the stories of communities as part of an empowerment 
process. 
Other authors questioned the notion of empowerment that was implicit in 
participatory approaches, arguing that the question that should be asked was not how 
much people were empowered by the process, but for what. If participants were 
merely being 'empowered' to take part in a westernised planning system, then this 
empowerment might actually have been tantamount to subjection (Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001). Cooke and Kothari concluded that proponents of participation in 
planning had generally been naIve about the complexities of power and power 
relations between and among all 'participants' in the process. 
• The tyranny of the &roup occurred where participatory forums or committees were 
dominated by and therefore reinforced the interests of existing cliques and power 
groups within a community. For this reason, some people might not want to 
participate. Practitioners and theorists alike assumed that people did want to (and 
were able to) participate, that it was a rational and responsible thing to do. 
However, too often we failed to recognise "how the different, changing and multiple 
identities of individuals impact upon their choices about whether and how to 
participate" (Cooke and Kothari, 2001:9). Community participation often entailed 
the holding of meetings and setting up of forums for debate and discussion. But if 
these were unable to take into account the complexities of associations within 
communities, and if practitioners were unaware of the dynamics of internal 
community politics, then meaningful and significant debate about development 
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would take place elsewhere, and the forums and committees established as part of 
the participatory process would become 'empty shells'. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This literature survey has attempted to explore what community participation in 
planning is construed to be, what it is for, and the various means by which it comes 
about. The way in which the concept of participation has changed over the years has 
been tracked, in particular the way in which the ladder of participation fIrst described by 
Arnstein has influenced the literature since 1969. It has been shown that debate and 
discussion about the degrees or categories of participation have continued, although 
much of this discussion has remained on the level of rhetoric, rather than practical 
application. 
In the planning literature, the debates over participation were influenced by moves 
towards more inclusionary forms of planning, which were in turn a response to the 
perceived failure of modernist rational models of economic development to address 
problems of global poverty and inequality. and to the spread of democracy. The 
inclusionary planning paradigm incorporated notions of empowerment and responded to 
influences of theories of poverty and social exclusion from the broader fIeld of 
sociology. The paradigm also built on work that stressed the need for communication 
and an attitude of learning on the part of the development professionals. Planning and 
development by their nature imply an intervention in a process, an intervention whose 
objective is to bring about change and / or action. An important contribution was the 
notion that participation should result in the creation of choices for all participants in the 
development process, even if that choice is to not participate. 
In this overview of the literature, the definition of participation varied depending upon 
whose interests were being served by the planning process. It was shown to be a 
complex process, one that had the potential not only to benefIt co~unities, but al!!O to 
disadvantage or disempower groups and individuals. Indeed, Dudley (1993) concluded 
that 'participation' had become a double-edged tool that could be used to justify an 
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evasion of responsibility and development inaction. Desai (1996) likewise felt that the 
creation of representative structures would not necessarily lead to the implementation of 
participatory development projects, since structures could give the fa9ade of 
participation and debate - 'more' leading to less actual participation. Cooke and 
Kothari (2001) went further in highlighting some of the conceptual limitations of 
participation, calling for an examination of what participatory development does as 
much as what it does not do, and questioning whether participation had in fact become 
'"the new tyranny". 
These views reflected some of the criticisms of and questions about the implementation 
of post-apartheid development planning in South Africa, views that were subsequently 
expressed by some of the development practitioners that were interviewed in the course 
of this research. 
One theme in the literature was that there were different stages or phases in policy 
making and project implementation at which different forms of participation might be 
more appropriate than others. Planners needed to know when to 'do' participation. 
However, effective participation was not something that could be 'done', mobilised or 
created from the outside. It had to be based on the conviction that people have a 
fundamental right to decide for themselves about matters that affect them. More often 
than not, however, experience and the literature have shown that people have either 
been totally excluded from the process, or have been "asked or dragged into partaking 
in operations of no interest to them, in the very name of participation" (Pretty, 
1995:121). Planners need to be conscious of the conflict between quantity and quality 
of participation, between the democratic right of people to participate, and, particularly 
in developing countries, the urgent and pressing need for project implementation. This 
potential conflict in priorities (termed the tyranny of the group and the tyranny of 
method by Cooke and Kothari (2001» was being acutely felt by planners in South 
Africa as this research began. 
In that country, the conflict had arisen out of the legacy of apartheid that had left many 
urban and rural communities seriously disadvantaged and lacking in many of the basic 
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needs identified as rights in the new government's Reconstruction and Development 
Programme. The conflict rested in the urgent need to deliver and implement 
development projects, but which could be delayed by the entirely appropriate 
commitment on the part of development practitioners and government departments to 
democratic rights and participatory processes. At the beginning of this research, 
evidence suggested that the implementation of basic needs projects, and participation in 
them, were both falling short of the government's own goals. But there was a dearth in 
the literature of evaluative studies of the implementation of participation processes, 
particularly in the developing world. Most of the authors postulated approaches and 
techniques that, in theory, could be used to incorporate participation in planning. Far 
fewer critiqued or reported on the application of these approaches in practice. There 
was limited documentation of whether or how the techniques had been applied in a 
range of development contexts, or of the experiences of those engaged in implementing 
participatory projects in multi-cultural contexts. 
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5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction: Key Research Issues 
The preceding chapters have sought to highlight the key areas for research that have 
arisen out of the literature on participation in planning. 
1. In the first place, there was the debate about what community participation is 
construed to be: the process of participation, how it is conceptualised, and the locus 
of power in participation. The literature showed that a number of theories of 
participation in planning could be used to interpret the process in South Africa. 
Choguill's (1996) ladder of participation for developing countries provided a 
potentially useful analysis on the one hand, building on Arnstein's (1969) theory 
and linking with notions of empOwerment and inclusion through participation; while 
from a very different perspective, Cooke and Kothari's (2001) concept of the 
tyranny of participation appeared to hold some relevance to the post-apartheid 
planning context. Umemoto (2001), Sandercock (2003)and Watson (2003) had 
likewise introduced different elements of participation into the debate, highlighting 
the challenges that face planners working in multicultural contexts. 
2. The literature also provided a framework for studying whether participation in South 
Africa was conceived as an end in itself - an outcome or a fundamental right - or as 
a means to some other end. In South Africa, democratisation and participation 
might have been a sufficient outcome for those who had been denied those rights for 
so many decades, but others anticipated that participation in planning would be a 
means to achieving development in disadvantaged communities. 
3. How participation actually comes about was a third area dealt with in the literature, 
covering the various techniques and methods that have been proposed and applied in 
the implementation of participatory development projects around the world. Much 
of the literature examined participation in western, Anglo-American contexts. 
However there is an increasing demand for appropriate participatory planning 
techniques in other development contexts. 
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Some authors attempted to adapt the western approaches and techniques of 
participation in planning to other contexts, but two major criticisms persisted. In the 
fIrst place, participation in practice appeared to remain a peripheral activity, isolated 
from policy decision making. A gap existed between the rhetoric of participation 
and the reality of exclusion of people from the planning process. Secondly, 
participation appeared to remain a set of ad hoc techniques for information 
extraction. Simply giving poor or excluded people more voice will not work if 
planners do not listen or try to understand. The literature pointed to a need for a 
change in the social discourse of public participation and for planners to challenge 
traditional assumptions and representations, evaluate past experiences and develop 
new practices appropriate to multicultural contexts. This linked into my desire to 
tell the story of the experiences of the planning process in the two communities 
under study - and thereby to contribute to the growing planning historiography in 
South Africa. 
4. A further area of research which was identified in the literature was that concerning 
the role of planners and development practitioners. Few studies had sought to 
document the professionals' experiences of the implementation of participatory 
projects; their relationships with policy makers and the communities they worked 
with; or to investigate their values about and attitudes towards the need for 
participation. 
5.2 Research Aim and Questions 
The research took as its fundamental aim the investigation of the implementation of 
participation in planning in rural South Africa from 1994 to 1999. This time period was 
chosen as it coincided with the first five years of post-apartheid govemm.ent - a period 
of great change in politics, policies and planning in South Africa. In particular, the 
study sought to take the research issues identified in the literature and to examine them 
in the context of two rural communities impoverished by apartheid. It aimed to 'tell the 
story' of the communities' experiences of the planning process, highlighting the 
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circumstances and conditions that facilitated and / or hindered participation by these 
communities. 
More specifically, the research sought to answer the following questions: 
1. What changes occurred in rural development planning practice in post-apartheid 
South Africa, given the principles of the 1994 RDP that included the assumption 
that participation was not just a good thing, but 'the right thing'? In answering this 
question, the study sought to explore whether democratisation and participation 
were pursued as ends in themselves, or as means to other planning and development 
ends. Recent debates in the literature had begun to question the received wisdom 
about the overwhelming benefits of participation, and the research needed to draw 
on the discussion in the literature about how participation was construed. It set out 
to gain insights into how participation in planning had been interpreted in the past, 
and in particular, how this had changed with the changes in government and policy: 
with regard to participation in planning, had the new government learned anything 
from the mistakes of the past? . 
2. Did the democratic process in the country lead to a greater awareness of 
participation in planning in South Africa? Did it facilitate the inclusion of those 
who were previously marginalised? Or did participation in rural development 
planning serve the interests of the state more than those of the communities 
concerned? Contributions from authors who examined the distribution of power and 
the dualities involved in participation ('us' vs. 'them') would serve as a basis for 
examining these questions. In addition, the research sought to ask: did participation 
in South Africa lead to the incorporation of 'local knowledge' into the planning 
process? Or was local knowledge kept peripheral - even disregarded - and instead 
structured by the planning process? 
3. To what extent was participation incorporated into the rural development planning 
process in South Africa after the 1994 change in government? Did it reflect the 
spirit of the RDP, or did it remain token and / or peripheral, a set of ad hoc and 
formulaic techniques for information extraction? Was participation constrained by 
institutional contexts that required formal bureaucratic procedures to be followed 
and RDP goals to be met, or did the principles of the RDP make it easy for 
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development professionals to incorporate participation into planning? Here, the 
discussion in the literature about techniques for and contexts of participation would 
be relevant, as would the more recent debates about the potential tyrannies of 
participation. 
4. How did development practitioners, policy makers and other participants perceive 
their roles and responsibilities in this process? There was a significant lack of 
information about development practitioners, who worked in a range of political, 
economic and social contexts in South Africa. These professionals came from 
different backgrounds, and worked in a range of government agencies, NGOs or as 
private consultants. As such, one might have expected to find differences in their 
values and attitudes to participation, and in their experiences of implementation of 
participatory projects. To what extent did they create and sustain the discourse of 
participation, and what was the effect of their experience of participatory 
development? 
5.3 Research Approach 
In a study such as this, it was neither possible nor practical to undertake a 
comprehensive survey of all rural communities in South Africa, or the development 
practitioners that worked with them. A case study approach was therefore adopted, with 
two case studies selected that might capture something of the wide context of rural 
planning in post-apartheid planning. 
Further, the questions in this study called for a research methodology that would focus 
attention on these real-world situations as they unfolded. and on the perceptions and 
experiences of the participants in the study. The methodology would need to facilitate 
the understanding of both the context and content of these perceptions and experiences. 
The research aimed to get behind the official story of post-apartheid land restitution and 
to explore and describe the realities of the respective case studies, as they were 
experienced by those involved This suggested a qualitative rather than a quantitative 
research methodology. 
Qualitative research is 
81 
"a systematic, empirical strategy for answering questions about people in a 
bounded social context, and ... a means for describing and attempting to 
understand the observed regularities in what people do, say, and report as their 
experience" (Locke et aI, 1993, p.99). 
Instead of trying to reduce the complexity of the subject under study (as would be the 
case using quantitative experimental methodology), qualitative methodology makes a 
point of seeking out the complexities. The research methods are diverse and exploratory 
- qualitative data collection methods are adaptive and their analysis is interpretive, 
focussing on the processes involved in constructing patterns of meaning and action in 
the research situation. In addition, the methods are communicative, in that there can be 
close and sometimes intense communication between the researcher and the 
respondents. who define. explain and construct the reality for the researcher. This 
means that in contrast with quantitative research settings, the researcher seldom has 
control over the research context: great flexibility has to be built into the methodology 
so that it can adapt during the course of the study. 
Apart from being qualitative, the approach to the research was also fundamentally 
exploratory and explanatory (as opposed to purely descriptive or classificatory). In this 
study, these two forms could be extended into what Yin (1984) referred to as 
'revelatory' research: research where the investigator has the opportunity to observe and 
analyse something that was previously inaccessible, because few researchers had had 
the opportunity to investigate the issues (even though in South Africa they were present 
across the country). The two case studies outlined below were not unique in South 
Africa, but the opportunity to observe and analyse the planning processes that occurred 
in these two communities at a specific time in the country's history, was. 
5.4 The selection of the two case studies 
In terms of the apartheid government's plans, the two case study communities were 
both designated to become part of the former reserve area of Bophuthatswana (see Map 
4), and both were designated as Presidential Lead Projects (PLPs) by President Mandela 
soon after the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development was published (RSA, 
1994a, see section 3.2 above). These PLPs launched the new government's policy, and 
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were selected for the potential they had to demonstrate the principles and programmes 
of the RDP. In all, there were nine PLPs: one was selected in each of the newly 
delineated nine provinces, and each province drew up its own guidelines for the 
implementation of RDP projects. The two case studies for this research were selected 
primarily because of my own field experiences, but also because they had had different 
experiences of the removals process under the apartheid government, and provided an 
interesting and informative contrast in the way in which rural planning was 
implemented in South Africa since 1994. 
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5.4.1 Case Study 1: Mogopa 
In North West Province (formerly the western Transvaal) the vi11age of Mogopa was 
selected. The community, known as the Bakwena ba Mogopa, provided an example not 
only of how the implementation of apartheid served to impoverish black communities, 
but also of the resilience demonstrated in the face of some of the worst effects of 
apartheid. Over a number of years, this community was a focus of the resistance 
movement and the Bakwena ba Mogopa worked closely with non-governmental and 
church organisations (Laburn-Peart, 1997). In 1984, however, they were forcibly 
removed from the village, which was destroyed by the authorities, and the land was 
leased to white farmers. Subsequently, the community planned, and eventually 
succeeded, in reoccupying and reclaiming their ancestral land, and has been rebuilding 
their village since 1994. 
Over the years, a number of participatory planning exercises were carried out with the 
community by development practitioners from non-governmental organisations, and 
throughout their resistance and return, representatives of the community were in 
periodic contact with officials from various government departments. This meant that a 
substantial amount of documentation existed about this community, some of it in 
published form. However most of this secondary material was in the form of files and 
field notes of development practitioners who worked with the community, either as 
members of the non-governmental organisations, or, more recently, as officials from the 
various government departments. 
5.4.2 Case Study 2: Schmidtsdrift 
The second case study provided a contrast. In Northern Cape Province (formerly part of 
the Cape Province. see Map 3), the BaThlaping community of Schmidtsdrift had been 
removed from their land and village in 1968 and the land, a large semi-desert area, 
occupied by the South African Defence Force as a training base and weapons testing 
facility. In Schmidtsdritt, a consortium of planning professionals was nominated by the 
community for appointment by the new provincial government in 1995 to conduct a 
participatory planning exercise with a view to relocating the original BaThlaping 
community back at Schmidtsdrift. However. during the apartheid era, they had been 
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scattered into at least three different locations, and this meant that work with the 
community in participatory planning exercises was limited and a frustrating process for 
the planners and development practitioners. 
There was far less documentation available to set the context for this case study: little 
had been published, and there was almost no history of involvement with non-
governmental organisations, which was the case in Mogopa. The involvement of the 
community with the pJanning process was limited, and over a far shorter time than had 
been the case for the Bakwena ba Mogopa. Nevertheless, enough material existed for 
their story to begin to be told. 
s.s Case studies and story telling 
Forester (1989, 1999a) encouraged researchers to use and analyse case study stories of 
how planners worked in practice. Watson (2002, 2(03) and Sandercock (1998a, 1998b, 
2(03) both took this notion further, particularly in multicultural planning contexts: 
"Much of what planners do ... can be understood as performed story. Yet the 
importance of story had rarely been understood, let alone validated in planning. 
Story is an all pervasive, yet largely unrecognized force in planning practice ... 
Let's liberate and celebrate and think about the power of story. And let's 
appreciate its importance to the 2111 century multicultural planning project, as a 
way of bringing people together to learn about each other through the telling and 
sharing of stories" (Sandercock, 2003: 183) 
The cases of Mogopa and Schmidtsdrift appeared to have all of the properties that 
Sandercock felt were necessary for a planning story to be told. Both cases had a time 
frame, as their experiences of apartheid and post-apartheid planning could be examined, 
and an explanation could be given for the reactions and actions of the various parties 
involved. Thirdly, there was potential for generalisability of their experiences to other 
rural communities around South Africa. Sandercock's last two properties for stories 
were the presence of a plot and that there should ideally be an element of moral tension 
if a good story was to be told. The conflict over land that was the theme for both case 
studies provided both plot and moral tension. 
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But it was not enough just to tell the stories: they had to be put to some use. For 
Sandercock, there were a number of ways this could be done: 
• 
• 
To facilitate the planning process - stories could provide examples to be used by 
others, for example in participation or conflict resolution 
To reinforce identity, or meaning to groups ('core' stories) 
• To be catalysts for change - stories could help to 'organise hope', one of the 
fundamental tasks of planners 
• 
• 
To connect with policy - stories could be a persuasive means of communication 
with policy makers 
To explain and criticise - story telling was seldom completely objective, since most 
had an underlying message and / or purpose: 
"In telling new stories about our past, our intention is to reshape our future. If 
we can uncouple planning history from its obsession with the celebratory story 
of the rise of the planning profession, then we may be able to link it to a new 
set of public issues - those connected with a dawning appreciation of a 
multicultural heritage ... " (Sandercock, 2003:2(0) 
• To become tools for teaching planning students - not only about planning history, 
but also, for example, that planning conflicts may be more than conflicts over 
resources, but may also be about relationships, personalities, politics, race, ethnicity 
and culture. 
Stories could therefore be a powerful means of reporting case study research, and 
certainly I had been encouraged to tell the stories of the two communities concerned. 
Since it was my intention to investigate and convey these stories as accurately as 
possible, it was important that rigorous methods of case study research were followed. 
5.6 The methods of case study research 
By their nature, case studies require an intensive and rigorous, yet flexible, research 
methodology: they may not end up as planned. In using a case study approach, the 
researcher needs to have a finn grasp of the issues: 
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.. the quality of a case study depends to a great extent on the quality of the 
investigator. It is not a 'soft' option in the sense that anyone can do it without 
preparation, knowledge of procedures or analytical skills... Ideally case study 
calls for wel1 trained and experienced investigators... Personal qualities such as 
having an open and enquiring mind, being a 'good listener', general sensitivity 
and responsiveness to contradictory evidence are needed". (Robson, 1996:163) 
In case studies, the researcher may be very closely involved in the process, and this can 
raise questions about the reliability of the findings, notably through the researcher's 
influence on what is being studied, and on those who are being studied. For Robson, 
having an 'open and enquiring mind' meant that appropriate questions were asked and 
answers were sought. Being a 'good listener' meant taking in information without bias, 
noting words accurately, capturing moods and appreciating contexts. This included 
'listening' to documents and archival records: "You need an open mind and a good 
memory" (Robson, 1996:164). 
The case study method is appropriate "when a 'how' or 'why' question is being asked 
about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control" 
(yin, 1989:20). In the present research, it was also of fundamental importance to 
investigate 'who' had participated in the planning process in the case study areas. In 
each case, the communities themselves had been involved, but there had also been a 
range of other actors, including government officials, non-governmental organisations, 
planners, engineers and architects. In addition, given that the study was set in the policy 
context of South African land restitution, an understanding of the historical perspective 
of removals under apartheid (the 'when' question) was of critical importance. 
The current research was begun as an in-depth study over time to investigate the 
relationship between each of the two communities and their land, to consider their 
participation in the planning process, and the effects on them of the implementation of 
planning policy. To achieve all this it was necessary to utilise a range of research 
methods, and to spend time investigating the details of events from the perspective of a 
range of informants. The case study approach enabled me to delve into the experiences 
and processes followed in a way that would not have been possible using only 
impersonal secondary data sources or more 'objective' methods. 
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However, the differences in data available for the two case study areas, and differences 
between the two cases themselves, made a common approach to data collection 
problematic. The fieldwork for Mogopa effectively took place over a much longer time 
period than at Schmidtsdrift; there was far more material available for the Mogopa case 
study; and (apart from the earliest meetings) it was not possible to undertake 
observations of meetings at Schmidtsdrift, as was the case at Mogopa. Nevertheless, 
the basic pattern of data collection consisted of reviewing as much secondary material 
as was available, attending meetings where possible, conducting interviews with a range 
of participants, and visits to the sites. 
5.6.1 Indirect Methods of Data Collection 
Indirect methods of data collection do not rely on the participation of respondents, and 
include the examination of documentary and archival records, also known as secondary 
material - '''secondary' because they were not primarily developed for the study" 
(Sarantakos, 1993:206) in which they are being used. These documents, written for 
some purpose other than the research, not only allow research on issues that the 
researcher would not otherwise have access to, but are generally factual records and free 
from bias. However, documents can differ widely in the level of detail that they 
contain, and in their format, which makes comparison of the information that they 
contain, impossible. 
5.6.2 Direct Methods of nata Collection 
Direct methods of data collection involve the gathering of information directly from 
primary sources. Questionnaire surveys and interviews are common examples. 
Questionnaires are a convenient direct method of data collection, but are limited by the 
fact that they do not allow for probing, prompting and clarification of responses. Under 
specific circumstances, the use of questionnaires can be an efficient and inexpensive 
method of data collection. However, for the current study, two major factors meant that 
a questionnaire survey would be neither efficient nor inexpensive. Firstly, the distances 
from the case study areas would have made a postal survey an expensive and unreliable 
option - neither of the two case study areas had access to a regular postal service. More 
importantly, the use of self-administered questionnaires in this study would have 
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presumed that those recipients / respondents living in each of the case study villages 
were literate; or alternatively, that appropriate research assistants were available to carry 
out the questionnaire survey. 
Interviews can take a number of fonns, depending on their purpose. They may for 
example be structured (following a formal list of questions in order to reduce 
interviewer bias), semi-structured (following a loosely constructed topic guide, but 
allowing the interviewer to probe issues introduced by the interviewee) or unstructured 
(following few or no strict procedures); they may be conducted with individuals or in 
groups; and the subject matter may be open-ended or focussed. Interviews can 
overcome the problem of illiteracy, and have the advantage of flexibility: the 
interviewer is able to follow up interesting responses in a way that is not possible with 
questionnaires. This is important if one is try to understand the complexities of the 
cases under study, and suits the exploratory and communicative nature of qualitative 
research. However, the use of interviews as a direct method of data collection assumes 
that the interviewer and interviewee speak the same language, or that a translator is 
available. In addition, interviews can be time-intensive and time-consuming, 
particularly if tape-recorded transcription is involved, and the quality and usefulness of 
the information obtained depends in large measure on the skills of the interviewer. 
In this study, interviews were carried out with a wide range of respondents. These 
included government officials at central government, provincial and local government 
levels, field workers and senior staff from non-governmental organisations, professional 
planners, engineers and architects, academics, and community representatives (see 
Figure 3). Altogether, 24 separate interviews were conducted with 19 different 
individuals (some of the interviewees were interviewed more than once over time to 
update myself on progress of the particular case). All were selected on the basis of their 
knowledge of or involvement in the planning process for one or both of the case study 
communities. Many of the interviewees were already known to me through my 
involvement in the research, but some were recommended for interview by those 
involved with the cases. In reporting on the interviews that were conducted, reference is 
made in the text that follows on the basis of the interviewee number allocated in Figure 
3. 
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In each case, the interviews were broadly focussed but semi-structured so as to gain the 
insights and experiences of each of the interviewees. A list of questions and broad 
topics covered in the interviews is given in Appendix 1. All of the respondents were 
able to speak English, although for many this was not their mother tongue. It was 
necessary in only two cases to have assistance with some translation / interpretation (in 
one case by a fieldworker, in another by a fellow community member). Each of the 
interviews was tape recorded, with pennission having first been obtained from the 
interviewee. The interview was subsequently transcribed for analysis. 
Inteniew Dumber 0rpaisati0D I Group represented Dateof' 
interview 
Interviewee 01 Department of Land Affairs 1999 
Interviewee 02 Department of Land Affairs 1999 
Interviewee 03 Northern Cape Province Official 2001 
Interviewee 04 Southern District Municipal Council (NW Province) 2001 
Interviewee 05 Southern District Municipal Council (NW Province} 2001 
Interviewee 06 Consultant Planner: 1999 
Interviewee 07 Consultant Planner: 1999,2001 
Interviewee 08 Consultant Planner: 1999 2001 
Interviewee 09 Consultant Planner: 2001 
Interviewee ] 0 Academic 1999 
Interviewee 11 Academic 1999 
Interviewee 12 NGO, ve 1999.2001 
Interviewee 13 NGO, . ve 1999~2001 
Interviewee 14 NGO., ve 2001 
Interviewee 15 MoROPll ~ty representative 1999,2000.2001 
Interviewee 16&17 Scbmidtsdrift community '''''''' 'ves ~2 interviewees} 2001 
Interviewee 18 Y_ ..I devel : practitioDer 1999 
Interviewee 19 In devO" : practitioner 2001 
Figure 3: List of interviews earried out during the course of this research 
A third direct method of data collection is observation. Through observation, a wide 
range of information can be obtained that may not be possible from other methods, as 
the researcher, through visual observation, studies events as they evolve in the 'real 
world'. Observation can be relatively inexpensive and uncomplicated, but it is not 
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necessarily effective when the researcher wants to fmd out about opinions and attitudes. 
In this study, most observation was of an unstructured, informal and non-participant 
nature, and was a valuable tool in establishing the social and physical contexts of the 
two case study areas. 
At Mogopa, a number of community meetings were attended, where development issues 
were discussed. In addition, 10 of the meetings of the Mogopa Development Forum 
were attended and observed over a number of years, and one meeting between 
provincial government officials and the Mogopa Development Committee was attended 
in 2001. Numerous visits to Mogopa were made between 1991 and 1994 with 
university students. Observation, as part of participatory rural appraisal, was more 
structured, formal and participant on these occasions. I made Jess formal, unstructured 
visits to Mogopa in 1997, 1999,2000 and 2001. 
At Schmidtsdrift, two meetings between community representatives and provincial 
officials were attended and observed in 1996, and a number of less formal visits to the 
site were undertaken in 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2001. 
Thus, a wide range of methods was used to carry out the qualitative case study research 
in the current study. 
"However, these are only ancillary tools in interpretive inquiries. At the heart of 
the inquiry is the researcher's capacity for encountering, listening, understanding, 
and thus 'experiencing' the phenomenon under investigation" (Piantanida and 
Garman, 1999: 139). 
5.7 Reflections on the choice of case studies in the South African context 
De Jongh (1990) discussed the difficulties - "the peculiar circumstances" - confronting 
social scientists undertaking fieldwork in South Africa in the 1990s, especially when 
doing research in communities other than their own. While most of the research for this 
study was carried out after the 1994 change in government and the abolition of 
apartheid, deep differences lingered in the country between people who had been kept 
apart pbysically and culturally by government policy: this remains possibly one of the 
worst effects of apartheid. One anthropologist wbo conducted fieldwork in South 
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Africa in the late 1980s was led to conclude that h no outsider ever becomes an insider" 
(Cross, 1990:42) in such a research setting. Despite this conclusion, she had continued 
her own work: 
"Rural and semi-rural populations are normally patient and polite to their 
investigating visitors - and if they are not, there is nothing much to do about it. 
Fieldwork is a process of learning greater cultural competence through a process 
of embarrassing mistakes. Slowly, the green fieldworker gets used to feeling at 
sea in someone else's pool of procedures" (Cross, 1990: 36). 
In order to bridge the gap between these two 'worlds', any planner seeking to work in 
the 'new' South Africa, and especially those working with rural communities, would 
have to study the stories, and enter the memories and resentments of past planning 
practices that were held by communities that had been the objects of apartheid planning. 
Instead, the communities would have to become the subject. Planners in South Africa 
would need to proceed on the basis of a thorough understanding of the socio-political 
processes that had shaped the contexts in which they worked (Watson, 2002), and (for 
some possibly for the fIrst time) to recognise and come to terms with the country's 
cultural diversity in their planning. According to Watson, this might mean working in 
contexts of "fundamentally different and conflicting rationalities" (Watson, 2003:405), 
which would require them to extend their thinking into other epistemological worlds -
like "walking in another's shoes" (Umemoto, 2001) or listening to "voices from the 
borderlands" (Sand.ercock, 1998). 
My contact and involvement with the two case study communities began some time 
before I embarked on the fonnal research process. When contact was first made with 
the Bakwena ba Mogopa in 1991, it was at the request and in the company of 
fieldworkers from the Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC), the NGO that had 
responded to requests from the community for support. TRAC had originally been 
invited by the community to assist with the ongoing negotiations with government 
officials over their land claim, and wanted to discuss ideas for the rebuilding of the 
village. Community members were welcoming, and discussions that were not carried 
out in English or Afrikaans, but in the local Tswana language, were willingly translated 
either by a fieldworker or by a community member. My association with the 
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community continued over a number of years through meetings of the Mogopa 
Development Forum, at which I was an advisor. Thus, by the time the formal research 
process began, I was known to many of the residents of Mogopa, and a good 
relationship had been established. 
The Bakwena ba Mogopa land claim was thus an obvious choice as a case study: I had 
access to the community and to the non-governmental organisation that had been 
working with them, and this overcame many of the potential practical problems that 
might be encountered. Importantly, a valuable amount of secondary data had been 
collected in the form of correspondence with government officials and agencies, 
photographs, and minutes of meetings, but none of this data had been analysed. This 
material had been collected while I was involved with the community, not as a 
researcher, but as a participant advisor in the planning process. 
In the case of Schmidtsdrift, a far more formal relationship was established with the 
community, although contact was first made when I met community leaders and some 
community members as part of the planning team in 1995. Only a limited number of 
visits were arranged, some in the company of officials and the planning team members. 
but others unaccompanied, and community representatives that were met and / or 
interviewed, spoke English. For Schmidtsdrift, there was not as much secondary data 
available as there was for the Mogopa case, although I was fortunate to be given copies 
of correspondence and files from the planning consortium that worked with the 
BaThlaping. Thus, the contacts made, and the background knowledge that I had gained 
as a member of the planning team, made Schmidtsdrift the choice as the second case 
study. In the two chapters that follow, the stories of the Bakwena ba M~gopa and the 
BaThlaping will be presented. 
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6. MOGOPA - 'TELLING THE STORY' 
6.1 Introduction: Buying the Land 
Mogopa is the name used officially to describe two farms that cover an area of 7,862 
hectares in the rural Ventersdorp district of North West Province in South Africa. The 
community of Mogopa, known as the Bakwena ba Mogopa, originally came to the area 
from the Free State Province to the south. In 1912, they purchased the farm Zwartrand 
(3,830 hectares), raising the necessary funds through the sale of cattle. They were 
successful cattle farmers, and Zwartrand provided good grazing for their herds. 
However, shortly after their move, the then Union government established one of the 
first legal pillars of what was to become apartheid, in the form of the 1913 Natives Land 
Act (Act No.27 of 1913). This Act aimed to restrict ownership of land by black people 
in South Africa to the existing reserve areas. The 1913 Land Act had, of course, been 
preceded by a number of laws in both the British colonies and Boer republics before 
Union in 1910. But the 1913 Land Act went much further: it provided 
"the statutory basis of territorial segregation, by dividing South Africa into areas 
where Africans could own land (the reserves) and the rest, where Africans were 
prohibited from 'purchase, hire or other acquisition of land or of any right 
thereto'" (Bundy, 1990:5). 
In 1936, the state scheduled more land for release and occupation by black people with 
the promulgation of the Native Trust and Land Act (Act No.I8 of 1936). This law, 
however, simultaneously placed further restrictions on access to land by black people in 
white areas. Together, the two Land Acts, as they became known, set the state's 
planning approach as one designed not only to control, but more specifically to deny 
black people access to land (Platzky and Walker, 1985). The term 'black spot' was 
coined at this time. It referred quite literally to 
"African freehold land and land owned by church or mission stations leased to 
individual Africans; in both cases land falling within what the government has 
defined as a white area" (platzky and Walker, 1985:44). 
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The land owned by the Bakwena ba Mogopa was regarded as a 'black spot', even 
though it had not been part of one of the traditional reserves. Theirs was one of the 
isolated areas that had not been specified in the 1913 Act. There were other such areas, 
and in 1916 a government commission 
"had recommended that (such) isolated Native areas be protected in their existing 
rights, so that no expropriation of that area or removal of its occupants be carried 
out except with the consent of Parliament conveyed by an Act. This limited 
protection for those hard-won freehold rights was not adopted in 1936" (platzky 
and Walker, 1985:90). 
But in 1931, the commission's recommendations gave the community enough of a sense 
of security to raise funds, through their farming and the sale of the mineral rights on 
Zwartrand, to purchase a second (adjoining) farm, Hartbeeslaagte (4,032 ha.). The 
acquisition of Hartbeeslaagte provided the growing community with additional land for 
both ploughing and grazing, and they thereby gained self-sufficiency in agriculture. 
However, aware of their vulnerability in terms of the growing number of apartheid laws, 
the Bakwena ba Mogopa sought to secure perpetual ownership by the community of the 
farms. The only legal way of doing this at that time was to register the land in the name 
of the then Minister of Native Affairs, to be held in trust for them. This move was also 
designed by the community to prevent individual chiefs or headmen from selling off the 
farms for personal gain. 
For the next four or five decades the community successfully farmed the land; a modest 
village was built on one of the farms, and schools, churches, shops and water reservoirs 
were built. Surplus crops from the land were sold to the local (white) farmers' co-
operative. 
The Mogopa village was organised along traditional communal lines: all men who were 
members of the community were granted the right to land for their (and their family's) 
needs, in exchBl:lge for which they contributed to the community funds, managed by the 
headman, who was accountable to the community for the use of these funds. For the 
people of Mogopa, the period up to the 19608 was one of relative prosperity and 
tentative security on their land, in spite of the shadow of apartheid policies that were 
beginning to be implemented elsewhere in the country. 
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6.2 Threats of removal: 1948 to 1983 
After the accession to power of the National Party in 1948, a form of apartheid 'social 
engineering' was implemented. This involved the systematic social and economic 
restructuring of South African society according to the ruling party's politically defined 
objectives. These objectives in turn embodied one of the fundamental principles of 
apartheid: the planned concentration of power (and land) in the hands of the white 
minority. Numerous Acts of Parliament (see 2.4 above) legally entrenched these 
policies, one of which involved the forced removal of black people from cities, white 
farms and 'black spots' to the rural reserves. 
Forced removals had been part of the country's history before 1948, but "they reached 
their most concentrated and colossal form between the early 1960s and mid-I970s" 
(Bundy, 1990:8). A 1965 circular from the then Department of Bantu Administration 
and Development3 described the processes for the removal of black spots. It serves to 
illustrate the way in which land ownership was used as a political tool: 
"with the words • clearance of black spots' is understood the suspension of 
property rights vested in Bantu in land situated in White areas, that is part of the 
larger policy of the creation of Bantu bomelands that has to be speeded up" 
(Platzky and Walker, 1985: 115, quoted and translated form the original Afrikaans, 
empbasis in the original). 
One of the many laws that were used in the removal of communities during this period 
was the Black Administration Act (Act No. 38 of 1927). While this Act was passed in 
1927, in many ways it embodied some of the principles of social engineering that were 
to be seen in apartheid planning in the years which followed. In the parliamentary 
debate preceding the passage of this Act, the then Minister of Justice made the 
following observations: 
"... If you have the power to remove (black people) from one place where they do 
mischief to a place where they do not do mischief, what a useful provision that 
would be. Just imagine for a moment. I am going to a certain extent into the 
realms of fancy. Imagine taking a farm and placing upon that farm all the 
3 Over the years this department's name changed a number of times to include: The Department of 
Native Administration; The Department of Bantu Administration and Development; The Department 
of Co-opcration and Development; The Department of Development Administration; and The 
Department eX Plural Relations. 
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agitators who are going about the country and letting them hold meetings with 
each other on that farm. In three months time how many of them would survive? 
Just think what the result would be of that sociological experiment... I believe 
that powers of this kind are essential in South Africa, and that they are going to do 
more good to the natives than any other portion of the community ... It is quite 
obvious, I think, that these powers would be used for the benefit of the natives" 
(Markus,1990:17-18). 
The state, however, tried to claim that all removals were voluntary. This is reflected in 
a statement made by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development at the 
height of black spot removals in 1969: 
"We get their co-operation in all cases voluntarily. As a matter offact, sometimes 
it is necessary to do quite a lot of persuasion, but we do get them away" (Platzky 
and Walker, 1985:p.128). 
The 1960s and 1970s was a period of intense implementation of the state's apartheid 
planning policies. At least three million people were moved into the increasingly 
overcrowded and impoverished reserves, and expected to make a new life for 
themselves under trying conditions4. There was much criticism from both within and 
outside the country (Christopher, 1994). In an effort to counter the negative image of 
forced removals, Minister Piet Koornhof was reported as saying that no more forced 
removals of people from their homes would take place (Platzky and Walker 1985: 152), 
and state planners publicly insisted that their planning was not a top-down, one-sided 
exercise. In the early 1980s the state officially adopted a more 'development-oriented' 
approach, and the term 'removal' became officially replaced by 'resettlement'. As was 
stated in a parliamentary debate at the time: 
"The word 'removal' should not be used at all. It is the Hon. member for 
Houghton who uses the word 'remove'. The correct word is 'resettle'. If you 
remove 8 person, then you remove him. You do not see him again and you do not 
take any responsibility for him. But if you resettle a person, that is a completely 
different matter" (platzky and Walker, 1985:152). 
4 Platzky and Walker estimated that 3,548,000 people had been removed between 1960 and 1983, while 
a further 1,934,650 remained lDldertbreat of removal; see also Desmond, 1971, and Map 3. 
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In an attempt to give credibility to the new approach, planning committees were 
established in communities that were targeted for removal. These committees were to 
consist of representatives of the Department of Co-operation and Development - the 
department had acquired a new name to match its new approach - representatives of the 
relevant reserve area, and of the community concerned. However, the case of the 
Mogopa community shows that the intention was to co-opt rather than to consult, and to 
manipulate and even divide communities. The question to be resolved by the planning 
committee was not whether the community would be removed, but when and how this 
would happen. The agendas for the planning meetings had already been set before the 
committee was formed; the community's removal had already been planned before the 
first meeting of the planning committee took place. 
By the end of the 1970s, the community at Mogopa numbered about 5,000 people, and 
it was clear that the village was viewed by the state as a 'black spot' in the otherwise 
'white' rural farming district of Ventersdorp. This was in the heart of conservative 
Mrikaner territory and the pressures from the state for removal began to be felt: 
nonetheless the villagers at Mogopa repeatedly sent away officials who threatened them 
with removal (l'RAC, undated). 
6.3 Government Tactics at Mogopa 
By September 1981, however, it was evident that the traditional headman had been co-
opted by the state into furthering its policies. This angered the community who had 
long suspected that he was misusing his powers to extract money from people for 
services that had always been free (such as the processing of pension applications and 
labour contracts). In response, they deposed the headman, on the grounds that he had 
misused tribal funds, was corrupt, and had failed to respond to tribal discipline (TRAC, 
undated). Despite this, the local white commissioner responsible for the administration 
of the area attempted to thwart the community's action by saying, 
'''I as a white man and magistrate of this whole area say Jacob More (the 
headman) will rule until he dies'. (As an agent of the State President who (was) 
Paramount Chief of all blacks, he was legally quite within his powers in making 
this statement}." (TRAC, undated: p.2). 
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The commissioner subsequently notified the people of their planned removal and set up 
a local planning committee comprised of the deposed headman and his cohorts as 
community representatives. The people of Mogopa unsuccessfully tried to force 
meetings of the planning committee to be conducted openly, and early in 1983 the 
headman agreed, supposedly 'on behalf of the community', to the relocation of the 
Bakwena ba Mogopa to a fann at Pachsdraai, an arid area some 150 km to the north-
west of Mogopa, and about 70 km from Zeerust, the nearest town with proper shopping 
facilities and work opportunities (see Map 4). While the deposed headman and ten 
families made the move, and were compensated (at R8,OOO per household), the rest of 
the community adopted a strategy of resistance by remaining at Mogopa. 
"This process of dividing communities by setting up, bribing and manipulating 
leaders is generally effective, from the state's point of view. The question of 
whether to resist or collaborate splits families (and communities) down the 
middle ... " (TRAC, undated: p.3). 
Resistance can take different forms, varying from silent resignation, individual or group 
resistance with or without outside support, moving elsewhere in defiance or desperation, 
or even violence. Whatever fonn resistance took in South Africa at that time, ultimately 
it meant defiance of the law: 
"The law is a potent form of control over black people. People threatened with 
removal are confused and intimidated by the complexity of the language and far 
reaching array of laws that confronts them. Most consider themselves peaceful 
and law-abiding citizens: to challenge the law ... is a radical step" (Platzky and 
Walker 1985:143). 
6.4 The involvement of the Transvaal Rural Action Committee ([RAe) 
It was in this context of threatened removal that the local community approached a non-
governmental organisation, the Transvaal Rural Action Committee (fRAC) for support 
and assistance. At first, on visits to Mogopa, "meetings were conducted between TRAC 
fieldworkers and the men. Women were observers, responding only monosyllabically 
when directly asked to" (TRAC, 1994 p.21). In fact, in these early stages, and as an 
indication of how the issue of the removal had split the community, it appears that many 
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women were in favour of relocating (fRAC, undated). Fieldworkers tried to convince 
the men of the need to involve all sectors of the community, including the youth and 
women, if they wanted to fight effectively against their removal. This was clearly an 
issue not only of participation (in the process of resistance and 'insurgent' planning'), 
but also of the empowerment of women, who were to become an important force at 
Mogopa (Laburn-Peart, 1997). When, with permission of the kgotla (the traditional 
male only tribal decision-making body. See Glossary) a separate meeting was arranged 
with the women, the women were surprised and apprehensive. 
"I started organising women and trying to put confidence in them that they also 
have to be part of the decision-making body of the community. The fact is that 
the women are the ones that are affected by all these threats of forced removal. 
When the government officials arrive in their community, the fust people to be 
approached are the women at their homes where they are looking after the 
children and their homes while their husbands are maybe in the veld looking after 
their cattle or even in town as migrant workers" (Lydia Kompe, former TRAC 
fieldworker and founder of the Rural Women's Movement. TRAC,1994:22). 
The TRAC fieldworkers pointed out to the women that their passivity and lack of 
assertiveness in the face of state officialdom could be interpreted as consent to the 
removal. It emerged that in fact most of the women had not been fully informed about 
the threatened removal, since they were excluded from the kgotla and only gleaned 
information from their husbands from passing remarks or overheard conversations. The 
men had made little or no attempt to explain to the women the wider situation 
concerning the proposed relocation, but had nevertheless left them to face and deal with 
the crisis when they (the men) left for work in the city every week. As a result of the 
meetings with TRAC fieldworkers, the women came to play an important part in 
resisting the removal of the Bakwena ba Mogopa. This facilitation and capacity 
building work of the NGO ultimately led to the formation of the Rural Women's 
Movement, a 'sister' NGO to TRAC and The Black Sash (See Glossary). 
With the support and encouragement of the fieldworkers, a women's group was fonned 
at Mogopa, and four or five representatives were elected to approach the kgotla. For a 
rural community organised along traditional lines, this was a revolutionary idea, and the 
fieldworkers had much work to do to persuade the men of the community to make this 
break with tradition, but tbey succeeded. 
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Less successful, however, was the struggle to resist the impending removal of the 
community. In June 1983, state bulldozers destroyed the community's schools and 
churches and some of the houses. Predictably, this was done on weekdays when most 
of the men of the village were away. It was the women of the community who faced the 
bulldozers and police officers. But they had at least been to meetings of the kgotla, and 
as a result could act with new confidence and in unity, confronting (with the support of 
TRAC fieldworkers) state officials who were attempting to forcibly remove them from 
their homes, and being served the eviction orders in the absence of the men. They could 
only watch while officials took the engines for their water pumps, and essential services 
were cut off. In the absence of their husbands, they and the older men were issued with 
an ultimatum to leave the farms by November 1983. 
These methods and tactics used by state officials to try to enforce the relocation of the 
Bakwena ba Mogopa were all tried and tested in other communities in order to obtain 
their co-operation to move 'voluntarily': 
"What does the state do once they have smashed the schools, stopped the 
transport, cut off the water, threatened force - and people still refuse to move? 
One of the most effective things it does is to do nothing. It waits. There is a limit 
to how long people can live without schools, without pensions, without migrant 
labour contracts and with daily uncertainty about their future. If it is a matter of 
who can sit it out, the state is the more likely winner" (TRAC, undated: p.7). 
6.5 Resistance and Removal 
But the people of Mogopa had other plans. With the help of church and other service 
organisations such as TRAC's parent organisation, the Black Sash, their plight became 
publicised, and became the focus of an international outcry. The community decided to 
defy the state's plans. and to rebuild their village, their schools and to install new water 
pumps, funded by church and non-governmental organisations, and foreign donors. But 
the state could not accept this defiance of its plan, and had to act: 
"In the early hours of February 14 1984, Mogopa was surrounded by armed 
police. At 4am the people were informed through loud hailers that they must load 
their possessions into trucks and go to Pachsdraai. Nobody was allowed to leave 
their houses. Jacob More took the police and the officials to the houses of all the 
leaders first. Tbcywere handcuffed and put into police vans. Their families 
refused to pack their possessions - government labourers did so. Women were 
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carried into the lorries and buses. People tried to run away and children were 
loaded with the furniture and dispatched to Pachsdraai. All of this happened in 
the presence of armed policemen who had dogs at their disposal. People caught 
standing together outside their houses were beaten with batons. Parents became 
desperate to fmd their children, and got onto the buses to Pachsdraai to go and 
look for them there ... No outsiders were allowed in ... - excepting the police of 
course, and the white farmers who had free access in and out to buy the people's 
livestock at a tenth of its value" (TRAC, undated:7). 
"The removal was executed without warning by an armed contingent of 
policemen who first sealed off the farms, preventing entry by the tribe's lawyers, 
journalists, diplomats and priests. In the ensuing panic members of the tribe 
suffered substantial losses through breakages and the forced sale of the cattle to 
white farmers who appeared on the scene" (Marcus, 1990:p.22). 
Mogopa ruins, 1984 
Three days after the removal of the community from Mogopa in 1984, a home and 
car lie stripped. When the community eventually returned to the site, some of the 
ruins of boundary walls (visible in the distance) were preserved as reminders of what 
they had endured 
(Photograph courtesy of Gille de Vlieg) 
The people of Mogopa refused to accept their fate at Pachsdraai with members of the 
tribe who had betrayed them, and immediately fled to Bethanie, home of their 
paramount chief. While their tenure at Bethanie was insecure and basic amenities such 
as water, housing and schooling were entirely inadequate, at least they were not 
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complying with the state's plans. They challenged the legality of their removal in the 
South African Supreme Court; a case tbat they won in September 1985, and 
immediately made plans to return to their land at Mogopa. But the state had , in the 
meantime, followed an alternative legal route and expropriated the farms before the 
matter had come before the Appellate Division: 
"Dr. Koornhof (Minister of Co-Operation and Development and subsequently 
Ambassador to the USA) went so far as to attempt to introduce legislation 
intended to nullify the tribe's right of appeal altogether" (Marcus, 1990:23). 
View of Mogopa, 1991 
The ruins of the original village were clearly evident as community member began the 
work of rebuilding at Mog pa 
(Photograph courtesy of Gille de Vlieg) 
The Bakwena ba Mogopa would have been guilty of trespass if they went home. They 
were told that the Pachsdraai resettlement camp wa their compensation (in lieu of 
payment) for the expropriation, and that this land had been given to deposed headman 
Jacob More on their behalf. The state further informed the community that it was not 
prepared to allow them to return to Mogopa. Instead, since life at Pachsdraai was 
unacceptable to them, and life at Bethanie was insupportable, it was prepared to make a 
new piece of land available. Conditions attaching to this 'offer' were soon found to be 
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unacceptable. These were that the community would have to accept incorporation into 
the so-called independent state of Bophuthatswana (and therefore the loss of their 
citizenship of South Africa), and that they would have no security of tenure. but would 
remain tenants on the land which they were to occupy. 
This and various other options (including the repurchase of the Mogopa farms by the 
community) were explored by the community and its lawyers, together with TRAC 
workers over a period of two years, but no feasible agreement could be reached. 
Another plan had to be formulated. With the support of church and voluntary 
organisations, it was decided that the people would participate in a South African 
Council of Churches project to buy land for dispossessed communities. A large farm, 
Holgat, in the Ventersdorp district not far from Mogopa, was identified, and the money 
was raised for its purchase. But only days before the official registration of the transfer 
of ownership, the state expropriated Holgat, on the basis that the land was needed for 
the establishment of an agricultural college (that was subsequently never built). 
In late 1987, demoralised and under increasing pressure from their hosts at Bethanie, the 
Bakwena ba Mogopa decided that they had no option but to return to their land (now 
state-owned and leased to white farms to graze their cattle), even if it meant putting the 
community at risk, and possibly even the final disintegration of the tribe. At a 
workshop that was to have finalised the plans for moving to Holgat and for the first 
season's ploughing, the community's committee took the following resolution: 
"All our plans have been destroyed... Our first aim is to undo the expropriation. 
If that fails each group must struggle forward according to its means, and to its 
history ... We believe that the government's reason for expropriating the farm was 
to defeat our plans for the future. However, we will go on struggling for land and 
for a future for our children and our grand-children. We tried to achieve our just 
aims in a peaceful way by buying a new farm. The government has now closed 
this door to peaceful action, as it has closed all the other doors we tried to use ... 
Now we have no choice but to go and claim our own farms. We know that the 
government will treat us as criminals for this whereas we are just South Africans 
fighting for our birthright... We believe that all our suffering has been caused by 
the way in which the government treats black people, as though we are not people 
but animals to be herded around or birds that can live in the sky with no home on 
earth ... Yet we know that in the eyes of God all human beings have rights. We 
will never give up our efforts to realise our right to live decent lives" (TRAC, 
undated: 10). 
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A week before the planned return to Mogopa, in September 1987, the state agreed to a 
meeting with community representatives, making an offer of a temporary place for the 
community to settle until such time as a mutually acceptable site could be found. At 
this meeting it was agreed that while at the temporary site, the community would draw 
up its own plans regarding its resettlement, and that these plans should be submitted to 
the state. As a result of the meeting, the people of Mogopa moved once more, this time 
to Onderstepoort, near Rustenburg, some 75 kIn north of Mogopa, where at least there 
would be adequate water and fuel supplies (See Map 4). 
The plans that were drawn up by the community and its lawyers, supported by TRAC, 
motivated for the settlement of the community back on the Mogopa farms, or on land 
adjoining nearby Mothopestad, about 30 km to the north-east. But this plan was not 
acceptable to the state planners, for two reasons. Firstly, it was not state policy to allow 
black people to live in areas earmarked (as Mogopa and Mothopestad were) for white 
occupation; and secondly, a dangerous precedent would be set by giving state approval 
to the Mogopa plan, in that other uprooted communities might also demand to be 
allowed to formulate their own plans or to be resettled on their original land if the state 
were to allow this for the people of Mogopa. The community and the state entered 
another stalemate. 
6.6 The Return 
Late in 1988, about 60 tribal elders returned to Mogopa, with the intention of 
maintaining the ancestral graveyard that had become overgrown and fallen into a state 
of disrepair. In March 1989, a Supreme Court injunction was brought against them, 
seeking their urgent eviction from the farm. The community defended this action, on 
the grounds that the land belonged to them, arguing that the 1985 expropriation had 
been invalid. They lost the case on a legal technicality, but the community's lawyers 
immediately lodged an appeal. In the meantime, more members of the community 
drifted back to Mogopa from their temporary home at Onderstepoort. The state reacted 
by warning that no further increase in the community would be allowed, and that no 
permanent structures should be erected on the Mogopa site. Officials numbered each of 
the existing tin shacks as a means of monitoring the size of the community. 
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In February 1990, State President De Klerk announced a series of reforms for the 
country, leading eventually to the repeal of a number of repressive laws, the Black 
Administration Act and the Land Acts being among them. In August 1990, the 
Bakwena ba Mogopa were given permission to start rebuilding their school on one of 
their original farms, Zwartrand. To them this was indeed a victory, and an 
acknowledgement by the state of their permanent return to their farms. More members 
of the community arrived during the course of 1991, and settled on the site and within 
the ruins of the original village, although in temporary structures only. 
Road sign to Mogopa, 1991 
This sign, erected by the community, was for many years the only indication of the 
location ofthe village, barely visible from the road. Access was via a very rough track 
across the veld for approximately 1 kilometre. 
On 24th July 1991, permission to plough and to build permanent houses on Zwartrand 
was finally given to the community of Mogopa, who were ironically encouraged at the 
time by the Minister of Development Aid to "think about how they would organise 
themselves in future, and to start planning for development" (Land Update, 1991: 11). 
The significance of this however, was that the state had finally come to terms with the 
persistence of the people of Mogopa, and had accepted the permanence of the 
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community on their land. The community was given assurances that the title deeds for 
at least one of their farms would be transferred back to them. They patiently awaited 
the fulfilment of this promise, as more members of the community drifted back to 
Mogopa. However, with the government and the nation in transition, little progress was 
made. 
Typical dwelling erected by returnee at Mogopa, 1991 
No formal structures were allowed by the authorities. Note the numbering on the shack 
wall and the container for storing collected rainwater. 
6.7 Drawing up a plan using Participatory Rural Apprai al technique 
It was at this stage, in 1991, that the community asked TRAC for help in drawing up a 
plan for the rebuilding of the village and the development of Zwartrand. This saw the 
start of my professional planning involvement at Mogopa, when a a staff member from 
the University of the Witwatersrand's Town and Regional Planning Department, I 
began to work with the community on development issues, culminating in the 
compilation of a draft village plan (Laburn-Peart, 1994). The community believed that 
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possessing such a plan would better equip them in their dealings with the authorities, 
and in continuing their negotiations not only for the return of the title deeds for 
Zwartrand, but also for the second fann, Hartbeeslaagte. 
In the initial stages, I acted largely as an advisor to TRAC on planning issues5, and 
visited Mogopa on a number of occasions with fieldworkers in order to become familiar 
with conditions in the settlement, and also to establish contact and credibility. A 
number of community meetings were held, chaired by the TRAC fieldworker, at which 
development issues were discussed. At one of the earliest of these, the planning process 
was explained, and the possibilities and limitations of what the planners could deliver 
were stressed. (This needed to be done repeatedly as the complex financial, technical 
and administrative procedures of village development were navigated). Nevertheless, 
residents were able to discuss and articulate their development needs. 
In such a deprived community, these were seemingly endless. Some of the suggestions 
at the time were: improved road access to the village; piped drinking water; a high 
school; churches; pre-school facilities for young children; a clinic; a community hall; 
improved toilet facilities; electricity; shops; adult education; and help with rebuilding 
their demolished houses. After protracted discussions, during which I was able to 
observe and note down the preferences of the various groups within the community6, 
they agreed unanimously on a list of 19 development needs, the most urgent priorities 
for development being: 
• water supply 
• a high school; 
• a clinic; 
• a creche for pre-school children; 
• electricity supply to the village; and 
• a community hall. 
5 I later became a Trustee of TRAC and a member of the Mogopa Development Forum. 
6 Needs identified by the women of Mogopa were for a clinic, a creche, churches, a coDuDlmity hall, 
improved water supply, improved toilets, provision of telephones, improved transport services. The 
women's orien1ation to household management and their own practical daily needs, is evident in this 
list. The men' s priorities were different, and were for a high scbool, electricity supply. improved 
roads, a post office, aduh education facilities. shops, and administration and agricultural offices. 
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Community meeting with TRAC fieldworkers, 1991 
Most community meetings were held outdoors, since no large venues existed. This 
meeting was held under a tree outside a corrugated iron structure that was used for a 
health clinic held in the village once every two weeks 
The process leading up to the drafting of the village plan involved a number of 
Participatory Rural Appraisal techniques (Chambers, 19 4, 1997), tran ects and 
mapping being the most useful, and which included working with small and larger 
groups of villagers. Women made an important contribution to these exercises, 
particularly in the transect and census taking components of the mapping task. In 
addition, regular discussions were held with as many members of the community as 
were able to attend meetings, given that many of the men were migrant workers and 
absent from the village during the week. 
The mapping exercise took place over a weekend. Residents taking part located 
landmarks, streets, and both occupied and unoccupied plots, nearly all of them remnants 
of the original village that had been destroyed after the community was forcibly 
removed in 1984. 
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'Model' ofthe village created by community members, 1991 
The participatory rural appraisal mapping exercise used matchboxes to depict dwellings 
that had been rebuilt in the village. These included both formal and informal structures. 
Vacant sites were clearly distinguishable. The exercise was carried out inside a 
structure that had served as a bakery. 
Each household's site was identified, and matchboxes, representing buildings, were 
placed on appropriate sites. The resulting map showed clearly how the village had been 
reoccupied. Families and extended family group had returned to sites that they had 
originally occupied. (The village elders had exercised strict control on which families 
were allowed to return to Mogopa at this stage: those associated with deposed headman 
Jacob More were excluded, as were all families that were not part of the original 
Mogopa community). 
The names and approximate ages of residents of each dwelling were then recorded on 
each matchbox, generating a simple, but reasonably accurate census (see igure 4). 
Students from the University of the Witwatersrand' Town Planning Department then 
recorded this information and transferred the map and census information onto paper, 
subsequently producing the first' plan' of the village. 
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Age 0-5 6-16 17-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 5St- Total 
Group: years years years years years years years 
Male: 68 144 161 93 63 51 89 
Female: 102 218 140 105 89 63 110 
Total: 170 362 301 198 152 114 199 1496 
Figure 4: Results of Mogopa census exercise, 1993 
However, as has been found elsewhere (Bremner, 1994; Hindson et ai, 1994), 
organising a community around development issues proved to be different from 
organising them around resistance. While irreparable rifts had occurred in the Bakwena 
ba Mogopa community at the time of their removal, when their erstwhile headman 
Jacob More and his family were rejected as sell-outs, during the time that the 
community was in exile and fighting for their land, they presented a united front against 
the apartheid state. As they reoccupied their land and became settled, old and new 
frictions and power relations emerged, as was illustrated when some of the men tried to 
exclude women from meetings in 1992. Many of these conflicts centred on access to 
resources: 
"Development introduces scarce resources into resource-starved communities and 
focuses the power struggles in these communities, because the individuals or 
organisations that can control resources are able to command political allegiance" 
(Hindson et ai, 1994:94). 
Access to government resources was to become an important issue to participants in the 
Mogopa Development Forum (see 6.8 below) as the new government implemented its 
Reconstruction and Development Programme after the 1994 elections. 
The principle of open meetings to which all members of the community were entitled to 
come, and which had flexible agendas so that villagers were able to raise any issues, 
was carefully applied by the TRAC fieldworkers. It was at these open meetings that 
women seemed to feel most free to express their opinions and concerns. This was an 
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important lesson for me and the planning students to learn7, even though it often seemed 
to slow down the planning process. Meetings tended to last much longer and at times 
seemed to get irretrievably diverted from the planning issues with which they were 
supposed to be concerned. But this process of open debate, listening and arriving at 
consensus was a deeply traditional one, and established important principles for 
development. The planners were able to draw these into a list of criteria by which the 
community wanted all proposals to be assessed8• 
These criteria were used in the identification of alternative sites in the village for the 
priority uses. The alternatives were discussed with the Mogopa Development Forum 
(see below) and at an open community meeting, at which the final choices were made. 
The remaining communal uses were then allocated future sites, and the boundaries for 
village growth were determined. The final village plan was therefore the result of a 
continuous process of debate and consensus, and when presented to the community, was 
welcomed as something to which they had actively contributed with a sense of 
achievement. It was not a formal plan with legal status, but it was later used by the 
community in negotiations with the state planners, and subsequently in a dispute over 
residential plot allocation. 
Late in 1993, however, and with the country's first democratic elections only a few 
months away, the Provincial Administration astonishingly renewed its attempts to get 
development atMogopa to proceed on its terms. This involved among other things, yet 
another planned move for the community. Representatives of the community and the 
Mogopa Development Forum were able to show that the community already had its 
own plan for development. (Although this was only a working document, with no 
official or statutory status, it found its way onto official documents, and a few years 
7 Prior to this time, no students from the Department of Town and Regional Planning at the University 
of the Witwatersrand had been taken into the field to work in this kind of practical way with rural 
communities. 
8 These were that: key facilities should be easily accessible by pedestrians; facilities should be centrally 
located where possible; decisions should be taken democratically; the identity of the community 
should be strengthened through preserving and reinforcing structures and landmarks of historic 
significance; there should be minimal disturbance of existing development; there should be a clear 
definition of public spaces, and by definition, of private space; and there should be a clear indication 
of the nature and direction of future growth of the village. and its boundary should be clearly defined 
so as to preserve agricultural land (Labum-Peart, 1994). 
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later, Department of Agriculture staff had transposed this somewhat rough village plan 
onto their own official plans for the farms)9. 
6.8 The Mogopa Development Forum 
As it became clear in the early 1990s that major government reforms were taking place, 
the nature of TRAC's involvement with Mogopa and other rural communities began to 
change. TRAC had originally been established to work with rural communities to resist 
forced removals. It was fundamentally an anti-apartheid NGO that had a significant 
advocacy and capacity building role. When the Mogopa community began to reoccupy 
their land, TRAC saw its role as: 
"equipping the community to engage with the Department of Development 
Administration (the name at that time of the government department with whom 
negotiations were being held) in the process of development planning" (TRAC, 
1993). 
Further, in examining its role under changing national circumstances, TRAC drew up 
specific aims for its involvement, these being: 
• "to involve members of the community in producing a development plan which 
is acceptable to the community (politically sustainable) and agriculturally 
viable (economically sustainable); 
• to pass on skills to community members for this purpose and to create 
appropriate organisational structures; and 
• to play a brokerage role in finding funds and implementing agents to realise 
this plan." (TRAC memo, November 1991). 
In accordance with these aims and its role, TRAC was instrumental in setting up the 
Mogopa Development Forum (MOP). This was initially an informal grouping of 
organisations involved in a range of development project proposals at Mogopa, and 
which comprised representatives of a range of government departments, statutory 
9 In the event, history overtook the final attempt by an apartheid government institution to remove the 
community. Nelson Mandela's African National Congress became the first democratically elected 
government in April 1994. with its election manifesto of Reconstruction and Development for the 
country. President Mandela announced in his State of the Nation Address to Parliament in May 1994-
tbat a number of Presidential Lead Projects (of which Mogopa was one) would launch the delivery of 
the RDP within the IllSt 100 days of his tenure of office. Indeed, 1995 was declared "the year of 
delivery" (RSA. 1995b) for the RDP. 
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agencies, non-governmental organisations, development practitioners and members of 
the community. However, at the first meeting, a more fonnalised role for the MDF was 
agreed upon, as were a number of principles to underpin its operation (see figure 5). 
The following 5 principles were agreed upon at the first meeting of the Mogopa Development 
Fonun on 23rd June 1993: 
1. "The direction of development should be the community's decision 
2. The development process should ensure the transfer of sJci/1s for sel/-sustainobility 
3. The Development Forum should push the Government to take responsibility for the 
provision of services 
4. The Development Forum shouldfacilitate the sharing of information among development 
orgOllisations, and their experiences 
5. The Development Forum should c~ordinate the efforts of different orgOllisations to avoid 
duplication ". 
The roles and functions of the Development Forum were agreed as follows: 
1. ""The Development Forum should work with the community to address development issues; 
2. 1t shuuld provide aforum to e1lSUT'e the transfer of sli/Is; and 
3. 1t should bring together all organisations involved in development in Mogopa" . 
Figure 5 Founding Principles, Roles and Functions of the Mogopa Development 
Forum 
These founding principles were agreed upon by all that attended the meeting, including 
the elected Mogopa representatives. Meetings, which were open to all members of the 
Bakwena ba Mogopa, were held regularly over the next four years. They were 
generally held on a monthly (or 6-weekly) basis, and usually chaired by a TRAC 
fieldworker. Minutes were recorded and confirmed at each meeting, and records exist 
of some 27 of these meetings. These minutes therefore give a formal version of events 
and construct a particular reality of what happened at Mogopa at the height of the RDP 
Pilot Programme (1994-1996). Figure 6 shows the range of organisations that were 
represented at the meetings, and also the frequency of attendance at those meetings by 
their representatives. 
A range of problems was tackled and issues of development discussed at MDF 
meetings, including: 
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• development priorities derived from the participatory planning exercise (agreed by 
the community as: water supply; a high school; a clinic; a pre-school facility; 
provision of electricity; and a community hall. See 6.7 above); 
• the reinstatement of the expropriated title deeds for the two farms; 
• the principles and workings of the post-apartheid Reconstruction and Development 
Programme. including the availability of funds from the new government's 
Settlement Subsidy and Homestead Basic Needs Grant; and 
Organisation No. of meetings Attended J.n~ 
Government ent of Land Affairs 7 
RDPOffice 1 
1J_~ .. ent o~culture 15 
Depamnent of Water Affairs and Forestry 2 
Province uepanment of Education 4 
Department of Health I Social Welfare 9 
TPA Dept. of Communily Development 3 
NW Transitional District Council 2 
NW Pilot ~ Committee 2 
NW Pilot District Office 2 
Other Organisation I IT . ..! Development Trust 14 
Agency SizweTrust 5 
WestvaallNW ~onaI Services Council 2 
Agricor 1 
AgribankNW 1 
NGO Transvaal Rural Action Committee 27 
National Progressive Health Care 2 
Boskop Training 1 
Chan:b-bued South African Council ofChurcbes 13 
Covenant ... , 15 
Academic University of the Witwatersrand (Dept. 10 
TRP) 
CODluhants PWP Architects 21 
Fink Hollenbach and Partners 9 
Elizabeth Lemmar Development 3 
lngplan Engineers I 
Mokbep Buildin& 1 
Eamst and Partners 1 
Aquilla Buildina Services 1 
Community members (meetings were open to all villaaers) 27 
Figure 6: Attendance of meetings of the Mogopa Development Forum by 
organisation type 
(based on minutes of 27 meetings from June 1993 to March 1996) 
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• a range of specific projects, notably covering the 6 development priorities, but 
including others, such as a vegetable growing project; a pOUltry project; fencing; 
livestock management; a brick making project; a bakery; and improvements to the 
access road to the village. 
Three of these development issues will be examined in more detail. The first, the matter 
of the reinstatement of the title deeds to Zwartrand and Hartbeeslaagte, will reflect the 
frustrations that were experienced by the community and the MDF in dealing with 
bureaucracy at a national government level. The second, the matter of the building of a 
new school and of extensions to the existing school, will serve to highlight the 
experiences of the community in working with Provincial government departments. 
Thirdly, the story of the provision of a clinic will illustrate the involvement of private 
consultants in the planning process at Mogopa. A common thread running through the 
examination of each of these issues is the way in which participation by the Mogopa 
Development Forum, and in particular by the community itself, was facilitated or 
undermined. 
The Mogopa Development Forum achieved some early results. By June 1993, 170 
villagers were involved in a government-funded project that brought water closer to 
their homes. Prior to this time, it was necessary for each householder to collect water 
from a well located some distance away. Those involved in the water project were paid 
a small daily amount for their labour, and the project resulted in pipes being laid down 
most of the roads in the village to serve communal standpipes that were shared by a 
number of households. The project was funded by the Independent Development Trust 
(IDT, see Glossary) a funding organisation set up by the government At that time, the 
lOT also agreed within the MDF to take forward the community's other development 
priorities of a creche and a community hall as well as extensions to the existing school. 
The minutes of the early meetings of the MDF record that a number of undertakings 
were given regarding these priorities: 
September 1993 Department of Education undertook to build 2 new classrooms by 
March 1994 
lOT reported as seeking funding for 5 additional classrooms 
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October 1993 Department of Agriculture agreed to run a vegetable garden project 
December 1993 IDT agreed in principle to fund 5 new classrooms, but requested 
proof that the community had title to the land 
Meeting of the Mogopa Development Forum 1995 
This meeting was held in a newly constructed shed for storing agricultural equipment. 
The shed and equipment had been provided by the provincial Department of Agriculture 
However, there were also early signs of frustration within the MOP. The Transvaal 
Provincial Administration (TPA) was then the provincial government body with 
responsibility for the resettlement of the Mogopa community. In spite of the fact that 
the national government had announced its intention to return the title deeds of the farm 
Zwartrand to the community in 1991, the TPA was still attempting to persuade the 
community to move to an alternative site in May 1993. This caused considerable 
tension in the MDF meetings. By January 1994, the TPA had withdrawn from the 
Mogopa Development Forum, saying that it would respond only to specific and direct 
requests for services from the community. This went against the principles of the MDP, 
and the community's disappointment was recorded in the minutes. It accused the TPA 
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of neglecting its duty, and of raising and then dashing the expectations of the 
community through its involvement in and subsequent withdrawal from the MDF. In 
the event, after the 1994 elections, provincial boundaries were redrawn by the in-
coming ANC government and provincial government itself was restructured. The old 
province of Transvaal was divided into a number of areas, with Mogopa falling within 
North West Province. But the determination of the provincial planners at the time to 
pursue a top-down planning approach, even against central government policy, was 
clear. 
6.9 Dealing with National Bureaucracy: the Issue of the Title Deeds 
The issue of the title deeds epitomises some of the frustration that community members 
experienced in dealing with government bureaucracy at a national level. 
The Bakwena ba Mogopa had bought two farms, in 1912 and 1936 respectively. Title 
to both of these had been expropriated on the community's removal in 1984 (see section 
6.5). In 1991, when the then Department of Development Administration 
acknowledged the return of the community to the village by granting conditional 
permission for them to plough the land and build a limited number of houses, it also 
announced that the government intended to return title for one of the farms (Zwartrand, 
on which the village itself was located). 
In January 1994, the year of the change of government, the outgoing (and by then 
renamed) government Department of Regional and Land Affairs provided written 
confirmation that title to Zwartrand would be returned to the Bakwena ba Mogopa. 
However, it became clear that title to the second farm, Hartbeeslaagte, would be 
returned only on certain conditions. These conditions revolved around the settlement of 
non-community members within Mogopa, as part of the government's attempts to 
concentrate rural development, inter alia in order to facilitate the provision of services. 
If the community rejected these conditions, then they would have to re-purchase the 
second farm. Not unexpectedly, they rejected these conditions out of hand: the 
cODllilunity had bought Hartbeeslaagte in 1936 and it had been seized without 
compensation by the state in 1984. The community threatened to reoccupy the second 
farm. an act that would embarrass the outgoing government at a sensitive time. 
118 
Five months later, in August 1994, with the ANC government in place, the newly 
elected Minister of Land Affairs visited Mogopa and announced that title to 
Hartbeeslaagte would indeed be granted back to the community, with no conditions 
attached. The ANC gave the following press release (figure 7): 
A celebration feast was held in the village. Two months later, the Minister paid another 
visit to attend the official first ploughing ceremony on the land and another traditional 
feast. 
"Land Affairs Minister Derek Hanekom on Saturday overturned a Land Allocation Commission decision 
and retmned to the Mogopa community the land they were forcibly removed from 10 years ago. 
Mr Hanekom on Saturday visited Mogopa. a small rural village near Ventersdorp in the Western 
Transvaal. and said to the community: "The land is yours." After the announcement joyous residents 
clapped and hugged each other. Mr Hanekom joined them in their celebrations. 
The Transvaal Rural Action Committee said in a statement the meeting in Mogopa took place after the 
community had threatened to re-occupy the second of their properties taken from them in 1984 by the 
former Nationalist government ... The two farms bought by the community in 1912, Swartrand (sic) and 
HaJ:tbeeslaaste. were expropriated without compensation. 
"It was a clear-cutfon:ed removal," Mr Hanekom said on Saturday . 
... In 1991. the then Minister of Regiooal and Land Affairs announced that the government would return 
tide to SwartlaDd. However. without the use of the farm Hartbeeslaagte. the community had been unable 
to grow crops to support themselves. Unemployment is high and the community is very poor, TRAC 
said. They applied to the Commission for Land Allocation for the return of their second farm. They we~ 
told they would have to buy the farm back. 
On Saturday. Mr Hanekom overturned this decision. 
According to TRAC. Mr Hanekom committed his department to helping the community to plough the 
land and to supply other needed development resources. Mr Hanekom requested that the day the 
community started ploughing he be allowed to join them to plough the first furrow, TRAC said. 
Figure 7: ANC press release (Johannesburg, August 13th 1994) 
(Source: ANC, 1994b) 
In the minutes of the Mogopa Development Forum (MOP) there is silence on the 
subject of the title deeds for a number of months. In May 1995, the Department of Land 
Affairs representative announced to the MDF that the deeds were no longer with his 
department, but with another, the Department of Public Works. That department was 
processing the transfer of both sets of deeds back to the community. By September of 
that year, the representative was able to announce that the deeds had now passed to the 
State Attorney. The next month saw the tabling of a letter from the Minister of Land 
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Affairs, acknowledging receipt of a letter of enquiry regarding the status of the deeds, 
and this was fol1owed at the November 1995 MDF meeting by another letter from the 
Minister, in which he informed the community that the matter was now being handled 
by the government's Deeds Registry Office. 
A new house constructed alongside a back at Mogopa, 1993 
Note the television antennae and electricity cables 
The title deeds, first purchased by the community in 1912 and 1936, had been eized in 
1984, their return promised in 1991, and confirmed three years later in 1994. But after 
six years of negotiation and bureaucratic obfu cation, when the Mogopa Development 
Forum was wound down in 1997, the deeds had still not been granted back to the 
community. (The deeds were eventually handed over to the c mmunity in 1998, seven 
years after the initial promise). 
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6.10 Dealing with Provincial Government: The Issue of the School 
While the 1994 change in government at national level brought delays as new policies 
and staff were put in place, delays and frustrations experienced in dealing with 
provincial government (illustrated in the issue of the school at Mogopa) were even 
greater. 
Subsequent to the 1994 elections, new provincial boundaries had been demarcated. The 
four provinces that had existed since Union in 1910 (Transvaal, Natal, Orange Free 
State and Cape Province) were divided into nine (Northern Province / Limpopo, 
Mpumalanga, North West Province, Gauteng, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern 
Cape Province, Eastern Cape Province and Western Cape Province, see Map 5). 
cape Province 
Map 5: Maps showing the four provinces of the 'old' South Africa and the nine 
provinces of the 'new' South Africa 
Mogopa fell into North West Province. Provincial governments, the second tier of 
government in South Africa, were restructured, both in terms of the functions devolved 
to them (including planning) and in terms of their staffing. Many of those who had 
worked in provincial government under the apartheid regime found their positions under 
the new structures uncomfortable. Some provincial departments pursued affirmative 
action policies in their recruitment and retention of staff, while others pursued a policy 
of retaining experienced staff during the transitional period. 
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The building of a high school had been second on the list of the Mogopa community's 
priorities, but of increasing concern to them over the life of the Mogopa Development 
Forum (MDp) was the need to extend the existing primary school. An administration 
block was required, for the school principal's office consisted of a small tin shack that 
could not be properly locked, but which also had to serve as the school's storeroom. In 
addition, five new classrooms were needed to accommodate the growing number of 
children attending the school. Many of these came from surrounding villages, which 
had no schools of their own. The MDF minutes record that at one stage, the class of 
Sub-A and Sub-B pupils (aged 5-6) consisted of 105 children, with only one 
teacher.The building and staffing of schools in South Africa is a provincial government 
function. At the first meeting of the MDF in September 1993 (before the change of 
government), the representative of the provincial Department of Education and Training 
(DEI') agreed that two classrooms would be built by March 1994. It was further noted 
that application had been made to the Independent Development Trust (lOT) and 
another funding agency, Sizwe Trust for funding for the construction of an additional 
five classrooms. Two months later, it was noted that Sizwe Trust had given agreement 
in principle for funding for the five classrooms, but wanted proof that the community 
had title to the land. As shown above, this would not be possible for a number of years. 
At the MDF meeting in January 1994, the DET representative confirmed that two 
classrooms would be built by the end of March that year. The Sizwe Trust 
representative announced that the application for additional classrooms had been 
approved (despite there being no proof of title), but noted that the building of these had 
been "put on hold", pending the completion of the two classrooms promised by the 
DEl'. However at the MDF meeting in March 1994, a report from Sizwe Trust implied 
that application for funding for additional classrooms was yet to be made. 
In March, work was started on the two 'DEr' classrooms. Two months later, consultant 
architects, members of the MDF, reported to the Forum that they had inspected the 
foundations, and had noted some problems. This matter appears to have been resolved 
outside the Forum, as is was not raised subsequently. 
In May 1994 the same Sizwe Trust representative reported that funding for five new 
classrooms had been approved. The delays that had been experienced were "due to the 
consultation process". Sizwe Trust also requested the Mogopa Development Forum to 
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identify a site for a new high school. In an attempt to clarify the situation regarding the 
funding for the five classrooms for the primary school, the consultant architects met 
with officials from Sizwe Trust in July 1994. They established that a final decision 
regarding funding for the additional classrooms was still to be made. This was due to 
take place in August, so that work would then start in September, using local village 
labour. However, the Sizwe Trust representative told the August meeting of the MDP 
that the Trust still needed a letter from the community formally requesting them to fund 
the building of the classrooms. 
The MDF minutes for both August and September 1994 record that community 
members complained about the confusion that had been caused by organisations making 
promises to the village, but not keeping to them. However, the confusion over the 
funding of the additional classrooms was to continue. 
In October 1994, the meeting was infonned that the DEI' had approved the plans for the 
new classrooms, but that MDF should pu~ pressure on Sizwe Trust to release the funds. 
The Sizwe Trust representative argued that the funding had already been signed over. 
He went on to announce to the meeting that his job description was to "go into needy 
communities and find out what people need, and to put them in contact with people who 
can help them". He did not attend subsequent meetings. A new representative from 
Sizwe Trust was challenged at the next MDF meeting about the lack of progress on the 
construction of new classrooms. The new Sizwe Trust representative claimed that his 
colleague who had undertaken to obtain the funding had not been authorised to do so: 
Sizwe Trust had indeed initially approved the building work, but unbeknown to the 
MDF, had come to an agreement with the North West Province Department of 
Education and Training (NWDEf) that all funding for schools in North West Province 
would be channelled through. the NWDET. An initial R12 million had been available 
from Sizwe Trust for schools in the whole of North West Province, but by October 1994 
only Rll ()()() remained, insufficient for Mogopa's needs. The MDF was informed that 
in spite of this, since the building had been approved in principle, funding would 
eventually become available to build the additional five classrooms. 
The hopes and expectations of the Bakwena ba Mogopa had been raised and 
disappointed, not for the first, or the last time, and the October 1994 minutes recorded 
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the complaints by members of the community that there had been so many promises and 
plans over the past years, but so little action. 
In March 1995 a delegation from the Bakwena ba Mogopa and the MDF met with 
senior staff (including the Minister) from the new NWDEf, to discuss the impasse in 
the building of new classrooms. The Minister requested copies of the agreements that 
had been reached with the lOT and the previous provincial Department of Education 
(DEf), and noted that while there was a Minister for Education in the new Province, 
officials and support staff had not yet been appointed to deal with many matters at the 
newly reorganised provincial level. A month later, it was reported at the MDF that 
funds from the RDP had been allocated for five classrooms and an administration block, 
but that the community would have to produce a business plan for the project. The 
consultant architects agreed to assist with this. 
However, in July 1995, the MDF was informed that while the former Department 
(DEI') had promised R700 000 for the school, this amount was incorrect, and should 
have been only R400 000. In addition, the new NWDEf considered that the building of 
an administration block (rather than classrooms) was the major priority, and had 
allocated R250 000 for this, and would now need a feasibility study prior to the 
allocation of funds for the new classrooms. In the MDF minutes, the community 
recorded its frustration and disappointment, requesting that pressure be put on the 
Department for the new classrooms. 
There followed lengthy correspondence between the consultant architects and the 
NWDEf. At the August 1995 MDF meeting, the consultant architects reported that the 
required feasibility study and plans for the proposed administration block were almost 
complete. 
The following month they were informed that they, the consultants, would be provided 
directly with the funds for the school building project. The consultants were concerned 
with this apparent change of official procedure regarding the allocation of funds, and 
asked the MDF for advice. The community responded with concern: some school 
lessons were now being conducted in three tin shacks, and they had "never heard of a 
situation where government money was channelled through so many hands". At the 
next meeting in October 1995, there was no mention of this unusual funding 
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arrangement, but the NWDEf representative urged the community to be patient, noting 
that funds for the additional classrooms had been applied for. 
The choolat~ogopa,1995 
The corrugated iron structure in the distance was used for a number of years as the 
school's storage and administration building 
It was then announced that the NWDEIT's list of development priorities had changed. 
Mogopa had been granted R250 000 for the building of a new administration block for 
the school, and the department had applied to the RDP und for additional classrooms 
(at R43 000 each). The national government Department of inance would be requested 
to release the RDP funding to NWDET. In total, three applications had been made for 
Mogopa by the NWDET: one for the administration block, one for the additional 
classrooms, and one for a new high school. The representative again urged the 
community to be patient. 
At the November 1995 Forum meeting, the consultant architects reported that they had 
met with officials from the RDP Office in North West Province, and had entered into 
correspondence with them regarding the confusion and lack of action at the school. It 
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emerged from this correspondence that the NWDET had not only changed its 
development policies, but it had also employed its own planners to implement various 
projects. It had therefore become a problem for the department that the community had 
appointed its own consultants, particularly since Mogopa was a Presidential Lead 
Project. The new departmental procedures required that consultants should apply to the 
provincial Tender Board if they wished to work with the community. Alternatively, the 
community could provide the Tender Board with its own list of consultants. The 
provincial representative was asked whether these procedural changes were the cause of 
the delays over the school building at Mogopa. He replied that the main cause of delays 
in fact lay with complicated national "government procedures involved" within the 
national RDP Office, which was responsible for funding all RDP projects, and 
Presidential Lead Projects in particular. (In fact, at this time, the entire RDP 
programme was being reassessed at national level and replaced by the policy of GEAR 
(see section 3.4). This meant that the national RDP Office was being dissolved and its 
funding and functions were being distributed among a number of national and 
provincial departments. It seems that the considerable confusion, mixed messages and 
delays affecting the provision of classrooms at Mogopa were caused in large measure 
by these major policy and structural changes. There was no communication about these 
changes at MDF meetings, however, and frustrated villagers, NGO staff and consultants 
had no one else to blame but the officials who attended meetings). 
By January 1996, the beginning of the academic year in South Africa, frustrated and 
disillusioned parents began enrolling their children at schools in neighbouring villages, 
some distance away. The consultant architects reported to the MDF that there had been 
no change to the school situation. They and TRAC had written numerous letters to the 
North West Province RDP Office and the NWDEI', requesting that representatives 
attend meetings of the MDF, but there had been no response. A community member 
had tried to approach a senior provincial official about the funding for the school, but 
the official had refused his call. Two months later it was reported that a delegation had 
met with the same official, who had agreed to investigate the situation and to visit 
Mogopa. He requested that the community draw up a business plan for the school 
development. The minutes recorded a request that "national government" should be 
informed of the problems with the process at Mogopa, since it was supposed to be a 
Presidential Lead Project. 
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This meeting (in March 1996) was the last Development Forum meeting for which 
minutes exist. Mter four years of promises, consultation and planning within the 
Mogopa Development Forum, only 2 new classrooms had been built at Mogopa, but the 
school's need for further classrooms has risen to six, in addition to the still awaited 
administration block. 
Changes from the policies of RDP to GEAR, and changes to government and provincial 
structures and personnel can account for some of the delays. There appears to have 
been an inability to implement policy intentions and undertakings, and there were major 
problems with communication and the management of the planning process. One of the 
problems appears to have been that policies made at the national level (such as those 
dealing with the restoration of title deeds to the community) had to be implemented by 
provincial departments, which themselves were in a state of transition. One interviewee 
observed that 
"there was an assumption that you could give it all to province and that they 
would be able to run with it (the project). Give them the money and they will run 
with it. It just did not happen. It did not take off". (Interviewee 02, 1999) 
Other problems arose when policy implementation depended on co-operation between 
several government and / or provincial departments, as was seen in the spending of RDP 
funds through both the IDT and the NWDEf. 
liThe setting up of new institutional structures, policy documents and White 
Papers is the policy making stage. People have observed policy maJcing in post-
apartheid South Africa and have said, 'This is very exciting. Your policy 
documents are most sophisticated!' And we have said, • Yes, but we are not 
implementing them!' There are a lot oj very bright people working on policy 
documents, but we don't have very bright people implementing. They are 
therefore bad policy documents. A good policy document that can't be 
implemented is a bad policy document. It must take account of implementation, 
and things that Joster or hinder implementation, and address those as part of 
policy. But it goes even higher, because in South Africa, (RDP) policy was made 
by intellectuals who hadn't even been inside government!" (Interviewee 10, 
1999). 
The sophisticated and far reaching policies that were drawn up in terms of the RDP, and 
in the euphoria of the new democracy post-l994, may have fostered an over-ambitious 
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view of what the government could do with planning, and what planning could do for 
communities, making much of the planning 'laudable, but ultimately not workable'. 
Over-ambitious goals and unauthorised undertakings led to frustration, and ultimately to 
a continued and deepened sense of exclusion, as the gap between what was possible and 
what was aimed for, widened. One commentator observed that: 
"a policy which asks its implementers to do the impossible may prevent them 
tackling the possible... It is assumed (that) citizens impatient to escape an 
oppressive past will not tolerate modest goals. But among implementers, 
ambitious goals may lead to despair, given the vast gap between what they are 
meant to achieve and what is possible" (Friedman, 1998:1-2). 
This commentator went on to add that: 
"Co-ordination between government departments, much pursued in policy 
documents, is not 'natural' - they have their own programmes and budgetary 
interests, and will not easily abandon them in the interests of a common goal ... 
The RDP offices were phased out precisely because they were unable to achieve 
co-ordination simply by establishing an institution which mandated it" (Friedman, 
1998:3) 
NGOs were also drawn into the problems of implementation. Like other NODs, TRAC 
had had some measure of success in its work with the community. But as the nature of 
this work changed from resistance to development, it was less successful at getting 
development projects off the ground. Observed one interviewee: 
"Somehow I feel that a lot of NGOs are just not geared to that. There are quite 
hard skills needed, and what NGOs are good at are the soft skills" (Interviewee 
13,1999). 
Working with government and provincial departments, rather than against them, did not 
come easily to some NOOs, and one TRAC fieldworker noted that in the North West 
Province, there was no precedent for co-operation between NGOs and government. By 
contrast, private consultants did have experience of working with government at various 
levels. However, as will be illustrated in the next section, at Mogopa, this did not 
guarantee success. 
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6.11 Dealing with Private Consultants: The issue of the clinic 
The firm of consultant architects referred to above had become involved at Mogopa in 
1993 at the founding of the Mogopa Development Forum (MDF). Throughout, its 
association with the Bakwena ba Mogopa was on a voluntary basis. At first, its 
involvement was in working with the community to draw up plans for a clinic (the 
community's third highest priority for development) and in assisting with the funding 
applications for this project. However, two consultants from the firm soon became 
involved in the school project, and later in discussions about the construction of a 
creche for the village. 
The saga of the clinic project followed much the same somewhat depressing pattern as 
that outlined above for the school, with one major variation. In October 1994, after 18 
months of involvement in the MDF (during which time the community's need for a 
clinic had been discussed, and the architects had worked on plans with community 
members) the lOT delegation to the MDF brought with it members of a firm of 
consultant engineers. It was at this meeting that the architects reported ongoing 
difficulties regarding both the school and the clinic projects that had been agreed to by 
the community and the MDP. 
Within one month, the IDT announced that funds had been approved by the Regional 
Services Council (RSC, set up to fund public works from money obtained via specific 
taxes on industry in the province, see glossary) for the firm of engineers to build a 
community hall in Mogopa. A community halJ had been the lowest of the six 
development priorities that the community bad identified in the participatory planning 
exercise in February 1994. Now it appeared to have become the highest 
One of the engineers, interviewed later, gave the folJowing account of the consultation 
process that had been followed: 
"I was asked by the RSC to visit Ga Mogopa and identify what they can do to help 
the area, because they cannot just jump in and build something. So I went there 
and I had a meeting. I took one o/the senior representatives o/the IDTwith me, 
and he was a black guy and he called them together, and we asked them, 
'what do you need? Because I have a client. I've got a client, who wishes 
to spend some money on you. What do you need? ' 
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Now one thing about those people: they can have meetings, like we've never 
experienced! We started at something like 9 o'clock, under a tree, and we 
finished at something like 5 o'clock in the afternoon. 
The first thing was the road from the main road, which is also a dirt road, but at 
least it's a main road in good condition. From there - you remember - you've 
got to drive through a little bush track to get to Ga Mogopa, and once you get to 
Ga Mogopa it's a disaster, because it'sjust stones. So I said, 
'Let's see ifwe can get money for you for a road?' And I said, 
'/ object to having a meeting with you in the sun under the tree. Can we not 
give you a bit of quality of life and build you a community hall? So that at 
least if you have church or whatever, a clinic, or whatever, you can use that 
facility, at least a nice facility?' 
And they said: 'Yes that would be wonderful'. 
And I said: 'What about water?' 
And they said: 'Yes, we need water' 
And so we went along the list, and we then prioritised ... " 
[Interviewer: What were the other things on the list? What other issues did they 
raise at the time?] 
"They wanted a water system, running water, so that they could have flush toilets. 
And we must look at the housing system. Rebuild some houses for them ... Oh yes, 
they wanted to extend the school, and they raised the question whether or not they 
could have a secondary school there. Which I pointed out to them at that stage 
they were only about 3000 inhabitants there and it doesn't warrant a secondary 
school. But a primary school, / agreed with them, we'll look at that. And then 
from that, we went back to the District Council [RSC]. 
[Interviewer: So ~ prioritised them?] 
Yes, and I said: 
'The first thing, / think, to give you a bit of status, is to build yourself a 
community hall where you can gather and have your meetings and so on, 
because that is the type of money we can easily raise'. 
And they agreed. They said yes, they'll love that. And with that information I 
went back to the District Council [RSC). J wrote the report. I said, this is the 
priorities (sic), see whether you can be of assistance with the hall, see if you can 
be of assistance with the road. And J also wrote another lener to the government 
in Mmabatho, saying a road would cost so much... / immediately got the go-
ahead to build the community hall." (Interviewee 09, 2001) 
The engineers attended the next (November 1994) MDF meeting to urge the community 
to work with them on the community hall project. Implementation "could begin within 
a week" if they did this. They further undertook to train members from the village and 
employ them in the construction of the community ball. 
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When challenged by TRAC members of the MDF, the engineers claimed to have 
properly consulted the community members. However, minutes from the Forum 
meeting show that there was a complaint about the "lack of transparency" in the way the 
IDT and the engineers were working, and that the newly announced project was neither 
following the principles of the RDP, nor working according to the agreed principles of 
the MDF (see section 6.8). 
In the event, construction of the community hall did not begin the next week, and two 
months later (February 1995), a meeting was held to resolve a number of matters. The 
engineers had stated in a letter that they felt that the community's earlier list of priorities 
(produced in February 1994 and reported in the Forum minutes in March 1994, see 
section 6.7) were 'arbitrary' and that they (the consultant engineers) had established that 
there was an urgent need for a meeting hall. 
The community members at the MDF meeting responded that this was not the case. 
Their need was for a clinic, not a community hall, and the minutes recorded that the 
MDF requested that that money allocated by the RSC for the hall should be redirected 
to the clinic and / or school project It was noted in the minutes that the development 
priorities for Mogopa were still for a school and a clinic, and that "they can have 
meetings under trees, but can't hold clinics or properly educate their children under 
trees". The community members placed on record that according to the principles of 
the RDP and the founding principles of the MDF, they had a right to be in control of the 
development process at Mogopa. They felt that this control was being taken from them 
in this instance. The IDT representative responded that IDT and RSC funding could not 
be redirected to the clinic or school. and that if the community refused the offer of a 
community hall, the village of Mogopa would "go to the bottom of the waiting list" for 
lOT and RSC project funding. 
Two days later, TRAC was notified that the community had requested that the building 
of the hall should go ahead. The engineers had held another, separate, meeting at 
Mogopa, in which had they outlined modified plans for a hall, which could be used by 
the school, clinic and even for church services. 
The community had been persuaded by their presentation, but it is feasible and entirely 
understandable that they agreed to the building of the community hall out of 
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desperation. Years of participation in MDF meetings, of following democratic 
procedures and the ideals of the RDP, had resulted in very little development on the 
ground. This was literally an offer that they could not refuse, particularly since it 
contained the promise of training and the provision of some desperately needed jobs. 
Workmen finally arrived (almost six months after the first promise of action) in April 
1995 to begin construction of the hall. But the ANC-linked Mogopa Youth League 
staged a protest that prevented any work from being done, stating in their protest letter 
that: 
"Proper consultation has not been done. Who appointed the constructor? Who is 
administering the money? Why are they building on the (designated) clinic site? 
Which people are being employed, and who has negotiated their salaries? 
Employment should serve those who were never employed before. We as the 
youth have come to the conclusion that {a village member] not to supervise any 
project (sic). The community have a right to decide". 
An urgent meeting to resolve this issue was called by the MEC (Member of the 
Executive Council, a senior Provincial government member) for Public Works. the 
provincial department in charge of the allocation of RSC funds. TRAC suggested that 
all the participatory planning work that had been done in the MDF would amount to 
nothing if the IDT / RSC unilaterally appointed their own consultants to work on 
projects about which the community had not been properly consulted. nor did they 
regard as priorities. In TRAC's view, recorded at the meeting, it appeared "that there 
was a marriage" between the funding body and the consultant engineers. However, in a 
later interview. the engineer related his view of what had transpired at the meeting: 
"{When] we got into the conference room, 1 was immediately attacked: 'Who 
gave me the right?' 
And the chairman of the RSC was sitting there, and he said, • Well, he had 
appointed us to go and do the work there'. 
And they [community representatives] said, 'Well you didn't follow the right 
procedures' ... 
Then they started spelling out that I should have consulted with the RDP and I 
should have consulted everybody before I started. 
And I said, 'Well I'm not normally consulting (sic) anybody. 1 consult the 
community, and if they want it and they're satisfied, well, then we carry on. And 
they gave me a scrubbingJII 
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[Interviewer: So you had been contracted by the RSC. which is at the level of a 
district council. but now the provincial government politician was questioning 
this?] 
"Ja: 'Who gave me the right?' And I said, 'Gentlemen, all you've got to do is tell 
me to stop, and I'll stop, don't worry'. 
And they said they don't need a hall there, they need a clinic. 
And I said, 'Well, they haven't got a clinic. There's nothing at Ga Mogopa. The 
hall is designed with rooms that we've earmarked to be used as a clinic, and they 
will have that immediately. Within 3 months ... And if you want to build a clinic 
at a later stage, you're welcome. But this is at least a start, and nobody is paying 
for it, the RSC is going to pay for it'. It was mUlti-purpose ... 
1 was actually confronted by the chief of the RDP committee in Mmahatho saying 
that I've got no right to be there. But 1 got word from the RSC about a week later 
saying, go and carry on. So 1 re-appointed the contractor, and we carried on. 
Nobody then interfered... That was my experience. So it wasn't so pleasant, 
death threats and so on. It was totally against the grain of what I'm used to when 
1 do a service in a community. They are normally very thankful and thank you, 
because it doesn't cost them a thing". (Interviewee 09,2(01) 
These comments throw light on the perceptions of some of the professionals involved in 
work with rural communities in South Africa. Clearly. this interviewee felt that he was 
doing a favour ('a service') for the community by his involvement, and when faced with 
opposition or when his professional judgement was questioned, his reaction was to refer 
back to government officials, rather than seek to resolve the conflict with the 
community. 
Further heated meetings were held in the village, at which the engineers alternately 
threatened to withdraw and promised to deliver. At one point, when asked if women 
and pensioners would be employed in the construction of the community hall, the 
consultant replied that "if llike the man, I will employ him. Women could be employed 
to collect stones". Finally, a community vote was held, which went in favour of the 
construction of the community hall by the finn of engineers. 
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The new community ball at Mogopa, 1995 
What did this saga convey to the people of Mogopa about planning, the formal planning 
process and about the role of development practitioners in that process? One firm had 
been involved in a voluntary capacity with the MDF for a number of years, although 
their considerable efforts had succeeded neither in obtaining funding for, nor in the 
delivery of, the clinic project. The community' s planning, through the MD and the 
consultants, had achieved nothing on the ground. Another firm, seemingly in 
collaboration with the funding agency, was able to come into and then bypass the MDF, 
eventually to deliver something, paying little heed to the participatory and democratic 
principles by which the MDF was attempting to operate, or indeed of the RDP. 
Mogopa was (and still is) an impoverished, marginalised community that had tried to 
plan and do things ' the right way'. Caught up in the con iderable wave of enthusiasm 
for the democratic process in South Africa - 1994 was the first time any member of the 
community had been able to vote, and (not yet discredited) Winnie Mandela herself had 
visited the village in the run-up to the L994 elections - they had embraced the ideals of 
the democratic planning process. As a Presidential Lead Project, the community of 
Mogopa was supposed to be a trailblazing project for the implementation of projects 
according to principles of the RDP, fast-tracking procedures and establishing best 
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practice for projects elsewhere in the country. But their participation in this process had 
achieved nothing on the ground for them. Promises had been made and undertakings 
had been given by officials at all government levels. These had come to nothing. It was 
hardly surprising that they accepted the offer of the community hall, even though it was 
not their highest priority need; they had not been properly consulted about it; nor were 
its members ultimately employed in its construction. Further, the community hall issue 
was a divisive one within the community. The minutes of the MDF record accusations 
against individuals thought to be conniving with the consultant engineers and pursuing 
or furthering their own interests. Scarce resources were at stake. 
The sense of disillusionment with the painstaking participatory principles that were the 
foundation of the MDF were felt not only by the community, but also by others 
involved. One of the consultant architects remarked: 
"Our involvement with the Mogopa Development Forum is complete, is over. We 
are quite disillusioned with the whole process. Government is not paying, money 
is not coming through to pay consultants, and the company is now having quite 
serious cash-flow problems" (Interviewee (17, 1999). 
The views of the engineer following his experiences at Mogopa are also significant: 
"But we as consultants, the role has completely changed. Where we've previously 
felt like consultants, it's now changed. It's not the same anymore, because they 
don't respect your experience or education, and so on... It was more a political 
thing than anything else. An Afrikaans speaker doesn't suit the politics of the 
moment, because [the assumption is that] he can only be from the old regime". 
(Interviewee 09,2(01) 
His sense of alienation from the process was further underscored later in the interview 
when he referred to the way in which meetings with the community had been 
conducted: 
"They've got a different sense of humour ... They won't laugh. I didn't laugh 
either, until afterwards! At that stage I was so annoyed. You know, I'm working 
presently with a project worth about R150 million. And I a"ange a meeting. And 
the people get here, and they want answers: When do you start? When will you 
finish? What is it going to cost? You know - to the pOint, business-like. But now, 
they get up there {Mogopa] and they talk about cows and ca"ots. Anything but 
the road! And you've got to listen to thal! It's not like a scheduled meeting fOT an 
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hour. It takes you from 9 o'clock until 4 o'clock. 1 never got away there, never 
before 4 o'clock. And it doesn't start at 9, but you've got to be there then. Then 
they sort of arrive and a"ive, and as you go on with the meeting, then they 
arrive ... For us, it's quite an adjustment, because we're used to a professional 
atmosphere, and a professional way of doing things, a western way of doing 
things. You've got to adjust tembly to their ways. 
[Interviewer: Or do they have to adjust to our ways?] 
I don't get the feeling that we're meeting each other halfWay. It's not as easy as 
that" (Interviewee 09,2(01) 
This interviewee illustrated the clash of rationalities that had occurred at Mogopa: 
the community had evolved its own way of doing things - of holding meetings and 
of reaching consensus - forged by its years of resistance to state planning. The state 
appointed this consultant to carry out at particular project, and he was used to doing 
things in a very different fashion. 
But the sense of disillusionment was not felt only by him. One of TRAC's planners 
described a different kind of clash of rationality: 
"I could never do that again. It's too time consuming, with not enough results. 
I'm tired of saluting flags and all that kind of thing. Perhaps what is needed now 
is to actually get results, and if that means we have to go through a period of 
skipping out a little participation, well, that's what we have to do: a bit of 
benevolent dictatorship. I know it sounds te"ible, and it's not politically co"ect. 
That's the problem! People are being so politically correct that nothing is 
happening. And that infuriates me. I'm sick of all these talk shops, where they 
say, we need to do this, we need to do that... The main thing is that we are going 
to learnfrom our mistakes, and the mistakes we're going to make on the ground 
are the ones we're going to learn from, that will teach us. I wish they'djust QQ 
things!" (Interviewee 13, 1999) 
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Water tanks installed as part of the new water supply system at Mogopa, 1995 
6.12 The Demise of the Mogopa Development Forum 
By early 1997, representatives from all of the involved organisations were no longer 
attending MDF meetings with regularity. TRAC sent out a memorandum calling 
members to consider the problems that had arisen, and propose solutions and changes, 
because the Mogopa community wished to "revive" the "spirit of the forum" (TRAC, 
1997). A meeting was set for July 1997, but in the meantime, with national and 
provincial policy changes being implemented, and powers being devolved to new 
district councils, a Provincial Steering Committee (PSC) had been put in place and the 
Mogopa Development Forum was never revived. One participant stated: 
"we never formally exited. We just slid out. I know there was a lot of frustration 
around the lack of delivery: Structures can only continue if there is a potential for 
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something. And impetus and energy comes from that potential. When people 
worked for so long towards a goal and the goal seemed to remove itself, it was 
difficult to keep active participation on the ground" (Interviewee 13, 1999). 
The MDF had set out with the aims of bringing together organisations involved in 
Mogopa; of giving control over Mogopa's development to the community; of 
transferring skills to village members; and of facilitating delivery. As such, it had 
anticipated some of the principles of the RDP even before the new government came to 
power, and had embraced them when they were published and adopted. From the three 
stories that have been told, the MDF appears to have succeeded, at least in part, in two 
of its aims. Organisations ~ brought together for a time, and community members 
acquired some skills and certainly learned much about some of the most frustrating 
aspects of the planning process. There can be no doubt that the MOP paved the way for 
local development committees that were set up in subsequent local government 
restructuring, and that members of the Mogopa community were well positioned to take 
their places on such bodies when they were established. 
One of the participants interviewed for this study commented that in this respect, much 
progress had been made in the MOP: 
"We mustn't be too sceptical. I think the people gained knowledge of what the 
process is. But in terms of hard outputs, not much came of it. There was a lot of 
energy invested in the Mogopa Development Forum, and hours and hours (of 
time). I think it is very sad (that it ceased to function)". (Interviewee 13, 1999). 
Another concluded at the time that "in reality, nothing happened. The community found 
the process very interesting, but not very usefur' (Interviewee 02, 1999). 
The MDF did not fail in its aim to "push government" on issues of project delivery. 
The minutes of the MDF meetings bear testimony to that But, during its lifetime, it 
suffered great frustration in getting the government to deliver on its own policy of 
meeting Basic Needs and the community's identified development priorities. Ironically, 
in spite of the frustrations, most of these priorities (originally identified as: water 
supply. a high school, a clinic, a creche for pre-school children, electricity supply to the 
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village; and a community hall, see above) had in fact become reality for the community 
by 2002. One report states: 
"A new school for 400 children has been built, and piped water and electricity 
installed. A number of shops, a large community hall, a clinic and administration 
buildings have all been put into place. Various poverty alleviation projects have 
been undertaken to provide both employment and food, including communal 
vegetable gardens and crops, a bakery, communal building projects, road 
construction and maintenance, and laying of water pipes" (Bannister et aI, 
2002:44) 
In spite of this apparent 'success' within a context of continuing poverty, it is uncertain 
whether the Bakwena ba Mogopa were empowered through participation in the 
planning process in the first five years of the new South Africa. In the apartheid era, the 
planning process had been an intensely negative experience for this community as they 
were moved from the land they owned and their village and homes had been destroyed. 
This chapter has attempted to illustrate that their experience of the post-apartheid RDP 
planning process was little different. For them, the period from 1994 to 1999 was 
characterised by inaction, obfuscation, delays, and at times, deception. 
After the demise of the Mogopa Development Forum in 1997, and in accordance with 
the local government restructuring, its planning and co-ordinating function was taken 
over by the South District Municipal Council (SDMe) and a Provincial Steering 
Committee (PSC) that included elected community members, was formed to oversee 
project implementation. One of the projects that the community became involved with 
was the drawing up a business plan for the construction of permanent houses in the 
village, and the PSC held meetings with villagers to get consensus on house design. In 
2001, some 300 houses were built, funded by the Department of Land Affairs (although 
the houses were still referred to by the community as their 'RDP houses'). Local labour 
was used in the construction, and community members were trained in a range of skills, 
from administration to sewing and carpentry, funded by the SDMe and other 
organisations. 
"The houses that were built are 48m2, and have 3 - 4_ rooms each, with the 
foundations designed to allow for future extensions. Since the community agreed 
that their priority was the biggest possible floor area within the budget, no ceilings 
or fittings were provided, nor were the houses plastered. These finishes will have 
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to be provided by the community at their own cost. The Village Trust Fund 
(which received money by leasing village land to diamond prospectors) will be 
used for these purposes ... " (Bannister et ai, 2002:45) 
'Working for a better life with the community' - the site for the construction of 
new houses at Mogopa, 2001 
The sign clearly announces that this is an RDP project (to be undertaken by the North 
West Government Department of Public Works and Roads), despite the fact that the 
RDP had been superseded by GEAR in 1996 
6.13 Postscript: Mogopa Diamonds 
The land restitution story at Mogopa is not over, and indeed has had a further chapter. 
From the first visits I had made to the village, I was told by villager that there were 
diamonds under the Mogopa soil, and the farms showed evidence of long abandoned 
diggings. I was sceptical about this, believing that if there were indeed diamonds, they 
would have been found by those earlier prospectors, and exploited. I was therefore 
delighted as well as surprised to hear that prospecting was to recommence late in the 
1990s. Happily for the community, it appears that the farms may indeed prove of value 
for more that just agricultural purposes. Reports show that by November 2002, the 
Industrial Development Corporation had entered into a partnership agreement with and 
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extended a R7,5 million line of credit to a local company, Mountain Ash, which is in 
partnership with Etruscan Resources, a Canadian mining company. The loan was for 
the development of the Tirisano Diamond Mine at Mogopa, which had an initial 
capacity of 4,000 tonnes per day and an anticipated diamond production of 19,200 
carats per year. "This was the first phase of the mining project, valued at R20m to be 
developed in the area. Etruscan Diamond MD Gerald McConnell said the second phase 
of the project would enable the Mogopa community to own 26% of the project" 
(Business Day, 2002). The community will continue to share in the project via the 
Bakwena ba Mogopa Community Trust, which now administers the village. 
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7. THE SCHMIDTSDRIFT STORY 
7.1 Early Records: 1880s to 1913 
According to oral tradition and some written records (Breutz, 1968; Desmond, 1971; 
Surplus People's Project, 1983; Platzky and Walker, 1985), the six farms now known 
collectively as Schmidtsdrift were settled in the 1880s by an offshoot of the Tswana 
speaking BaThlaping tribe, which had originally occupied the nearby region of Taung. 
The Taung region is said to have been the southernmost point of the Tswana 'trek' of 
the nineteenth century. The BaThlaping originally got their name as 'people of the 
place of fish' from the fact that they had settled on the Vaal River, one of the main 
sources of water for the interior of the country. They ruled the lower Vaal area in the 
18th century, although they were subsequently pushed out of the area by the Griqua 
people. 
The BaThlaping settled on the 32269· ha area, some 70 km west of Kimberley, in the 
mid-19th century, shortly before a time of intensive activity following the discovery of 
diamonds near Kimberley in 1871. In the years that followed, and in order to meet the 
demand for labour, the state imposed hut, land and other tax requirements on the local 
(black) population. This effectively forced many indigenous people from the 
surrounding areas to fully participate in the money economy for the first time, by 
working on the rapidly expanding mines as a cheap labour source. Schmidtsdrift was 
near enough to Kimberley for workers to 1I'avel on a weekly basis, while the rest of the 
community continued to raise cattle and some crops along the banks of the Vaal River. 
7.2 The Period 1913 to l.96Os 
The Schmidtsdrift farms were declared a scheduled 'native area' (or reserve) in terms of 
the 1913 Land Act, which meant that they were administered by the Union 
government's Bantu Trust However, the community continued to live in a traditional 
way for the ensuing decades, and family homesteads spread widely throughout the area. 
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In the period immediately prior to the 1960s, a small 'white' village was also 
established at Schmidtsdrift (a 'white spot' in the native reserve). This consisted of a 
trading store, a hotel, a police station, a post office and a clinic, which "perhaps most 
important of all" (Desmond, 1971:110), was visited by a district surgeon twice a week. 
Cosmos Desmond also recorded that other small shops were scattered throughout the 
area. 
In the early 1960s, as the National Party government refined its apartheid policies, 
Schmidtsdrift was replanned according to 'Betterment Planning' principles (see section 
2.3 above). At first the community tried to resist this imposed reorganisation of the way 
they lived and farmed, and the enforced 'villagisation' of their homesteads that 
Betterment Planning involved. However, the state responded by deposing the 
(previously either hereditary or communally elected) headmen, and replacing them with 
leaders of the government's choice. Fearing further reprisals, the community did not 
continue to resist the implementation of the state's Betterment Planning scheme, and the 
people were resettled into a number of prescribed and carefully laid out residential 
villages, while the grazing and arable land was portioned out into 'economic units'. 
Perhaps by way of reward for their compliance with the government's planning policies, 
members of the community were compensated for the abandonment of their original 
homesteads. However, it appears that compensation was paid in kind, rather than in 
cash. Desmond records that compensation was "used to build very neat houses on the 
new sites" (Desmond, 1971:111). In addition, the Bantu Trust drilled a number of 
boreholes and erected fences around the new villages and fields. 
Some six Betterment villages were set up in this manner, and Desmond's estimate of the 
total Schmidtsdrift population at this time (the mid-I960s) was between six and seven 
thousand people. However, after only a few years, some of the villagers were moved ''to a 
completely different area, so all this effort seems to have been a waste of time and money. 
The boreholes and fencing are still there, but the houses have been completely flattened" 
(Desmond, 1970: 111). 
The basis of the economy at Schmidtsdrift remained traditional agriculture, supplemented 
by remittances from migrant workers. The land was used primarily for grazing livestock. 
Cattle, goats and sheep were kept, and horses and donkeys were used as draught animals. 
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The soil in much of this semi-desert part of the country is not fertile, but families or 
traditional family groups were allocated land for cultivation on the areas close to the Vaal 
River, where the arable land was located, and where water was freely available. While the 
land was managed communally, it remained officially the property of the government's 
Bantu Trust As was the case in most rural villages in South Africa at the time, many of 
the able-bodied men from the community were migrant labourers. This meant that they 
left the women in the villages to take care of much of the farming work, as they (the men) 
worked on the mines at Kimberley or Douglas, returning to their homes on weekends. 
Many were away for much longer periods. 
7.3 The Removal: 1968 
In spite of being declared a 'scheduled area' in terms of the 1913 Land Act, the land at 
Schmidtsdrift was not incorporated into any of the homelands when the boundaries of 
these were drawn up in the 19508. Schmidtsdrift thus became a 'black spot' in terms of the 
Native Trust and Land Act (No. 18 of 1936). In 1968, having been threatened with 
removal since the promulgation of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act in 1959 
(see section 2.3), the community (by now numbering some 8 000, according to Desmond, 
1971) was unceremoniously moved, in about 100 military trucks, to a place some 130 to 
140 miles away. 
One interviewee, a child at the time, described the removal: 
"When we [were] removed, I was only 10 years old. I was young, but I could see 
what was happening. I can remember very well. To us, because I was still young, 
it was very nice for us, because we could see the trucks coming. It was exciting, 
because we just wanted to climb [aboard the trucks]. We didn't know where we 
were going. But our parents were very sad. Some of them were crying, because 
they didn't know where they were going to, what is going to happen to them when 
they come to that place... To our parents it was a nightmare ... " (Interviewee 16, 
2001) 
Their new "home" was in fact nine different places, several miles apart, known as the 
"Wyks" (districts), on a remote farm about 25 miles north of Kuruman (see Map 4). It was 
144 
"an inhospitable place, unsuited to either crop or livestock farming. They were 
forced to leave their ancestral homes and dumped in the area without shelter. 
Their suffering was self-evident... They also suffered material losses in the move. 
They lost access to valuable agricultural and irrigable land. Most people lost 
livestock, which was grazing on the veld, which they had no time to round up 
before they were made to leave. People's possessions were broken in the move 
and many lost small items because of the confusion. People estimate that of the 
livestock that was transported in railway trucks, about 50% died. And what did 
they get in compensation? ... Arbitrary amounts were received. The average 
compensation for a house was R90 ... Others received R40 for a three-roomed 
house" (Land Update, 1994:13). 
Desmond wrote: 
''The ground is too dry to grow any crops or vegetables; livestock scratch about to 
find blades of grass. The place is infinitely remote, like a lost, dead land... [When 
they arrived] they found tents, boreholes and roads bulldozed through the arid 
landscape. I tried to drive to one of the boreholes but soon became stuck in the sand. 
The residential areas in particular are inches deep in sand. When I first visited in 
June 1969, some people had built proper houses, but many were still in the shacks. 
The men who were working in Kimberley and Douglas were unable to return home 
[on weekends] to build lest they lost their jobs or were endorsed outlO so the building 
was left chiefly to the women. One blind man was living in a construction made of 
old sacking. At that time he was not receiving a pension; I do not know whether he 
received one before he died a couple of months later. When asked what they thought 
of the place, people simply shrugged their shoulders and said: 'What can we say?'" 
(Desmond, 1971: 112-113). 
Platzky and Walker (1985:55), in their documentation of forced removals in South 
Africa, record that some of the most depressed resettlement areas in the country were to 
be found north of Kuruman where the people of Schmidtsdrift had been moved. They 
described it as "poverty-stricken, dry, dusty, isolated and forgotten by the rest of the 
10 To be 'endorsed out' is a reference to the rights of black people to be in a town in 'white' South Africa. 
Among other Acts and regulations,the 1945 Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act had sought to 
limit and control the influx of black people into 'white' towns. Any black person who had lived in 
one town since birth, or had worked for at least 10 years for one employer in one town, qualified in 
terms of Section 10 of the 1945 Act, for rights to reside in that 'white' area. When in 1970 the Bantu 
Homelands Citizenship Act legislated that every black South African was a citizen of one of the 
Homelands, those with Section 10 rights were able to retain them (although their children were not 
entitled to them). Section 10 rights would be lost, however, if the person changed jobs or lived 
outside the 'white' town. In this event, the person would be 'endorsed out' of the white area, losing 
vital access to places of employment. These infamous laws were among the first to be repealed in the 
reforms oftbe 19905. 
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country". Indeed, there are no further records of the fate of the community for the next 
nine years. 
Records do exist as to the fate of the land, however. Three different government 
departments contested the possession of Schmidtsdrift after the community was 
removed: the national Department of Mineral Affairs wanted it to be proclaimed as an 
alluvial diamond mining area; the Cape Provincial Administration wanted to use the 
land as a nature reserve; and the national Department of Defence wanted to use it for 
military training and weapons testing purposes. An inter-departmental committee 
examined the submissions of each of the government departments, and decided that the 
management of the land at Schrnidtsdrift should be passed to the South African Defence 
Force (SADF) in 1972 (see below). 
The road to Schmidtsdrift from Kimberley 
This photograph, looking towards Schmidtsdrift, gives some idea of the remote location 
of the village, and of the semi-arid landscape 
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7.4 Incorporation into Bophuthatswana: 1977 
In 1977, the areas north of Kuruman, including the Wyks where the Schmidtsdrift 
community had been resettled, were incorporated into the self-governing homeland of 
Bophuthatswana. When the Bophuthatswana Administration opted for "independence" 
later that year, the consequence for all residents, including the scattered Schmidtsdrift 
population, was the loss of their South Mrican citizenship. They thereby lost both their 
political rights and their access to jobs and services in South Africa. While those with 
Section 10 rights to be in 'white' urban areas (see footnote above), retained these, they 
were regarded as 'aliens' and had no protection against deportation. 
7.5 Establishment of SADF training facility: 1978 
As part of the apartheid government's evolving homeland policies, the land at 
Schmidtsdrift, already formally expropriated from the BaThlaping, had been transferred 
from the Bantu Trust to the South Mrican Defence Force (SADF) in 1972. The 
insensitivity of the forced removal of the community was aggravated when the SADF 
established a training and weapons testing facility at Schmidtsdrift in 1978. 
7.6 Settlement of San (!Xu and Khwe) at Schmidtsdritl: 
In 1990, soon after the anti-apartheid South West Mrican People's Organisation 
(SWAPO) won Namibia's independence elections, the SADP airlifted members of the 31 
Battalion (the so-called 'Bushman Battalion', because it was made up of members of the 
San or Bushmen people) to its base at Schmidtsdrift The men had been used as trackers 
during the South West Africa / Angola wars during the 1970s and 19808, and "the reason 
given by the SADF for this relocation was that it did not trust SW APO' s assurances that it 
would not seek retribution against the Bushmen who had fought against if' (Sharp, 
1994:2). 
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San settlement at Schmidtsdrift, 1997 
Despite having been moved to the area from Namibia in 1990, the !Xu and Khwe were 
still being housed in tents 
In ]993 the 'Bushman Battalion' was disbanded, and the soldiers were assigned to other 
military units, such as 3 Infantry Regiment in Kimberley. However, the 4,300 San 
residents remained where they had been 'housed' in 1990: in tents at Schmidtsdrift, 
living in "appalling conditions ... " A report by the South African ouncil of hurches 
noted that "the people are living in cramped and leaky tents... The San community at 
Schmidtsdrift has since 1990 degenerated into despondency and frequent alcohol abuse. 
Having aligned themselves with the apartheid-era SADF, there is not much sympathy in 
government circles for the community" (South African Council of Churches, undated). 
The following extract from a newspaper article in 1995 (figure 8) sheds some light on 
the San Community, and also the hostility felt by the BaThlaping towards them. 
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"We !Xu are a small people and we have always been oppressed by the bigger groups," says Mahongo. 
wIn tJwse years relations between us and die swart mense (Cbokwe and Mbukushu inhabitants of southern 
Angola) were bad. They would chase us, take our cattle and capture our children to work for them as 
slaves. The Portuguese come to us and said: 'We will help you. Come with us and we will fight them 
together'. So we joined the Portuguese army." 
After the Portuguese left and Angola's civil war began. the IXu fled south and lived amongst the Khwe in 
the Caprivi Strip of wbat was then South West Africa. "We were employed by the South African army 
because of our skills at tracking and knowledge 0/ the bush. We had been chased off our traditional 
lands; we had no economic alternatives." 
In 1990, dming the run-up to Namibia's independence elections, most of the members of the two 
communities. fearing persecution at the hands of a SW APO-Ied government, decided to pull out with the 
South African army and settle at Schmidtsdrift. where they were given automatic South Amcan 
citizenship and rows of canvas tents that they live in to this day. 
Promises of proper brick homes with modem facilities never materialised and never will -- at least not at 
Schmidtsdrift. A local group of Tswana people, the BaThlaping, were shunted off this land by the 
military in 1968 and are now making a strong claim for their tide to be restored. 
This week Land Affairs Minister Derek Hanekom visited the site with a group of BaTblaping and 
promised to speed up resettlement of the original owners. In his taUcs with the Tswana community, 
Hanelrom stressed that land restitution would bave to coincide with a just solution to the plight of the !Xu 
and Kbwe - which is a moral position that held liUle sway among the BaThlaping delegation. 
"We will definitely not be able to live together with the Bushmen. They have a different lan,guage and a 
different culture. We won't be able to speak to them. And they will steal our goats and sheep. Everyone 
knows they are good hunters and they can walk long distances through this veld ... They are not our 
problem. The army created it and the army must solve it,· BaTblaping elder David Noko said 
George Mokgoro, a spokesman for the dislocated Tswana people, who spent 10 years on Robben Island 
for his part in the struggle against racial oppression, bas gone on record with an even stronger statement: 
"We will not share with them. I am not talIcing about another form of apartheid. 1 am just trying to 
reflect the foelings 0/ the community. We are Tswanas. We cannot have two different peoples on the 
Stll1l.e piece 0/ lond." 
... For the !Xu and Khwe residents of Schmidtsdrift, this hostility from the Ba1blaping is simply a sign 
that history will repeat itself, that the big will always oppress the smal1. "We joined the army for jobs and 
to survive. We were not the only block people who fought with the SADF. But they only see us. It is 
becouse we ore the small people. That is why they single us out," says Mahongo. 
Figure 8 The San (!Xu and Khwe) people of Schmidtsdrift: extract from a 
newspaper article, February 1995 
(Source: C Weekly Mail & Guardian 1995 [online]. 
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"Tent Town, reflecting the pain and conflict of the community's life in 
Schmidtsdrift" 
Linocut by an unnamed !Xwe artist. A number of art projects were established with 
members of the San tent village at Schmidtsdrift to try to generate some income for the 
residents (Source: Winberg, undated:31) 
7.7 ACLA Land Claim: 1992·1994 
In 1992, as the pace of reform in South Africa accelerated, the BaThlaping, assisted by 
the Association for Northern Cape Rural Advancement (or ANCRA, an NGO affiliate 
of the National Land Committee), lodged a claim for the return of 28 000 ha (of the 
original 32269 ha) of their land before the newly established Advisory Commission on 
Land Allocation (ACLA, see section 3.3.1 above), a case that was heard in December 
1993. At the hearing, various alternative proposals for the development of 
Schmidtsdrift were heard, including those of the National Parks Board, the Cape 
Provincial Administration, and De Beers Consolidated mining company, which also 
owned a game ranch nearby. These agencies together suggested that the farm could 
best be utilised for community-managed eco-tourism and hunting. In turn, the SADF 
told the hearing that it needed the land for its military base, and that the cost to 
taxpayers of clearing the land of unexploded ordinance and of relocating the base 
elsewhere, would be R120 million. 
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However, the BaThlaping and the SADF were not the only people claiming a right to the 
Schmidtsdrift land (see figure 9 below). A group of Griqua people presented a counter-
claim to ACLA that they had lived in the area since 1804, prior to the arrival of the 
BaThlaping. 
"Griqua National Conference representative Calvin Andrews told the ACLA hearing 
they had been forced off their land by successive white fanners. While admitting 
that there were neither title deeds nor records to prove their tenure, Andrews said 
they would fight to get the land back" (Land Update, 1994: 13). 
Approllimate Group Commmts 
period of 
d 
Late 1~ Griqaa community Claim made through Griqua Natiooal Conference to 
Century Aa...A in 1992. Rejected. 
New claims lodged in 1 W7 by United Griquas of 
Griqualand West and House of Griquas (who united 
in 20(0) 
Latel~ Tswana speaking Registered on the land in terms of the 1913 Land 
Century- BaThlapingtribe Act. Removed from land in 1968. 
1968 Claim for land lodged in 1992, rejected in 1994. 
Resubmission 1995, agreed in principle in lW7. 
United with claimants Klein Fonteinljie 
Invaded land Gemeenskap to form Schmidtsdrift Communal 
in 1994, 1995, Property Association in 1999. 
lW7 
1913/1936- SA government's Bantu Assumed ownership of all land designated as 
1972 Trust 'reserves' 
1968/1972- South African Defence Land tnmsfeJTed to SADF after BaThlaping were 
2000 Force removed 
1990-1997 San (!Xu aud Kbwe) Moved by the SADF to live in tents at Schmidtsdrift 
after Namibian independence. New land allocated 
in 1997. 
Figure 9 List of various claimants to land at Schmidtsdrift 
Land restitution at Schmidtsdrift was therefore far from a simple matter of transferring 
land back to the original BaThlaping claimants. One interviewee who was involved in the 
negotiations stated: 
"To me it's one o/the most complex cases, where you had competing rights over 
Schmidtsdrift. You had the Griquas, first, who were not victims of forced 
removal, because they were not considered as being black; whilst the Tswanas 
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were moved away. And within the Griquas, you had people who considered 
themselves as being Coloureds as well [i.e. of mixed descent]. So even within the 
Griqua community, you still had to test who was Griqua and who was Coloured, 
and who had a just claim [to the land]. Those things are happening up to today, 
and this really ripped the Griqua community into two . 
... Everybody thought it [the land restitution process] was going to be easy, 
because it was state land ... utilised by the Defence Force. And we thought that 
the transfer of that land would be 'a piece of cake', and that progress would be 
made speedily. Particularly because there are mineral deposits which would 
begin to support the community, and the land is good. 
We thought [there] would be quite a clear way of redeveloping the communities. 
Instead, all these benefits have counted against the communities: the competition 
for the mineral rights, competition as to who gets the most productive land. And 
these have further divided the communities between what is called the Tswanas, 
the Griquas, and the San communities. Our view was that the 
compartmentalisation of these people really went against the grain of nation 
building, the establishment of a new people, and a new nation ... The process 
should have been unifying, but it has been really divisive up to this point". 
(Interviewee 14,2(01) 
7.8 Land Invasions: 1994 and 1995 
In April 1994, ACLA announced that it had rejected the land claim by the BaThlaping. 
Angered by this rejection, which occurred at the time of the first democratic elections in 
South Africa (and came soon after a request by the community for permission to visit and 
clean the graves of their ancestors at Schmidtsdrift was refused by the SADF), members 
of the community attempted to occupy the land Some 150 people were arrested. Some 
months later, in August 1994, the new government indicated to the community that they 
would be allowed to return to their land, raising expectations that some members of the 
community would be able to return to Schmidtsdrift by Christmas 1994 (Schmidtsdrlft 
Community Consortium, 1995:6). 
"However, the occupation of the land by the SANDF and the San and Khoi 
communities, as well as government red-tape, ... retarded the process to such 
an extent that on Saturday 29 April 1995 the community, frustrated and 
anxious, decided to forcefully occupy the land. They were eventually 
persuaded to leave the occupied area by the Provincial Minister of Land 
Affairs... The negotiation with the SANDF allowed for six male members to 
be permanently stationed in the area and to be trained as rangers. 
Ongoing discussions and consultations between the community leaders and 
both central and provincial government ... fInally culminated in a negotiated 
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agreement that the community [wouldl not repeat their invasion of the land. 
This agreement [was/ subject to a commitment from the government that 
planning / would / commence with immediate effect. 
The management of the project Iwasl delegated, by mutual agreement, to the 
Northern Cape Provincial Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Land 
Affairs. A Provincial Steering Committee (PSC), ... rwasl established to 
expedite the process" (Schmidtsdrift Community Consortium, 1995:6). 
Tent and shack erected by community members invading chmidt drift, 1995 
7.9 The Requirements of the Land Reform Process 
As part of the RDP-funded Land Reform Programme, Provincial Steering Committees 
(PSC) had been established in each of the Provinces to plan and manage the process. 
Among other things, each PSC's task was to: 
• 
• 
• 
Oversee the implementation of all the RDP Land Reform Projects in their respective 
Province; 
Report on their compliance with the Department of Land Affair's Core Business 
Plan requirements (see below); 
Ensure that the selected Project Facilitators were acceptable to the communities 
concerned; 
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• Facilitate the planning and development processes; and 
• Ensure that Cash Flow and Time Plans were adhered to. 
In Northern Cape Province, the Director-General of Land Affairs was designated as the 
Accountable Officer, and the Director-General of Rousing and Local Government, the 
Responsible Officer in terms of the Land Reform Programme. 
Early in 1995, Schmidtsdrift having been designated as one of the Presidential Lead 
Projects, the Board of Trustees of the Schmidtsdrift community commissioned 
professional consultants (the Schmidtsdrift Community Consortium) to act as their 
Project Facilitators and to draw up a development plan for the area. This was in 
accordance with the agreement that had been reached after the April 1995 land invasion 
at Schmidtsdrift and in terms of the Land Reform Core Business Plan requirements. 
The Core Business Plan included the following principles: 
• Planning must facilitate infonned beneficiary decision-making; 
• Principles of the RDP must apply throughout; 
• Plans must meet the following criteria: 
- A multi-level approach 
- A multi-disciplinary approach 
- The creation of representative structures 
- The use of capacity-building mechanisms 
- The provision and examination of at least three realistic alternative scenarios 
for development, showing implications for choice 
• Project Plans must clearly indicate the overall development philosophy of the 
project in terms of the RDP policies and principles 
The plan was also required to be action-oriented, indicating items for immediate 
delivery, priorities for the short-tenn, and items that would require medium- to long-
term attention. 
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7.10 Submissions to the Land Claims Court: 1995 
While the formal planning process got underway, the legal process of regaining title to 
the land continued. After requesting assistance and advice from the National Land 
Committee (NLC), the Schmidtsdrift BaThlaping community resubmitted their claim 
for the restitution of their land in late 1995, this time to the newly formed Land Claims 
Court. The new claim was lodged in accordance with the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act (Act No.22 of 1994), a fundamental tool of the Land Reform Policy of the ANC 
government (see section 3.3.1 above). At the same time, the NLC convened a meeting, 
facilitated by the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights (which had replaced 
ACLA in terms of the 1994 Act), to discuss the lack of progress in the Schmidtsdrift 
land restitution case. This meeting was attended by members of the community; the 
Premier of the newly demarcated Northern Cape Province; representatives of the 
renamed South African National Defence Force (SANDF); and the national 
government's Department of Land Affairs. 
Some months later, after protracted correspondence and discussions, the parties reached 
agreement that the land should belong to the BaThlaping, and that the SANDF (and !Xu 
and Khwe people) should relocate elsewhere. An agreement in principle was signed at 
a ceremony at the provincial legislature offices in Kimberley. 
7.11 The Planning Process at Schmidtsdrift: 1995-1997 
By their nature, each of the Pilot Land Reform projects was unique. There was no 
precedent to guide officials, planners / consultants or the communities involved 
regarding the planning process. In the case of Schmidtsdrift, the consultants listed four 
aims of the pJanning process: 
• To facilitate the speedy restitution of the land claim; 
• To oversee the return of the claimants in a co-ordinated manner; 
• To facilitate the speedy redistribution of land for the San community; and 
• To develop a master plan for the provision of infrastructure and the identification of 
land and spatial use (Schmidtsdrift Community Consortium, 1995). 
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The consultants began the planning process by holding a number of workshops with 
both Provincial officials and members of the community, to determine the project brief 
and to draw up a "record of understanding" (see figure 10). 
"It is hereby recorded that: 
1. the community or people formerly resident on certain land fully described in clause ... have 
succeeded in obtaining restitution of such land from the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
and have caused a Trust ~ the Schmidtsdri/t Community Development Trust (Tswana) to be 
formed and registered to receive transfer of such land and to hold the same for such community ..• ; 
2. in terms of provisions of clause 6.2 of such Trust Deed, a Designated Development Plan may be 
adopted in accordance with the provisions of such clause for the development of such land; 
3. the Trustees of the said Trust have resolved to prepare such a plan for adoption accordingly, and 
have commissioned ..• to undertake the work necessary to set such process in motion. to assist the 
Trustees to present such plan. to a meeting of the specijUd beneficiaries as providedfor in the said 
clause 6.2 of the Trust Deed for their consideration and. if thought fit. adoption. and if adopted, to 
assist the Trustees in the implementation of such plan; 
4. Certain Son and Khoi have been settled on the land by the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and provision requiTes to be 1NIde for the permanent settlemtmt of such persons on land 
suitable for their purposes; 
5. The Government of the Republic of South Africa, in coUoboration with the Government of the 
Province of the Northern Cape, Ms, in accordance with its Reconstruction and Development 
Programme: 
6. designated the restitution of such land and the consequent development thereof for the specijUd 
beneficiaries, as a Presidential LeotI Project and is willing, subject to the provisions of this Core 
Business Plan RestiIlIIion agreement, to provide funds and reSOllTces to assist in the preparation and 
implementlltion of the Designated Development Plan; and 
7. agreed to moJce provisionfor the penrtllMnt settlement of the San and Khoi referred to ... and is 
willing •.. to provide funds and reSOllTces to assist the San and Khoi to develop /and for the benefit of 
such persons; 
8. 1his agreement is entered into to provide the jromework within which the parties hereto wiU prepare, 
seek adoption and implement such Designated Development Plan and the development of land for the 
purposes of the Son and Khoi •.. 
Figure 10: Sehmidtsdrift record of undentaDdiag 
Source: Schmidtsdrift Master Plan Document (1997) unpublisbed 
The brief was thus to draw up a Designated Development Plan for the land, in 
anticipation of it being formally transferred back to the community. The working 
documents and the Master Plan Document show in different levels of detail the actual 
planning process followed (see figure 11). 
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Facilitation Stream Preparatory Work Technical Stream 
I 
Conv,ntion 1 Land SUNey Land rUdit 
Role Player Consultation --------; SWOT Analy~ (Strengths, 
---i 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and 
Threats 
PLANNING TEAM Planningtalyais 
Community Workshop!; -------' ~PLANNING TEAM 
RoeAayar~ t 
PLANNING TEAM ~ Master Plan Draft 
~~----------~ I 
Convention 2 ______________ Replannlng~aster Plan 
FINAL MA~R PLAN 
Figure 11 The planning process at Schmidtsdrift 
(Source: Schmidtsdrift Master Plan, 1997) 
However, in the Proceedings of the Community Participation Convention, drawn up by 
the consultants, the following more simplified planning process is recorded (figure 12): 
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Phase 3 
Phase 4 
Phase 5 
Phase 6 
Community Consultation and Area Survey 
SocIo-economtc Survey 
PreIimi18ry Planning Review 
Community Planning Convention 
Development of Master Plan Document 
Implemenlallon 
Figure 12: Simplified planning process at Sehmidtsdrift 
(Source: Schmidtsdrift Community Planning Convention Proceedings 1996) 
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7.12 Community Participation atSchmidtsdrift: 1995-1997 
The planning process thus formally involved community participation in at least two 
phases (phases 1 and 4). However, it would appear that the consultants had initially 
intended to hold one community convention prior to drawing up any planning proposals 
(see above). Indeed, the first public convention was seen as ~ critical event during the 
project-planning phase, as it was aimed at establishing the community's needs, priorities 
and problems. The consultants stated that 
"the convention was used as an opportunity to discuss with the various affected 
parties the original status quo, way of living, needs and expectations, and the 
proposed potential development of their areas. The discussions were aimed at 
providing first hand planning information to the team. Whereas the government 
was committed to finance the convention which could have brought all the 
original residents of Schmidtsdrift together, the various unforeseen circumstances 
debarred this event from taking place during the initial stages of the project. 
Despite this obstacle, the project team decided to investigate alternative 
development strategies for the area. Interviewing and workshop techniques were 
used to bridge this gap" (Schmidtsdrift Master Plan Document, 1997:27). 
Thus, much of the basic planning work was actually completed by the professional team 
before any community convention could take place. This included a land use survey of 
the site, a socio-economic survey, conducted with the assistance of community 
members, and community workshops. 
7.12.1 Socio-eeoDolDic Survey (Inteniews) 
The interviews took the form of a questionnaire, designed to gather information about 
the socio-economic characteristics of the community, including "their living conditions 
and their future desires to move back to Schmidtsdrift" (Schmidtsdrift Master Plan 
Document, 1997:27). Interviewing teams, dispatcbed to the areas around Kimberley 
and Kuruman where some of the scattered community now lived, enlisted the assistance 
of a number of community members and ANCRA (the Association for Community and 
Rural Advancement). to complete the survey. 
The 1997 Master Plan does not record the (potentially very useful) details of the 
information gained from this exercise. It does state that in the sample of 283 families 
almost half of the population was aged over 50, and there were very few cbildren 
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present, most having been sent to urban areas for their education, or to their parents in 
the towns. A high percentage (78%) of the interviewees was unemployed, and the 
families relied on state pension payments. 
Provincial government official meeting with community member at 
Schmidt drift, 1997 
ANCRA fieldworkers had for some time been actively involved in capacity building 
programmes with members of the scattered Schmidt drift community, and a sisted the 
planning team: 
"The beginning [starting pointl was that the communities know where they come 
from; they know the land, so that they are there to inform us about how they 
would resettle. So what we did wa the documentation part of it. I!J&J. had the 
information. We just wrote it down and [ aid j. 'i thi what you are aying? ' 
And that would be our job. They know the area; they an tell you the detail about 
where they were, and how they were." (Interviewee 14,2001) 
" During the interviews it became apparent that the needs and expectations of the 
community living in Kuruman was different to that of the community at 
Kimberley. Also, whilst the majority wished to return to Schmidt drift, some had 
invested heavily in their present locations. One of the main difficulties has been 
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to track community members in order to ascertain if they intend remming back to 
their land. This made it difficult to determine exactly the number of people who 
will be returning. A media campaign was subsequently initiated, inviting people, 
directly descended from the claimant community, to indicate their desire to 
resettle at Schmidtsdrift" (Schmidtsdrift Master Plan Document, 1997: 27-28). 
7.12.2 Community Workshops 
Workshops with community members: The consultants arranged workshops with 
Schmidtsdrift community members at Kimberley and Kuruman "in order to understand 
their needs, expectations and problems for consideration during the planning process" 
(Schmidtsdrift Master Plan Document, 1997: 29). The Master Plan document records 
that the workshops were conducted over a period of three days in each area, and aimed 
to ensure maximum participation of the community members. Once more, this process 
was carried out in collaboration with ANCRA. While the planning document does not 
record how many people attended the workshops, an ANCRA representative described 
the use of participatory techniques by the planners and fieldworkers: 
"We participated in a number of pre-convention meetings, saying: 'You know 
Schmidtsdrijt, you have been there, you know it better than ourselves.' And we 
literally plotted Schmidtsdrift on the ground, drew some of the houses. And they 
would say: 'This is how Schmidtsdrift looks like, and this is where we were 
removed, this is where we used to graze our cattle, this is where the arable land 
is, where the minerals are.' And we said, 'okay, if this is Schmidtsdrijt, how do 
you hope to do this?' A very participative method of involving the communities 
and deciding. Long before the convention." (Interviewee 14,2(01) 
In addition to being participative (as the above quote illustrates), one of the principles 
adopted by the NGO fieldworkers and the planning team was that the planning process -
and capacity building for participation in the planning process - should be as inclusive 
as possible. This proved to be extremely difficult, given the dispersed nature of the 
community; the fact that many had not had a formal education; and that traditional 
Tswana culture worked against women participating in decision-making forums. 
Indeed, conflict began to emerge between those who supported tradition and traditional 
leaders, and those who were in favour of change. Wben asked whether some 
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community members had become excluded from the process, an ANCRA field worker 
stated: 
'That is a very serious and limiting factor, that some of them, as much as they 
would be open to participate, some of them would be restricted by their very 
culture [from being] very outspoken and critical about certain things. Questions 
about what the different land uses should be - these and others were informed, in 
a sense, by the gender of the person, and also by other factors. 
But in ANCRA, the emphasis was that for people to participate, you need to create 
the capacity of the people to participate. And there was a lot of investment in 
developing the capacity of women. We had a gender programme, which, while it 
looked at the development of women within the broader context, it sometimes did 
not shy away from having women specific programmes to try to build confidence 
and ability, to be more articulate of their positions and their needs. So we looked 
at gender in the broader context, but also needed to be realistic that women, 
particularly in rural areas, are not always forthcoming in terms of participating 
in this kind of institutions [- because it was against tradition?] - exactly." 
(I~terviewee 14,2(01). 
At the various workshops, community members were encouraged to attend the planned 
community convention, which it was anticipated would be "a mechanism to debate and 
propose the planning parameters for the development of the area" (Schmidtsdrift Master 
Plan Document, 1997: 29). 
Worksho.p with the Board of Trustees: This workshop focused on providing information 
about and describing the development process to the elected community leaders who 
made up the Schmidtsdrift Board of Trustees; the limitations of both financial and time 
resources; and the planning requirements of the restitution process of the Land Reform 
Programme. The Master Plan document records that the Board of Trustees 
"was key to guiding the team with regard to community issues requiring attention 
during the planning process. Continual contact with the Board was maintained to 
ensure that the planning process was undertaken within the scope of the work as 
defined and agreed upon with the comulunity". (Schmidtsdrift Master Plan 
Document, 1997: 28). 
WorkshQPs with GY stakeholders: The two workshops for various "key stakeholders" 
involved the following: 
• The Provincial Minister of Local Government, Housing and Land Affairs 
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• The Provincial Commissioner of Land Affairs 
• A representative of the SANDF 
• The Board of Trustees 
• The consultants 
• Representatives of the community of Schmidtsdrift. 
"These workshops assisted in successfully clearing the misunderstanding that 
prevailed between the government and the communities and also outlined a way 
forward with regard to the re-occupation of the area. After consensus was reached 
on the way forward, the community and the government mandated the consulting 
team to continue with the planning process" (Schmidtsdrift Master Plan 
Document, 1997: 29-30). 
7.12.3 The Planning Convention: 1996 
The Planning Convention - "the first of its kind in the history of the country" 
(Philander, 1998:84) - took place over two days in April 1996. It was held at 
Schmidtsdrift, on the site of the old hotel. A number of dignitaries attended, including 
the Minister of Land and Agriculture and the Northern Cape Commissioner for the 
Restitution of Land Rights. The Board of Trustees set up task teams to make the 
necessary travelling, catering, accommodation and other arrangements, and finance was 
obtained to cover the costs of these for community members travelling to the site. 
The Planning Convention aimed to embody a number of the core principles of the RDP, 
in particular those of meeting the basic needs of the community; empowering the 
community; developing the human resource and economic potential of the area; and 
allowing the community to 'drive' the process. The convention's primary objectives 
were: 
• To jointly formulate a framework for developing the land; 
• To jointly develop the human resources within the community; and 
• To get a clear land development planning mandate from the community. 
The secondary objectives were: 
• To generate debate on development issues; and 
• To establish an opportunity for the consultants to advise the community in critical 
decision-making. 
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Two significant inclusions in the convention proceedings noted that the convention also: 
• proposed to allow "all role players to engage in debate around the suitability of 
various design options identified by the Planning team"; and that the convention 
• "aimed to resolve the land re-development needs of the community. This process 
was necessary to lock in all role players and to engage in a fully participative design 
process" (Schmidtsdrift Community Planning Convention Proceedings, 1996: p.19) 
Approximately 6 000 people attended the community conference: 
lilt was a mixed group of people. The whole community of the Tswana claimants 
was there. We had the various Departments from the Northern Cape. We had the 
Commissioner of Land Claims, NGOs, the Griquas and other communities .... 
Really, the idea was to say, 'How do we go about planning for the land, 
portioning it for different land uses, so that everybody can live on the land and 
make out an. existence on the land?'" (Interviewee 14,20(1). 
It was the first time that all members and descendants of the original community that 
had been removed from the land in 1968 had gathered together in such numbers: 
"They came form Kimberley, Kuruman, Majeking, Cape Town. Some from 
Jo'burg [Johannesburg]. All the people who had been moved out and who were 
prepared to come back. That was what the convention was all about. The 
convention put the stamp on the jact that we were planning their return ... " 
(Interviewee 08, 20(1) 
Eleven issues that covered "the aspects most likely to impact on the resettlement of the 
community" (Schmidtsdrift Community Planning Convention Proceedings, 1996: p.lO) 
were addressed during the convention, and the delegates were divided into 
'commissions' - one for each of the eleven issuesll. Each commission discussed and 
debated its issue,and reported back to the plenary session. The recommendations of 
each commission were incorporated into the development of the Master Plan. 
11 The 11 issues were: Urban I Rural iDfrastructure development; agriculture. nature conservation and 
tourism; economic I SME development; health and welfare; project funding; education. training and 
adult literacy; women in development; legal aspects of development; local government and policing; 
mining; and sport. recreation, arts and culture. 
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Members of the planning consortium that were interviewed as part of this study were 
satisfied that the process of dividing the delegates into the different groups or 
commissions was a successful way of ensuring participation, and that each of the issues 
was discussed by those interested in the particular topic. Further, the collective 
contribution of each commission became part of the decisions that were taken at the 
convention, and in turn were incorporated into the final plan: 
"We had a very deliberate process, and people actually took part in that process. 
Also, ... even the activities preceding the convention were trying to build the 
capacity of the people to talce part in the task groups ... I just think that having a 
convention of people to come to plot their future was quite a good beginning, 
where the emphasis was put on participative ways of development. It was the 
beginning of the process ... " (Interviewee 14, 2001). 
"In 1996, we had the first convention. It was in April, at the anniversary of the 
elections. We had a big meeting here, people [came] from Kuruman, Douglas, 
Kendal. All the beneficiaries came together. We came and talked about how -
because we want to come back to our land - how are we going to use our 
. land ... There were many people that came ... I think everybody came. It was a very 
good meeting. Very nice. We had commissions; we discussed everything at those 
commissions. And then we came back, and reported back. Everybody was 
happy." (Interviewee 16,2001). 
The community convention had been planned to give the community an opportunity to 
participate in the debate and decision-making about the development of their land. It 
appears to have achieved each of the five aims set by the participants at the start of the 
convention, and the planning team felt that they had thereby been mandated to 
incorporate decisions reached by participants into the Master Planning Document. The 
Proceedings of the Schmidtsdrift Community Planning Convention thus ended on a 
most optimistic note: 
"the stage has been set The consulting team is now mandated to perform for the 
community according to the decisions taken at the convention. The immediate 
tasks in the developmental phase will be the following: 
• Develop the Master Plan 
• Process the approval of the planning document by the community 
• Commence with the Project Implementation Phase. 
The Schmidtsdrift convention was an exercise designed to empower the 
community in making decisions on the development of their land, and, in essence 
therefore, carve out a situation which will suit their needs for years to come. 
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The convention also served as a mechanism for consensus-making and character 
building. Given the success of the convention, it would be fair to say that the 
convention met with most of its objectives... The community are anxious to 
return to the land. A mandate for the development principles has been established 
which will enable the consultants to produce the Master Planning Document. The 
integrated and consultative process followed by the planning team should result in 
a product of which everybody will proudly be able to say: We did it!" 
(Schmidtsdrift Community Planning Convention Proceedings, 1996: 16). 
7.12.4 The Strategic Planning Workshop: 1996 
The process of participation in accordance with RDP principles and the requirements of 
the Land Reform process continued when the consultants facilitated a strategic planning 
workshop in September 1996, some six months after the community convention. This 
was held in response to the continuing needs for community capacity building and the 
difficulties being experienced in communicating with the scattered community. The 
main aim of the workshop. funded by Kagiso Trust (a body set up to channel overseas 
funding for community and development projects. see section 2.3 above) and held at the 
Moffat Mission in Kuruman, was "to draw up a strategic plan for projects that would 
not ordinarily be funded by government". (Philander. 1996). All of the 11 elected 
members of the Schmidtsdrift Board of Trustees. and a selected number of community 
members, participated in the workshop. 
Participants identified a number of problems that were faced by the community as it 
prepared to relocate back to Schmidtsdrift. Perhaps most essentially. there was no final 
list of those qualifying for restitution that wanted to take up their rights and return to 
Schmidtsdrift. Once numbers could be determined, the community faced the problem 
that there was virtually no development on the site. Among the essential items that 
were lacking were: schools, clinic and shops; basic infrastructure; employment 
opportunities; affordable transport to travel back to Schmidtsdrift; and houses for 
returnees. In addition, the community faced severe financial and socio-economic 
problems due to unemployment. Lastly, but significantly, it was noted that 
communications had begun to break down between the Board of Trustees and the 
community. 
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According to Philander (1996), specific time was set aside at the workshop to discuss 
the duties of the Trust, and ways in which the Trust could be strengthened. Increased 
co-operation between the community and the Trust would be vital to the success of the 
restitution process, and it was agreed that regular meetings would be held where 
grievances and suggestions could be raised. "Moreover, the Trust should not isolate 
themselves from the community" (Philander, 1998, p.91). A full-time RDP Co-
ordinator was appointed to serve as a link between the various scattered members of the 
community and the Trust. 
The workshop identified a 'wish list' of 17 income-generating projects that they wanted 
to engage in on their return to Schmidtsdrift. The highest priority projects were: 
mining; game reserve; poultry farming; vegetable fanning and marketing; river sand 
processing; stone crushing; dairy; bakery, brick making; and transport operation 
(Philander, 1996). However, it was acknowledged that the lack of skills from within the 
community would be a constraint to the launching of any of these projects. Training 
and capacity building would therefore be essential, and as a first step, the workshop 
facilitators helped the participants to draw up simple business plans for each of the 
priority projects. 
7.12.5 Further workshop with Board of Trustees: 1997 
The Board of Trustees had recognised its lack of organisational skills (Philander, 1998) 
and early in 1997, requested that another workshop be held to produce a 'plan of action' 
for the implementation of the Master Plan. At that workshop, the Board members were 
asked to identify the role players involved in the process and rank them in order of 
importance. The following were identified: 
• The Schmidtsdrift community 
• Board of Trustees 
• Consultants 
• National Government Department of Land Affairs 
• Provincial Government (different departments) 
• NGOs (ANCRA, lOT, Kagiso Trust, NLC) 
The Board members were then asked to identify the achievements and shortcomings of 
each of the role players. These are listed in figure 13. Of significance is the fact that 
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the Board considered it to be in part their own shortcoming that the community had not 
returned to the land in a shorter time, while clearly holding both National and Provincial 
government, and the consultants, accountable for lack of delivery as well. In addition, it 
considered that NGOs were taking a backseat in the process. In fact, ANCRA had been 
closely involved in the preparations of the community for the convention, and had 
participated in that convention as well. These points may indicate that the Board of 
Trustees did not fully understand the roles of each of the parties: it was not the role of 
the consultants (or the NGO) to 'deliver' or implement the plan. Once the plan had 
been accepted and approved by Northern Cape Province, it was the responsibility of the 
Provincial authority to fund implementation through a tender process. 
Role player Achievements Shortcomings 
COMMUNITY Planning convention Lack of I'8BOUI'C8S 
Level of consultation Physical distances (K1mber1ey-Kuruman) 
Unity Quick to blame 
Motivation Lack of respect for leadership 
Water rights Scope for more active engagement 
AbIIty to oven:ome dlfticulties 
Reaching Court SeUlement 
BOARD OF Gender balance In name and action Not being able to return the community In 
TRUSTEES Formaly constituted a Ihortertlme 
In existence for more than 2 years Relationship between Board and 
Securing finance from NGOs community has changed due to a shift of 
AbIIty to get through diIIk:Uties focus 
Bridging the KimberIey-Kuruman Not creating opportunities to engage 
distance community 
ProIIIe of Board In government Is Lack of capacity 
good Some Board membera are not active 
CONSULTANTS Set up database Lack of speed In delivery 
Made community 8W81'8 of 
Implications of· relocating 
Succesafully planned convention 
FaclltaIion of the process 
finalising Master Plan 
CspacIy building 
Projeclpropoeala 
Presentation to government 
NATIONAL People able to cIain back their land Delaying the process through slow 
GOVERNMENT ,~,,,,, 
PROVINCIAL CormIIItad themseIvea to the process Lack of action 
GOVERNMENT 
NGOs Funding workshops Taking a backaeat In the procell 
V\IIIIInslness to fund 
Figure 13: Aehievements and shorteomiDgs of role playen at Schmidtsdrift as 
usessed by Board memben 
(Source: ASCH,l996b) 
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However, at the meeting, the Trustees clearly wanted to take greater control of the 
implementation process, no doubt in an attempt to speed things up, despite the fact that 
they lacked fmancial resources. A plan of action was developed at the workshop, which 
included the following key tasks: 
• Board of Trustees to select 240 families to relocate in Phase 1; 
• Board and consultants to decide on which area at Schmidtsdrift would be pegged out 
for settlement; 
• Board and consultants to jointly work on subsequent phases of relocation, including 
a timeframe for these; 
• Consultants to arrange for basic water and sanitation services to be in place at 
Schmidtsdrift prior to relocation; 
• Board to identify community members to liaise with different provincial 
governmentdepanrnents; 
• Board to ensure that all returnees sign affidavits; and 
• Board to hold meetings with the community to inform them of progress. 
While the provision of water and sanitation services was not the remit of the 
consultants, the plan of action envisaged that the consultants would arrange for this. 
Likewise, the pegging out of the sites should have been a Provincial government 
responsibility. Other issues discussed at the workshop included the clearing of the land 
at Schmidtsdrift of military waste and of unexploded ordinance; and the phasing of 
relocation. 
The planning process followed by the consultants up to this point was in accordance 
with the requirements of the Land Reform Programme, and made provision for 
extensive and systematic public participation. The consultants stated in their report that 
they intended to encourage all role players to engage in debate; to resolve the land re-
development needs of the community; and to engage in a fully participative design 
process. These were ambitious intentions, given the historical context and the fact that 
the community lived in various dispersed locations. 
In the event, it appears that a considerable amount of participation .l!U facilitated up to 
this stage, largely because of the commitment and efforts of NGO fieldworkers and the 
planning team (and in spite of the views of the Board of Trustees that the NGOs had 
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taken a back seat in the process). One of the Schmidtsdrift residents recalled the 
number of occasions on which the project leader had met with the community: 
"That time, we were still in Kuruman and then we came with a Combi when we 
came to appoint Mr Cooper here. And then the second time Mr Mkgoro 
[chairman of the Board of Trustees] took him to Kuruman, and we had a big 
meeting there. Everybody was there, the community was there, and we appointed 
Mr Cooper to do the pre-plan. And he came to us, we were sitting at the Wyks 
(wyk 1 up to wyk 10). And he went to every community, taking their concerns 
about coming back home, and then he came back and did the pre-plan." 
(Interviewee 16, 2(01). 
An NGO worker cited the close cooperation that existed from 1995-1997 between the 
newly established Northern Cape Provincial government, the planning team, and the 
NGOs working in the Schmidtsdrift area: 
"We had a Provincial Steering Committee, chaired by the MEC for Local 
Government and Housing - Pakes Digketsi - which brought together different 
Departments ... NGOs, and just about anybody that had anything to do with 
development was brought into that Provincial Steering Committee ... So that there 
was good co-ordination, and I must say that in a number of national workshops, 
always referred to Northern Cape as a good example of interdisciplinary and 
intergovernmental participation of different spheres. It was actually a model that 
even the Department of Local Government [and] nationally the Department of 
Land Affairs was trying to remodel for the country... And above that we had also 
what was called the Provincial Development Committee, which was chaired by 
the advisor to the Premier of the Province. So there was a lot of authority in the 
structures, and a great interaction. And I must say there was also a great support 
at that time for NGOs, and the role that they were playing. " (Interviewee 14, 
2001) 
7.13 Submission of Scbmidtsdrift Master Planning Document: 1997 
It was within this atmosphere and spirit of co-operation that the Schmidtsdrift Planning 
Consortium submitted the Master Planning Document to the Northern Cape Department 
of Local Government and Housing in February 1997. The document outlined the 
project brief; the planning approach taken; stakeholder participation in the process; the 
results of the land audit; a description of planning scenarios that were considered; the 
proposals for development; and an implementation strategy. In tenns of the latter, the 
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plan envisaged the return to Schmidtsdrift of some 2,300 households in the initial stages 
after the design and construction of basic infrastructure and community facilities: 
• 
• 
• 
"Stage One will involve the development of business plans and the securing 
of funding from the various departments of Government; 
Stage Two will involve the design and construction of the required 
infrastructure; 
Stage Three will involve the phased return of the community" (Schmidtsdrift 
Master Plan Document, 1997: 120) 
It was anticipated that Stage One could begin in February. and be completed by May 
1997; Stage Two would run for approximately one year; and that the earliest that 
community could begin to return to Schmidtsdrift (while some construction was still 
underway), was September 1997. 
7.14 Third Land Invasion: 1m 
However, when later in the year, no visible progress had been made and the fonnal 
restoration of title to the land continued to be delayed, by amongst other things, the 
reorganisation of Provincial and local government, members of the community once 
more threatened to invade their land at Schmidtsdrift. One interviewee described the 
events at that time in the following way: 
"The community started to get angry. They said. 'No. Now we are going back to 
our land! We are going back, because it seems that this [land restitution] is a 
long process.' Now they started losing their temper. So we came there and had a 
meeting with ... the MEC for Land Affairs. And they told him, 'We are going 
backl' So he can't stop them. And then, we agreed that 30 families should be 
relocated to come and stay here, because people were feeling that everything 
could be done if somebody is here. Nothing can be done if we are still at 
Kuruman, sitting there and we are waiting for the government to do everything 
here, while we are not here... 'No, we are going back.' He could not stop the 
people to come, so we came in 1997, in November. November 1"'. I was also 
there. 1 came here. It was a happy day. But there was nothing here... And it was 
hard, because the soldiers were still there. And they came to us and said, 'You go 
back. You go backl' And we phoned ... and helthe MEC] came and spoke to 
them, to the army, and they let us stay... We were supposed to be 30 families, but 
we were not 30, there [were] maybe 6Ofamilies!" (Interviewee 16,2001). 
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Mter negotiations between community members (assisted by ANCRA) and provincial 
government officials, it was agreed that a limited number of families would be allowed 
to return to the land, and that the process of restitution and settlement planning would 
be speeded up. 
By now, however, there was considerable disillusionment with the lack of action 
following the restitution and planning process that had been followed. Interviews with 
consultants and NGO fieldworkers who had been engaged in negotiations highlighted 
this frustration, in particular with the lack of co-ordination between government 
departments in what was supposed to be prioritised (Presidential Lead Project) 
restitution, and the role of the development practitioners: 
"What was particularly frustrating about Schmidtsdrift was the inability of the 
government, between governmental departments, to resolve the issue" 
(Interviewee 08, 2001). 
"It's quite a complex case, Schmidtsdrift, and the saddest part is that five years 
down the line, nothing has happened in terms of development of the land. People 
are still living in shacks. And I must say, the way the land was acquired was 
through land invasion. People had to invade their land... They had no support 
from the Province" (Interviewee 14, July 2001). 
7.15 The Land Claims Commission Settlement: 1m -2000 
Contrary to the community's perception, the legal processes dealing with the land claims 
had continued to be pursued at the Land Qairns Commission, albeit slowly. In 1997, the 
!Xu and Khwe were allocated new land closer to the town of Kimberley, and agreement in 
principle was finally reached for the resettlement of the BaThlaping community back on 
the farms at Schmidtsdrift. A number of issues, including the clearing of dangerous 
objects such as unexploded ammunition by the SANDF, remained under discussion. 
However (as noted in section 7.7), objections had been raised by various Oriqua 
groupings against the agreement reached between the State and the BaThlaping 
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community. In the process, the "United Griquas of Griqualand West" and the "Klein 
Fonteintjie Gemeenskap" had lodged counter land claims for the land12• 
In February 1999, the different parties signed a Framework Agreement. In so doing, the 
BaThlaping community and the Klein Fonteintjie Gemeenskap agreed to form the 
Schmidtsdrift Communal Property Association (see below). So it was not until April 
2000 that it was finally agreed that the BaThlaping community, comprising some 769 
families, would be granted back 28 509 ha of the Schmidtsdrift land. A ceremony to mark 
the signing of the Schmidtsdrift Land aaim Agreement was held in September 2000. 
Thus, 
"after more than five years of negotiations, an agreement was reached with the 
SANDF. The agreement encompasses the clearing of dangerous objects and the 
time frame for the departure of the SANDF from the 28 509 ha of land being 
restored to the newly-formed Schmidtsdrift Communal Property Association. The 
breakthrough was achieved when the SANDF indicated that it did not require 
compensatory land for the land being restored to the claimants. The Schmidtsdrift 
Land Claim Agreement includes the restoration of land and the community 
gaining access to restitution discretionary grants from the Department of Land 
Affairs." (Department of Land Affairs, 2000: 12) 
Part of the agreement entailed the setting up of a Management Committee comprising 
representatives of both the C9mmunal Property Association and the provincial 
government, which would draw up a business plan for the resettlement and the spending 
of money that would be made available in terms of the Land Reform process. Technical 
assistance would also be made available 10 the Management Committee. 
7.16 The Schmidtsdrift Commllll8l Property Association: 1999 
The Schmidtsdrlft Communal Property Association (CPA) was formed in terms of the 
Communal Property Associations Act, No. 28 of 1996 (see section 3.6.2), and as a 
12 The United Griquas of Griqualand West soon split into two groups, the Bngelbrecbts and the 
Hoogstanders, but after several meetings, these groups agreed to work together to settle their claim 
amicably. Another Griqua grouping, the House of the Griquas, bad also lodged a claim for 
Scbmidtsdrift. In January 2000, an agreement was signed between the House of the Griquas and the 
United Griquas of Griqualand West, declaring co-operation to settle the Schmidtsdrift restitution claim 
(DLA, 2000:14) 
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consequence of the 1999 Framework Agreement (see above). CPAs were intended to 
be vehicles for setting up communal land ownership, and the Schmidtsdrift CPA was 
constituted, with its first CPA committee elected, in 1999. However, in facilitating this 
process, ANCRA fieldworkers found that much work was needed to persuade the 
members of the Schmidtsdrift community of the need for the CPA. 
Up until then, the community had been represented by its own Board of Trustees, which 
was made up of elected members, some of whom were traditional leaders of the 
BaThlaping. The Board of Trustees had effectively replaced the traditional Tswana 
kgotla (see glossary). This arrangement had served them reasonably well from 1994, 
but now the government required a new structure - implying that the BaThlaping's own 
elected representatives were less than satisfactory and not 'an effective vehicle' for 
communal land ownership. In the event, many of the members of the Board of Trustees 
were elected onto the Schmidtsdrift CPA committee, but not all members of the 
community were satisfied that they had had to comply with this aspect of the 
government's land reform programme. 
"You must bear in mind that it [the CPA] was quite a foreign concept. People 
[had] lived under traditional authority, but now the law required them to have a 
CPA, which would hold land on their behalf... The first thing that you had to do 
was to workshop the very concept of the CPA with the communities. Long before 
you even decided on what the constitution would be, what the principles oj the 
constitution would be. You just had to workshop the concept and for a highly 
illiterate community, an elderly community, it was not a small task... All we could 
say was, 'look, you are required to have this one'. And I must say very /rankly, 
with most communities I've worked with, they say 'okay, fine. If that's the 
process, let's go through with it. Just do it'/ 
[But at Schmidtsdrift] there was no identification with this new institution, this 
foreign institution. They didn't know how to relate to it, they didn't have the 
capacity to relate to that institution. It was quite an alien institution. The idea, 
the mistake thpt people make is that when you create an institution, people ... have 
the capacity to understand what it is and how to interact and interface with it. 
But people saw this institution and said, 'well, we don't know what it means, but 
that's fine. You have it, that's fine, and we'll get our land and we'll go back to 
our way of doing things.' Because the institution doesn't relate to their way of 
doing things, to their culture" (Interviewee 14,20(1). 
It was a case of conflicting rationalities (Watson, 20(3). The government wanted to set 
up formal democratic structures of communal land ownership among land reform 
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communities, and had passed legislation - the Communal Property Association Act 
(1996) in order to do this. But the community wanted to continue to be represented by 
its own leaders, and for land to be allocated by them. Some communities had accepted 
the structures imposed on them by the state, but in this case, 'considerable work' had to 
be done by NGO field workers to persuade members of the Schmidtsdrift community 
that a CPA was required by government as the structure through which land and 
development would be delivered. Part of the work that the NGO fieldworkers engaged 
in was thus to inform the community about this new requirement of the land restitution 
process, and to build their capacity to use the elected CPA as the 'effective vehicle' that 
it was designed to be. However, in so doing, tensions within the Schmidtsdrift 
community arose on two fronts. 
The first had to do with the traditional role of elders and headmen in controlling access 
to communal land. In terms of the restitution process, the CPA was required to legally 
acquire, hold and manage communal property. and to have authority over the land, 
something that had been the function of the kgotla: 
"Some of them [the elders] argued that the land was taken from tiwJl, as chiefs. 
So why should it be returned to the CPA, which is unknown and irrelevant to the 
communities? And untried, that's the worst part of it! It has been untried and 
untested anywhere else, and 1 am still very sceptical. So the question then 
becomes, how do you allow the two irutitutioru to coexist and complement each 
other? This for me will be the crucial test of the stability ... " (Interviewee 14, 
20(1). 
On the second, not unrelated, front, the introduction of the CPA appears to have 
highlighted a class differentiation within the Schmidtsdrift community. Those who had 
had access to education and were literate, appeared to be in support of the CPA as part 
of the machinery of land reform and democracy in the country. The older, less educated 
members appeared to favour the continuation of the authority of the traditional leaders: 
"Those who are learned and who have been exposed to urban life and who are 
young, are more prone to support the CPA. They understand the institution -
intellectually - they understand why it should be there and they look down on 
chiefs and traditional leaders. On the other hand, the majority of the elderly 
people and the chiefs say, 'no no no, there's no way we will become dominated by 
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urban based intellectuals who want to impose this institution.' So that divide is 
there, and it's very, very serious" (Interviewee 14, 2001). 
This clash of rationalities was not something unique to Schmidtsdrift. In other 
communities around the country, similar tensions between traditional leaders and the 
newly created Communal Property Associations had emerged: 
"We had undertaken research with one of our affiliates ... to undertake case study 
research of different CPAs: What have they don.e? Have the achieved their 
objectives? What were the flaws? And the research was quite negative about the 
CPAs. Few of them seem to be working ... The challenge is there, and there is 
still growing tension between the CPA and the traditional chiefs... The chiefs 
have said, 'there is no way that we can agree to a CPA'. And those who favour a 
CPA say 'there is no way that we can concede to a traditional authority!'" 
(Interviewee 14,2001). 
Thus, the government had set up CP As as new legal structures through which land and 
development would be distributed, but it appears that many communities could not 
understand why their own already existing structures were not adequate vehicles for this 
distribution. The planners and NGO fieldworkers had the task of mediating this clash of 
rationalities, and of persuading the communities to comply with the CPA requirements 
in order that they could receive that to which they were entitled - their land. 
The process of negotiating, organisational development and capacity building as part of 
setting up the Communal Property Association in Schmidtsdrift was therefore a time-
consuming process, one that perhaps had not been anticipated. Further, while the CPA 
was meant to function in a largely administrative capacity, the responsibility for 
planning was retained by the local government structures in the province (see section 
3.6.2). This meant that even if the CPA had been accepted by the community, it still 
had little say in decision-making regarding the implementation of planning proposals. 
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7.17 Northern Cape Province's response to the 1997 Master Plan 
What of the master plan, submitted in February 1997? 
By July 1997, little progress had been made, although a letter from the Schmidtsdrift 
Planning Consortium project leader to the Chairman of the Provincial Steering 
Committee (PSC) recorded that feedback had been received from various departments 
of government, with suggestions to 'enhance' the master plan (ASCH, 1997). That 
letter recorded that the Consortium had still not been paid for its services, and the PSC 
was requested to 'look into the matter'. In addition, concern was expressed "that the 
community may believe that we are responsible for stalling the process", and sought to 
reassure them that this was not the case. The project leader pointed out that the 
Northern Cape Provincial authorities had not yet made any appointments with regard to 
the drawing up of a Business Plan for development and implementation at 
Schmidtsdrift, as required by the Land Reform process. Interviews with Consortium 
members revealed some of the tensions that were being felt: 
"We began to feel that we were defending the Province in terms of delivery, and 
the inefficiencies of government. We were the messengers, saying. 'look, you are 
going to get your land back on such and such a date, or by next year'. And 
eventually you get to the point ... that you're not prepared to defend the 
indefensible. Because it's therefor everybody to see". (Interviewee 08, 2001) 
It appears that progress at Schmidtsdrift had been the victim of a change in approach to 
development on the part of the Northern Cape. In an interview with one of the 
Province's officials, it was stated that from 1994 to 1998, the approach to land 
restitution was to settle land claims as quickly as possible. From 1999 onwards (after 
the country's second general election, the appointment of a new Minister of Agriculture 
and Land Affairs, and the restructuring of local government). the state' s focus shifted to 
supporting the emergence of black commercial farmers and an emphasis on the need for 
sustainable development: 
"At first we just used to settle claims without looking at sustainable development 
issues. That was in the first four years of the democracy ... Then we started 
looking at sustainable development. And that's exactly what you see [at 
SchmidtsdriftJ. You are now not having a pocket of poverty in the rural area; you 
are actually having a hub. You are having a housing settlement, but it is also 
linked to an economic triangle within the Province. It is also linked from a 
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macro- and micro- economic perspective. We are looking at all sorts of things, 
capacitating the communities, co-operative governance models ... " (Interviewee 
03,2001) 
In view of the fact that the approach to land refonn was changing, the Northern Cape 
Province had referred the Master Plan for evaluation to SIOA, a Swedish NGO that had 
been appointed to support the development of the provincial administration in Northern 
Cape, and with it the new approach to land reform. SIDA reviewed the documents, and 
on the basis of their recommendations, terms of reference were drawn up for a Business 
Plan for Schmidtsdrift. After going to tender, a new set of consultants was appointed in 
mid-I999. An internal document stated at the time that: 
itA Steering Committee comprising all the relevant state departments has been 
established to administer the development planning process. Development 
planners have been appointed to compile a Development Plan on the envisaged 
land (sic) ... at Schmidtsdrift. Bigen Africa and lmenda have been appointed and 
boundary disputes are being resolved to ensure final transfer of title." (Internal 
N.Cape Provincial document, undated). 
The new planning consortium, Bigen Africa and Imenda, submitted their "Pre-
Planning" report to the Province in August 200013, shortly before the announcement by 
the government that the land was formally being handed back to the BaThlaping (see 
figure 14). 
13 Repeated requests for access to documents from these consultants during the course of this research 
proved fruitless. 
l'n 
Department of Land Affairs. Department van Grondsake Kgoro ya tsa Naga . UMnyaogo wezoMhlaba 
Media Release embargo: 15 September 2000 
MINISTER DIDIZA TO SE'ITLE SCHMIDTSDRIFT n LAND CLAIM: R14 HO .... IN 
COMPENSATION 
The Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs, Ms. 17w1co Didiza. the Chief Land Claims Commissioner, 
Adv. WA Mgoqi and the Regionol Land Claims Commissioner: Northern Cape and Free State, Mr. S 
Ramalcarana will be settling the first restitution claim involving various counter claims in the Northern 
Cape. The settlement agreement involves a financial award of R14 ()()() ()()()-()() to be used for the 
acquisition of or development of assets that would lead to the socio-economic upli/tment of the 250 
beneficiaries. 
The settlement agreement will officially be signed OIl 15 September 2000 at Roodepan Catholic Church, 
Kimberly. Proceedings will start at 10hOO sharp. 
Various land claims were lodged on the land geocraUy referred to as the SANDF Scbmidtsdrift Training 
Area and covers an area of approximately 32 269 ba. The history of the various communities rdlects the 
complexity of overlapping land rights in South Africa. In this instance the land was, in the late 1 CJl' 
century, registered in the name of the Griqua community. However, these rights were diminished over 
time with legislation such as the Land Act of 1913 which to some extent gave more rights to members of 
the BaTblaping community as the area was then scheduled as a native reserve. The 8aTblaping 
community was consequently forcibly removed from the area in terms of the native Trust and Land Act of 
1936. 
In 1997, an agreement in principle was reached between the BaTblaping community and the State. 
However, various Griqua Groups lodged counter claims for the land generally referred to as 
Scbmidtsdrift. The Land Claims Court subsequently requested aU parties to proceed with negotiations in 
an attempt to settle these c1aims outside of Court. 
During negotiations with the State, the various representative bodies that lodged the counter claims 
namely the United Griquas of Griqualand West, the Fouteintjie Trust as well as the House of Griquas, 
indicated that they were willing to negotiate for an alternative as set out in the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act, 1994 (Act No 22 of 1994). 
The Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs toot a decision in terms of Section 42Dl(a)(ii) of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994 to separate the various clai.ms, being satisfied that satisfactory 
arrangements for the restitution of rights in land will be made to any other claimant(s) who may have 
been dispossessed of rights in tbe claimed poperty. 
In terms of this decision a final agreement was sigoed OIl 8 April 2000 with the ScbmidtBdrift CommuDal 
Property Association, representing both the beneficiaries of the Batlaphing community and the Fonteintjie 
Trust. In terms of this agreement roughly 769 households will benefit from the restoration of 
approximately 28 509 ha c:L1and. 
During the morning of a April 2000, after three years of negotiations pertaining to the finalisatiQn of the 
Schmjdtsdrift claims, a m~or brealc through was achieved. The United House of Griquas, as elected by 
the various beneficiaries, met with the Minister for Agriculture aod LaDcl Affairs and agreed to accept the 
offer of R14 000 000-00 as compeusation for their rights in land lost. It was furthermore agreed that a 
MaDagement Committee comprising of both representatives of the Joint Committee IUd tbe provincial 
government would, through a process of commuoity facilitation, draft business plans for the utilisation of 
the capital amount for the approval of the Minister. The State will also make technical assistance 
available to the Management Committee in this process and the beneficiaries will also gain access to the 
various Land Reform grants to assist them with the planning and implemeldltion process. 
Figure 14: ADnoUDcement of land claim settlement at Schmidtsdrift, 2000 
(Source: http:tnapd.pwy.&Qy.za/newslsept2000/sdwpd.bnnl) 
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In the meantime, the Provincial Steering Committee (PSC), comprising all the relevant 
state departments, had been re-convened after the country's second general election in 
1999. Its remit continued to be the administration of the development planning process 
in the Northern Cape Province. However, according to NGO representatives and one 
member of the Schmidtsdrift community, a significant change had occurred with the 
new approach to land restitution: 
"One thing that I must say about the Northern Cape, and regrettably: It has 
changed. We had created a number of committees that worked with different 
aspects of land reform. We had a Provincial Steering Committee, chaired by the 
MEC for Local Government and Housing - Pakes Digketsi - which brought 
together different departments . .. and just about anybody that had anything to do 
with development... And it looked at development: how many cases are there of 
restitution and redistribution, and what would be the budgetary requirements to 
resettle these people and to invest in development. It really had that kind of 
responsibility. And from there, we had various sub-committees... And above all 
that we also had what was called the Provincial Development Committee, which 
was chaired by the advisor to the Premier of the Province. 
So there was a lot of authority in the structures, and a great interaction. And J 
must say, there was also a lot of great support at that time for NGOs and the role 
they were playing. So that there was good co-ordination, and I must say that in a 
number of national workshops, Northern Cape was refe"ed to as a good example 
of interdisciplinary and intergovernmental participation of different spheres. It 
was actually a model that the [provincial] Department of Local Government and 
nationally the Department of Land Affairs was trying to remodelfor the country. 
But for some strange reason, when there were changes in the Ministry and the 
Province, all that hard work just went away, and was lost... " (Interviewee 14, 
2(01). 
The reshuffle at Provincial level appears to have resulted in a change in the approach to 
communication with the various parties involved in the process at Schmidtsdrift. The 
original Schmidtsdrift Planning Consortium did not win the tender to continue with the 
work with the community, and ANCRA, the NGO most actively engaged with the 
community up to that time, ceased its advocacy and community capacity building 
activities. With the increased formalisation of the land restitution procedures, there 
appears to have been a decline in co-operation and communication with ANCRA and 
otberNGOs. 
When interviewed, the Schmidtsdrift RDP co-ordinator did not seem to know what had 
happened to the original consultants: 
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"We were also disappointed. Because we don't know what happened to Mr 
Cooper, because we appointed him, and he made a nice Master Planfor us. Very 
nice. And then, after making this Master Plan, he just vanishes. We don't know 
what is the problem! And even now, the people are still asking the [provincial] 
government, 'where is Mr Cooper? We ~ Mr Cooper, we want him to come 
and develop Schmidtsdrift.' ... Because, really, he was a nice man. He listened 
to people. He's done exactly what the people wanted. Now, after he has gone, the 
government appointed another consultant. That was Bigen Africa. Bigen Africa 
came along. And the people were fighting, 'Where is Mr Cooper? We want Mr 
Cooper, we don't want anyone else'. And then they were saying to us, 'No you 
can't again get Mr Cooper.' And then the government bring along Bigen Africa. 
And Bigen Africa made a pre-plan. Then they were supposed to do a Master 
Plan. But after doing the pre-plan, they also just vanished! We don't know 
where ... " (Interviewee 16, 2001). 
In fact, Bigen Africa and Imenda had been appointed to complete the 'facilitative' pre-
planning phase, but had not been awarded the second phase of the work, the township 
development (or, as the above-mentioned interviewee called it, the Master Plan). When 
interviewed, the project leader from the Schmidtsdrift Planning Consortium was critical 
of the way in which his Consortium's involvement had been terminated, and speculated 
on two possible reasons for the delays in implementation: 
"After the convention, we worked on the plan, and submitted it to [the Provincial] 
office, and then we hoped that the funding would come in. But that didn't happen, 
with the politics that were played out - the San needing to buy another piece of 
land. But the development had been planned so that [the BaThlaping community] 
wouldn't transgress with development on the San land ... It was very frustrating. 
We did that in goodfaith ... It is speculation on our side, but there was always the 
belief that the mineral rights on Schmidtsdrijt were the real issue ... " (Interviewee 
07,2001) 
We eventually (as a firm) decided that we were wasting our time in 
Schmidtsdrift... We had fulfilled our brief. Our brief was to draw up a plan, 
submit it, and hand it over. And we fulfilled that. We were hoping that we would 
have the reappointment for implementation phase. But that has never been out to 
tender, it has never gone out... I followed it up for about a year, and then the 
realisation dawned that this thing is never going to happen... So much 
expectation, and no delivery. And what they do is to make the consultants the 
scapegoats, the fall guys, for non-delivery. But we can only do so much ... " 
(Interviewee 08,2(01). 
Even ANCRA's representative seemed unaware of the progress that had been made in 
the planning process since their 'withdrawal': 
"The [original] plan ... was accepted, but I can tell you confidently, that nothing 
really came of it in terms of implementation. Part of [the plan] was that it would 
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be used as a means of raising funds for injrastructural development and 
investment in the area, and those kinds of ideas. And it is regrettable, because 
immediately after independence in 1994, [Schmidtsdrift] was considered one of 
the PLPs and we hoped that it would move muchfaster than it has up to today ... " 
(Interviewee 08, 2001). 
He was also critical of the way in which the (new) Provincial Steering Committee was 
functioning, and cited the reason for this as being the 1999 reorganisation of the 
Provincial Department of Local Government and Housing: 
"After the second elections, there was a reshuffling in the Department. There was 
also a weakening of civil society organisation. We were all hoping that Northern 
Cape would continue to lead in terms of land reform. It had more land restitution 
cases resolved that any other Province; it had the most viable land redistribution 
projects than any others, so it was really becoming a model Province around land 
reform, but all of that is lost now!" (Interviewee 14,2001). 
7.18 Restitution and resettlement on the land: 1999-2001 
By July 2001, when I undertook my last field trip to the community, the first 240 
households had in fact resettled on the land at Schmidtsdrift, around the site of the old 
'white' village that had served as headquarters for the SADF and SANDF. Sites for 
occupation had been pegged out, shared basic water supplies had been provided; and the 
Northern Cape Department of Local Government and Housing had provided VIP toilets 
for each site. There was however no electricity supply and the residents had to use 
batteries for appliances, and candles or paraffin for lighting. Since there was no 
economic base in the village, apart from fanning, unemployment levels were very high, 
with most residents relying for their income on remittances from those working in 
Kimberley or further afield, or state pensions: 
"People are not working. People are sitting jobless. There are no jobs here. We 
are living from the grannies who get pensions. So if you are Sitting with a granny, 
after she has [been] paid her pension, you can buy at least food, and then the 
others can survive through her or through him" (Interviewee 17, 200 1). 
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Some had begun to engage in subsistence farming, although there was a view that the 
!Xu and Khwe people, who had not yet been moved to their new land , had tolen cattle 
belonging to the Schmidtsdrift BaThlaping (Schmidtsdrift resident, 2(01). 
Approximately 140 children attended a primary school in the village. Thi consi ted of 
five mobile classrooms that had been provided by the Provincial Department of 
Education. Prior to this provision, all pupils had had to travel dai Iy some 55km by bu 
to the town of Douglas to attend school. This was not only expensive; it was als 
exhausting for the pupils, some as young as 7 years old. (In 2(0), high ch I pupil 
still attended school in the town of Douglas). A clinic had been establi hed in ne of 
the renovated SADF buildings, although it was staffed only on a f rtnightly ba i . 
Two residents of chmidt drift outsid their hom ,2001 
A number of 'spaza' shops had been establi hed by re ident , tater f r ential 
items, and a bakery project had just got underway, facilitated by an N hi 
organisation was also working with the community t introdu e a brick-making project. 
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Both of these projects had been identified as priority projects at the Strategic Planning 
Workshop in 1996 (see 7.11.4 above). 
"We are going to build [our] houses. We must not go and buy the bricks from 
elsewhere. We must take the bricks from our project here, and build our hou es. 
So our money can circulate" (Interviewee J 6, 200 1). 
The Communal Property Association (CPA) committee had managed much of thi 
work, and the full-time RDP co-ordinator had been appointed to co-ordinate the 
different projects. The co-ordinator's role included the compilation of a CPA 
membership register (in accordance with the CPA Act, see 3.6.2 above), and assistance 
for residents with the filling out of application forms for the government ettlement 
grants to pay for free basic services. These grants were available to all people in the 
country who earned less than R800 per month. 
Schmidtsdrift administration offices in the converted ADF buildings, 2001 
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The RDP co-ordinator, the Schmidtsdrift CPA, the local branch of the Mrican National 
Congress and the ANC Youth League, each had offices in the converted SADF 
buildings. By this time, local government structures had been set up in Northern Cape 
Province, with Municipalities placed in charge of service provision, planning, township 
establishment and rates. Schmidtsclrift formed Ward 2 of the Siyancuma Municipality 
in the District of De Aar, and the local Ward Councillor also had offices in the old 
SADF buildings. Almost ironically, the Xhosa word 'Siyancuma' means 'we are 
happy': 
«We were happy when we elected our own councillor here, living with us, who 
can feel the pain, that these people don't have water. If the people don't have 
water, he don't have water also. Then he can just stand up and report to the 
Municipality ... He is still young, and working hard. He is a hard worker for the 
community. Everybody is okay about him." (Interviewee 17,2(01). 
Regarding the current levels of participation by those at Schmidtsdrift, the RDP co-
ordinator went on to state: 
"We have meetings with the community, and we are going around our farms here, 
calling meetings, taking the needs from the people. People are mandating us, [so 
that] when we come to the council, what should we say? What the people are 
saying! We represent the people. That is democracy. So democracy is working 
here at SchmidtsdriJt, and people are happy with that... The future? If everything 
is going now, is running well, I think we are going to have a very nice future. 
Everybody will be working, and then, it will be nice for us to be here." 
(Interviewee 16, 2(01). 
7.19 Postscript: Schmidtsdrift Diamonds and WDdHfe 
Two agreements of potential significance for the future development were announced in 
2003. Some 30 local BaTblaping and San residents were trained as professional hunters 
as part of the Schmidtsdrift and PlatfonteinCommunal Wildlife Ranch. and the 
community provided local labour in the construction of a Rl million fencing project 
The Wildlife Ranch will include the creation of a lodge to encourage eco-tourism, and 
local residents will also be trained for the hospitality industry (Northern Cape Province, 
2003). 
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Like Mogopa, Schmidtsdrift appears to be destined for a diamond-studded postscript: 
early in 2003, a press release announced that New Diamond Corporation, a local 
company founded in 1999, had acquired property 
''from the government... The property ... lies in the heart of the South African's 
diamond-producing region, east of Kimberley and near the confluence of the Vaal 
and Orange Rivers. Schmidtsdrift is surrounded by various alluvial diamond 
workings, but it was not mined until 1999 as it had been a military artillery range 
for many years". (Sunday Times, 2(03) 
The press release claimed that the company had spent some three years exploring the 
area, spending some R60 million to recover diamonds worth R58 million. 
"As required by the Mineral Act's empowerment charter, provision has been 
made for the local community at Schmidtsdrift. The community, which consists 
of some 400 families who returned to the land after being evicted by the previous 
government, will have a 20% direct equity participation in the project... In 
addition, they will receive a 5% - of - turnover royalty payment" (Sunday Times, 
2(03) 
This augurs well for a community that appears to have remained optimistic in spite of 
living in conditions of continuing hardship and poverty. 
185 
8. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
8.1 Introduction 
The communities of Mogopa and Schmidtsdrift are in many ways typical of black rural 
communities in South Africa that suffered some of the worst effects of apartheid. All 
were affected by legislation that was promulgated early in the twentieth century, and 
which culminated in the policies of the National Party that came to power in 1948. For 
the next 50 or so years, black rural communities in South Africa lived on land that was 
not and could not legally be theirs. They were moved or prevented from moving 
elsewhere (especially to urban areas), or threatened with removal to even more remote 
locations. Fundamental amenities such as a reliable clean water supply were lacking in 
many areas; schools, clinics and shops were at best basic; and employment 
opportunities where they lived were all but non-existent. Poverty was rife as most 
families depended on pathetic pension payments to the elderly, or on migrant 
remittances from the able-bodied who sought work far from home and family, returning 
sometimes only a few times a year, but who had few legal rights in the urban areas 
where they had gone to work. 
Only in 1994, when the first democratic elections were held in the country, was there 
tangible hope for most rural communities of South Africa. This thesis has attempted to 
tell the story of two of these, and this chapter summarises the case study findings and 
draws some generalisations from them. While each community in the countty will have 
its own unique story to tell, the findings at Mogopa and Schmidtsdrift show that there 
are a number of experiences that are common. These are discussed in this chapter as: 
- Rights: how the communities came to own their land; 
- Removals from the land and what subsequently became of it; 
- Resistance and reclamation by the communities; 
- Return to the land; 
- Requirements of the RDP planning process and how each community fared under 
the system; and 
- Reconstruction of the villages and the community. 
One hundred years ago, the communities at both Schmidtsdrift and Mogopa had rights 
and owned their land, but it was land subsequently designated for 'white' occupation 
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and use. Both were subjected to removal under apartheid legislation, although the 
process in each case differed. While the Bakwena ba Mogopa actively resisted their 
removal and were supported in this by high profile personalities and the international 
press, the BaThlaping offered little publicised resistance and subjected themselves to 
the prevailing planning practices of the day. Both communities made high profile 
reclamation of their land, and eventually returned to reconstruct their villages and their 
lives in the post-apartheid era. 
8.2 'Rights': How they came to their land 
Both Tswana speaking people, the BaThlaping and Bakwena settled on land in the 
interior of South Africa and built villages that were surrounded by the fields which 
supported their cattle and on which they grew their subsistence crops. The BaThlaping 
were the earliest recorded settlers of their land in the 18th century, were driven away and 
then reoccupied it in the mid 1800s. By contrast, the Bakwena ba Mogopa purchased 
the first of their two farms from white settlers prior to the passage of restrictive 
legislation, and the second farm was bought in 1931 when the community believed its 
land was safe from expropriation. 
When diamonds were discovered in nearby Kimberley, and land tax was imposed in the 
surrounding areas, many of the men from Schmidtsdrift went to work on the mines. 
The Bakwena ba Mogopa (underneath whose land lay diamonds, the rights for which 
had been sold to help pay for the second farm) similarly sent their men to work on 
mines when the platinum and gold reefs of the western Transvaal opened up. 
In this way, the two case study communities were typical of many others across the 
country prior to 1948: they were settled and successful subsistence fanners, who 
supplemented their income with money eamed by migrant labourers on the country's 
mines. But neither Mogopa nor Schmidtsdrift fell within designated 'scheduled areas' -
areas set aside by the Land Acts for occupation by black communities - and like many 
other communities, both were therefore declared 'black spots', earmarked for removal 
by the government that came to power in 1948. 
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8.3 Removals and what became of the land 
The BaThlaping appear to have 'gone' quietly. In 1968 - towards the end of the 
'decade of removals' when all property rights for black people in areas outside the 
designated bantustans had been suspended - they were moved and dispersed to nine 
different places north of Kuruman, one of the most remote and desolate parts of South 
Africa. 
The eviction from Mogopa was far from quiet The community survived the intense 
period of removals suffered elsewhere in the country in the 1960s and 1970s, but 
pressure again built up by the early 1980s. Despite world-wide condemnation of the 
continuing policy of removals and protest from non-governmental organisations, the 
international press and high profile South Africans, including Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu, the Bakwena ba Mogopa were subjected to a violent process of dispossession and 
dumped at Pachsdraai, subsequently moving to Bethanie and then Onderstepoort. 
The land at Mogopa was leased out to local white farmers, many of whom had acquired 
the Mogopa cattle at greatly reduced prices. The wells and schools had been destroyed 
as part of the strategy to force the community to move, and within a short period, the 
houses and the rest of the village buildings - all made from local stone - were in ruins, 
some of which are still visible today. When members of the community ventured back 
to Mogopa in 1988, the only thing that remained intact was the ancestraJ graveyard. 
At Schmidtsdrift, by contrast, while the houses were destroyed or fell into ruin, the 
schools, shops and post office that had been part of the settlement were preserved and 
put to use by the new occupants of the land, the South African Defence Force, who had 
acquired the vast farm for a training and weapons testing facility. When the SA OF 
needed to rehouse the San members of the 31 Battalion after Namibia's independence in 
1990, it did so in a tented camp at Schmidtsdrift, a move that was perceived as a further 
insult by the BaTblaping. 
So Schmidtsdrift and Mogopa represent a snapshot of what happened elsewhere in 
South Africa - communities being moved between 1960 and the mid-1980s, being 
moved amid protest / publicity or almost unnoticed to the outside world. But the impact 
on the lives of the communities affected by these removals was devastating. 
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8.4 Resistance and reclamation 
In resistance and land reclamation, the two case study communities continued to 
represent a cross-section of what was going on elsewhere in South Mrica. At the time 
of their removal, the BaThlaping appeared to have passively accepted their position in 
terms of planning policies and within the law of the land - however galling this must 
have been to them. Once the reforms of the early 1990s began, however, and assisted 
by an NGO - but still operating within the prevailing legislation - they lodged a claim 
for the return of their land before the newly established Advisory Commission on Land 
Allocation (ACLA). This claim was contested by other agencies and the SADF, and 
also by the Griqua people, who had occupied the land for a period in the early 1800s 
(see figure 9, and section 7.7 above). The claims and counter claims for the land at 
Schmidtsdrift meant that the restitution process was not a simple matter of transferring 
the land back to the original inhabitants. Griqua, Tswana and San people all competed 
with each other and with government departments at a time when historic and 
fundamental changes were underway in the country and the nation's expectations were 
at a peak. One of the more positive consequences of this contest was that the 
BaThlaping people, who had been dispersed into different remote areas, unified to press 
for the restitution of their land. 
When ACLA announced that it had rejected their claim in April 1994 - days before the 
elections and change of government - 150 people invaded the land. They were arrested, 
but their protest succeeded in drawing the attention of the new government, which made 
public its intensions to return Schmidtsdrift to the BaThlaping people later in the year. 
However, a year later, when no progress had been made, members of the community 
staged a second land invasion. Their protest ended only when promises of government 
action were made. This meant that once more the community submitted themselves to 
the statutory planning process. 
Resistance by the Bakwena ba Mogopa had been ongoing since their removal in 1984, 
as they fought government plans for their relocation and disenfranchisement in 
Bophuthatswana. They actively drew up plans for the purchase of alternative land, and 
when these were frustrated, reoccupied the farms. At the same time, they continued to 
challenge the government through the courts for title to their land. 
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By 1990, at the time of tentative reforms in the country, the community was given 
pennission to stay at Mogopa, but in temporary structures only, and the following year 
they were allowed to start farming the land. This victory for the community pre-dated 
the 1994 change in government and the community's planning for the redevelopment of 
the farms and the village thus started before the RDP and its Land Reform Programme 
came into being. The process that was set in motion included the convening of the 
Mogopa Development Forum, which began to meet regularly, and whose membership 
comprised representatives from provincial and government departments concerned with 
development in the area, members of the NGO, private consultants and academics, and 
whose meetings were open to all members of the community. 
8.5 Return to the land 
At Mogopa, the retu@ to the land was begun in a clandestine fashion, when a group of 
community members and elders went back to Mogopa to tend the ancestral graveyard 
that had fallen into disrepair. While there is no doubt that the graveyard had become 
overgrown, there is also little doubt that the group fully intended their stay to be 
permanent, in spite of court injunctions brought against them. More members of the 
community drifted back to Mogopa and erected temporary shacks, and in 1991, in the 
spirit of the reforms sweeping the country, the government capitulated and recognised 
their claims. In that year, the state also promised the return of the title deeds to the 
Bakwena ba Mogopa and by 1993, when an informal census was carried out, the 
population had grown to around 1500. 
The return to the land at Schmidtsdrift also took place via an invasion, the third by the 
BaThlaping. This was in 1997 and after a number of delays bad occurred in the formal 
restitution process. In contrast to what bad happened at Mogopa, the Schmidtsdrift 
community had tried to comply with the requirements of the Land Reform process, but 
their expectations of returning to their land had been raised and dashed repeatedly since 
1994. So their feelings of frustration were similar to those of the Balcwena ba Mogopa 
when they eventually - and angrily - occupied their land. 
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8.6 RDP requirements and the planning process 
Once the people had invaded and occupied their land, the authorities had little choice 
but to deal with and speed up the restitution process. In both cases, the communities 
forced the hand of the government by their action. But in the early years of the new 
government, procedures devolved to provincial and local levels were often delayed due 
to administrative changes and the lack of qualified or experienced staff to implement 
them. 
In terms of the RDP-funded Land Reform Programme, Provincial Land Reform 
Steering Committees (PSCs) were established in each of the nine new Provinces to plan 
and manage the process. Schmidtsdrift and Mogopa were located in different 
Provinces, and their experiences show that the interpretation and outworking of the 
Land Reform Programme was not uniform under the devolved planning powers to the 
Provinces. 
Both communities had been designated as rural Presidential Lead Projects (PLPs) by 
President Nelson Mandela, thereby setting them up as pilot projects to receive focussed 
attention. While the notion of PLPs was soon abandoned by the government, the 
communities themselves continued to expect that their needs would be treated as 
priorities. In Northern Cape Province, the Provincial Steering Committee (PSC), with 
the agreement of the Board of Trustees of the Schmidtsdrift community, commissioned 
professional consultants to begin the physical planning for the area. At the same time, 
the legal process of regaining their rights to the land, continued. The newly formed 
Land Claims Court was.petitioned late in 1995 and eventually agreement in principle 
was obtained that the land should be returned to the BaTblaping. 
From a planning point of view, the consultants appointed at Schmidtsdrift set about to 
formally involve the community in the process, through consultation in the early stages, 
and. more specifically, through the holding of a community convention at which the 
scattered members of the community could come together to establish priorities for 
development. A Master Planning Document was submitted to the Northern Cape 
Department of Local Government and Housing early in 1997 in accordance with the 
requirements of the Land Reform Programme, and anticipated that the community could 
begin their return to the land later that year. However. disilJusionment set in when 
implementation of this plan was delayed and specifically, no progress was visible 
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regarding the restoration of their title to the land. The community threatened to resort to 
the only form of action that seemed to elicit results: to invade the land. They were 
persuaded not to. but the 1997 Master Planning Document was never implemented. It 
appears to have been shelved when amendments were made to the land restitution 
process in 1999 and nationally a formalised set of procedures. including those required 
in terms of Integrated Development Planning. was adopted for the process. Ironically. 
in drawing up the Master Plan for development. the planners for Schmidtsdrift may 
have' got ahead' of the process, since in terms of the new procedures, the provincial 
authorities set about appointing new consultants to undertake detailed land planning for 
the area. 
The records therefore show that little formal progress was made until the land was 
transferred to the BaThlaping and nationally land restitution shifted from a judicial 
(Land Qaims Courts in terms of the RDP) to an administrative process (administration 
through PSC and the provinces under GEAR). This had meant that powers were 
devolved to Provincial level (placing greater demands on staff), and a fixed set of 
restitution procedures was adopted. Only at this stage was a PSC "comprising all the 
relevant state departments" again convened to administer the development planning 
process for Schmidtsdrift. This included the appointment of (the second firm of) 
development planners to compile a plan for the area. With the devolution of greater 
restitution powers and the reorganisation of local government in the Northern Cape had 
come staffing and administrative problems similar to those seen in North West 
Province, one official commenting: 
"We are understaffed at the moment ... We only got files sent down last year 
from Cape Town ... We used to be a satellite. We are still evolving. This is that 
time lag that we still need to cater for in times of change. We wade through 
that, and we're still coming on strong". (Interviewee 03, 2001) 
At around the same time as the local government reorganisation, ANCRA, the NGO 
that had been most actively engaged at Schmidtsdrift, discontinued its involvement with 
the community. It appears that with the increased fonnalisation of the land restitution 
procedures came a decline in co-operation and communication between the community 
and the NGOs. 
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Planning and the Land Reform Programme took a different form at Mogopa. In 1991, 
three years prior to the change in government, the community, through TRAC, had 
begun what could be viewed as its own insurgent or participatory planning process and 
agreed on their priorities for development. The Mogopa Development Forum met 
regularly to co-ordinate the efforts of interested parties, and predated the formation of 
the Provincial Steering Committee (PSC) in North West Province. In fact, it appears 
that the provincial authorities in North West were relatively inactive regarding the Land 
Reform process at Mogopa, effectively leaving the community and the Mogopa 
Development Forum to drive the process themselves. While to the observer, this might 
have had the appearance of empowerment for development, in practice, the 
Development Forum could plan, but struggled to implement development priorities and 
proposals at Mogopa. These powers, and especially funding, had simply not been 
devolved to it. The stories told in Chapter 6 about the battles for the clinic and the 
school illustrated some of the problems that were encountered. 
It was only after the demise of the Development Forum in 1997 that a Provincial 
Steering Committee for Mogopa was formed and planning proceeded 'according to 
RDP principles'. This is ironic, since GEAR had replaced the RDP in 1996. 
Nevertheless, in the spirit of the RDP, the community was represented on the Mogopa 
PSC, and the first major project that was undertaken was the planning for and 
construction of permanent houses in the village. It appears that up until that time, the 
staff and skills needed by the rural planning machinery in North West Province had 
simply either not existed or those in power saw their priorities lying elsewhere, in spite 
of the fact that Mogopa had originally been designated a Presidential Lead Project. In 
an interview in 1999, an official in the Department of Land Affairs indicated that 
'organisational' problems at Provincial level were part of the delays at Mogopa. 
Another official stated that the problem with Presidential Lead Projects in general was 
"that they were never properly integrated into the system. They were part of the 
(Land Reform) Pilot Programme, they were called PLPs and everyone thought 
that they would get additionaljunding: they were special projects. And they did 
get some additional support from the then RDP Office, which then closed down 
very shortly thereafter. The title, PLP, gave them a status which it probably did 
not have. But it did help to kick start a lot of projects in key areas across the 
country. .. I don't think they got lost. I think that many got reconfigured and 
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restructured and they got brought into the work ojthe departments ... But it was 
an experiment, and we must remember that." (Interviewee 02, 1999). 
The Presidential Lead Projects (PLPs) may have been an experiment, but the lives of 
ordinary rural villagers were affected. Their hopes and expectations for an early 
resolution of their plight were raised by the designation of their villages as PLPs. More 
than five years later, they still lived in poverty, most at Schmidtsdrift still lived in tin 
shanties, and members of both communities, as elsewhere in the country, still talked in 
terms of the RDP, although it too had 'got reconfigured and restructured' into GEAR. 
8.7 Reconstruction 
Reconstruction at Mogopa had begun almost as soon as the group of elders invaded the 
land to tend the ancestral graveyard at the end of the 1980s. At the community's 
invitation, TRAC began by encouraging the development of small-scale projects. Once 
it became clear that the community would be allowed to stay on the land, priorities for 
development were worked through and alternative sources of funding were sought. 
When the Mogopa Development Forum was established in 1993, it took over the role of 
development co-ordination. Under its auspices, the community set out its priorities for 
development and with the help of TRAC, attempted to realise these. 
Among the first projects undertaken at Mogopa were the rebuilding of the school (later 
destroyed by a storm), a bakery and a village vegetable farming project, all of which 
involved the women of the village. The bakery was short lived, and the vegetable 
farming project lasted only a few years. More successful was a project to improve the 
water supply to the village, which had been by a communal well only. Supply was 
improved through the provision of pipes throughout the village and taps .shared by 
groups of families; and the long but very rough track from the main gravel road into the 
village was graded and improved. Each of these projects used local labour and was 
undertaken during the lifetime of the Mogopa Development Forum. In addition, the 
school and clinic, whose stories are told in Chapter 6, and which were rated as the 
highest priorities for development by the community in 1991, were built while the 
Mogopa Development Forum still functioned 
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Thereafter, reconstruction continued under the PSC and the village Development 
Committee. By 2001, 300 houses had been built and electricity had been supplied, 
further improving the quality of the lives of the community. However, by then the 
Provincial authorities had turned their development attention to other rural villages that 
needed water and sanitation, and in fact had begun to devolve their funding of rural 
development to local councils. At Mogopa, development continued under the guidance 
of the community-based Mogopa Development Trust, which had begun to function as 
the local council, and which had also negotiated the agreement with the Tirisano 
Diamond Mine at Mogopa. This meant the creation of a small number of jobs, and a 
share in the royalties from the mining enterprise. 
Reconstruction at Schmidtsdrift occurred at a slower pace. While some of the original 
buildings had been maintained by the SADF, and were converted for use as village 
administrative offices, a school and a clinic, development of other amenities and 
housing was more ponderous. It appears that progress at Schmidtsdrift had been the 
victim of the many changes in legislation and approaches to development on the part of 
the Northern Cape provincial authorities, and which closely reflected central 
government policy on land restitution. In addition, little progress had been made at 
Schmidtsdrift until after the redrawing of provincial and local government boundaries. 
In an interview with one of the Province's officials, it was stated that from 1994 to 
1998, the official approach to land restitution was to settle land claims as quickly as 
possible. From 1999 onwards (after the country's second general election; the shift in 
land restitution to a more administrative process devolved to the provincial authorities; 
and after the reorganisation of local government, which included a programme of 
capacity building for inexperienced officials), the approach in Northern Cape Province 
to land restitution focussed on the need for sustainable development. So while a Master 
Plan for development at Schmidtsdrift was drawn up in accordance with the (national 
and provincial) RDP requirements and submitted in 1997, national priorities at the time 
lay not with the drawing up of such plans, but with settling claims in the Land Claims 
Court. Likewise, provincial priorities did not yet lie with development. This might 
explain why the official could state in an interview in 2001 that 
"It (the Master Plan) wasn't very valuable to us, in terms of what we needed ... I 
think it was too early in the process for a clear understanding ... (long pause, then 
silence)" (Interviewee 03, 2001) 
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By 2001, the first 240 families were resettled in tin shanties at Schmidtsdrift. While 
there were administrative offices, a clinic and a school (all located in the renovated 
SADF buildings), there was limited piped water to communal stands in the residential 
buildings, but no electricity or economic base in the village. Like their Mogopa 
counterparts and others throughout the country, the community at Schmidtsdrift 
continued to depend on small-scale subsistence farming and remittances from family 
members who had employment in distant urban areas. 
8.8 Participation in the planning process at Mogopa and Scbmidtsdrift: 
analysis and explanation 
Perhaps the biggest difference between the two case studies lies in the way in which the 
communities participated in the planning process. The BaThlaping of Schmidtsdrift, 
apparently passive at the time of their removal and subsequently divided and dispersed 
as a community, appear to have waited until the formal and official planning processes 
were put in place before they took tentative steps to become involved and press for the 
restitution of their land. 
By contrast, the Bakwena ba Mogopa united early on against their headman who 
apparently 'sold out' to the apartheid authorities and protested their removal at every 
tum. They solicited the support of churches and NGOs and fought a high profile 
struggle, eventually succumbing to become one of the last 'black spot' removals, in 
1984. They resisted the government's plans for their resettlement elsewhere, and 
instead made their own plans for the purchase of an alternative farm. Eventually, they 
took the risk and the initiative by invading their own land in the late 1980s, and started 
to rebuild their village. 
The dispersed Schmidtsdrift community remained passive, dependent on an NGO 
(ANCRA) to plead its cause and lodge its initial land claim with the Advisory 
Commission on Land Allocation in 1992. Thereafter, ANCRA worked with the still 
scattered members of the community to support their case. 
The only documented participation by the BaThlaping as a group prior to the 1996 
Planning Convention was the two land invasions by a small number of community 
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members. Apart from that, community leaders attended meetings with provincial 
authorities and later with the planning consortium. Interviews with field workers from 
ANCRA revealed that they conducted a number of 'pre-convention' meetings, held in 
the different locations where the BaThlaping had been settled, as part of the preparation 
process. 
The restitution planning process at Schmidtsdrift was by and large therefore a formal 
one, carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Land Reform Programme. 
As such, the planning consortium was at pains to include the community in the process, 
however formally. The fact that the community was scattered in nine different and 
remote locations made this process particularly difficult, but with the help of ANCRA, a 
survey was carried out and through their various 'pre-convention' meetings, community 
members had an opportunity to take part in some participatory rural appraisal activities. 
At the Planning Convention in 1996, a large number of community members attended 
and participated in the proceedings. From the records of that event, there appears to 
have been a sense of achievement and accomplishment at the end of the Planning 
Convention and once the Master Plan had been drawn up and submitted to the 
provincial authorities. Thereafter, participation by the community all but ceased, until 
the process was revived late in 1999 and infrastructure began to be developed for the 
first group that had returned to the land. 
For the Bakwena ba Mogopa, the high profile nature of their removal and their active 
resistance as a community appear to have set the pattern for their participation in the 
planning process. First, they refused to participate in the apartheid government's 
planning of their removal and settlement at Pachsdraai. At regular meetings attended by 
members of the community, they fonnulated their own ('insurgent') plans and moved to 
Bethanie while making arrangements for the purchase of another farm. When that 
failed and the government once more tried to impose its plans on the community, they 
again resisted and planned their invasion of the land under the pretext of tending their 
ancestral graves. Having made clear their intensions to stay at Mogopa, the community 
continued to engage the assistance of TRAC not only to help press their legal case, but 
also to help with planning for the redevelopment of the farms. A planning committee 
was elected by the community and regular meetings - open to all residents - were held, 
facilitated by TRAC fieldworkers. The Mogopa Development Forum existed for a 
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number of years as a highly participatory forum which community members could and 
did attend. In this respect, the MDF echoed the workings of the traditional Tswana 
kgotla (see section 6 above). One of the major problems with this almost textbook 
scenario for 'bottom-up' community participation in planning was that the provincial 
and national authorities did not participate in the same spirit. Lacking the financial 
resources to implement their plans, the community was unable to act on their own 
priorities for development, and the funds were not forthcoming from the authorities. 
The Mogopa Development Forum ceased to operate around 1997, but the Bakwena ba 
Mogopa continued to control the planning process by electing their own Mogopa 
Development Trust to manage development in the Village. This committee was granted 
recognition by the provincial authorities, and together with officials, made up the 
Provincial Steering Committee for Mogopa. They were able to negotiate all subsequent 
projects, reporting back to community meetings. The Trust fulfilled the function of the 
Communal Property Association, which the Bakwena ba Mogopa refused to establish. 
This could be seen as yet another way that the community asserted themselves against 
planning structures and procedures required by the government and imposed their own 
rationality regarding land allocation, community representation and participation. At a 
meeting which I attended in 2001, a senior provincial planner suggested that if the 
Mogopa Development Trust was set up officially as a Communal Property Association, 
then it would be a legal entity in accordance with the requirements of the Department of 
Land Affairs. The Trust Chairman replied that the Trust and the community had their 
own legal constitution, and that the rights of residents would be guaranteed by that 
constitution. 
The fierce independence of the Bakwena ba Mogopa was therefore still in evidence, 
even though the Trust was working closely with the provincial authorities to further 
develop the village (at that 2001 meeting, agenda items that were discussed included the 
new 'RDP' houses that had been built and - at last! - the financing of new classrooms at 
the school, by then attended by over 400 pupils). 
The difference between the two communities appears to be their different levels of 
independence and empowerment, and in this they might represent two extremes seen in 
other rural communities in South Mrica. The BaIcwena ba Mogopa were fiercely 
independent from the start, and sought to control the process at every opportunity. By 
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contrast, at almost every stage, the BaThlaping of Schmidtsdrift were submissive to and 
dependent on others. Initially, they depended on NGOs to initiate and help them 
navigate the land restitution process. Participation in the drawing up of the 1997 Master 
Plan was logistically difficult, but was encouraged and facilitated by ANCRA and the 
planning consortium, culminating the Planning Convention attended by 6000 members. 
But the Master Plan was not implemented after it was submitted to the provincial 
authorities, despite the fact that it had been drawn up strictly in accordance with the 
requirements of the day. The community did not act or protest, but waited. When the 
disillusioned members of the planning consortium withdrew from the process, the 
community was once more dependent on the state and its processes. 
When new land restitution procedures were put in place in 1999, and powers devolved 
to the prOvincial authorities, the community appears to have waited for them to restart 
the planning process. From then on, participation occurred according to the terms 
specified by the authorities, and after some hard work on the part of the NGO they were 
persuaded to establish a Communal Property Association as a means to access what was 
rightfully theirs - the land. In addition, a full-time RDP co-ordinator was appointed to 
co-ordinate different projects and liaise with the CPA. By 2001, all planning activities 
at Schmidtsdrift, including formal participation by the residents, had been incorporated 
into the new local government structures and functions of the Siyancuma ('we are 
happy') Municipality. 
8.9 Conclusions: explaining the Case Study flnd;ngs 
The two case studies presented in this thesis were selected for a number of reasons, 
including the fact that I had been involved in both at different times during the planning 
process. In many respects they were typical of many black communities in rural South 
Africa. But in another, they were not typical. This is because they were both 
designated as Presidential Lead Projects. The implication of this status was that they 
were earmarked as pilot projects in which a number of development principles, 
including that of participation, were to be introduced and 'fast-tracked' along the Land 
Reform process. 
199 
The case study evidence shows that this did not happen, and thus the principle and the 
fact of Presidential Lead Projects for rural development failed. In Mogopa, while 300 
houses were built through the activities of the Provincial Steering Committee, much of 
the development occurred when planning took place under the Mogopa Development 
Forum. This was not an institution set up in tenns of the Land Refonn Programme, but 
was a community based forum that preceded it. The land was occupied in 1988, title 
deeds were eventually granted back to the community in 1998, and the 'RDP' houses 
were finally built in 2001. By any account this cannot be described as a 'fast-tracked' 
process, and the action was taken not because of community participation, but in 
accordance with a timetable followed by the powers that be. Further, as soon as the 
houses were built, the province seems to have placed their development funding and 
attention in other rural areas that had more urgent development needs. This is neither 
surprising nor without justification: while the Mogopa community may not have been 
the beneficiary of a 'fast-tracking' of development by the national and provincial 
authorities, it benefited from national and international publicity, sustained NGO 
support and assistance as well as donor funding, and latterly of natural resources in the 
fonn of diamonds. But this study has also shown that one of the most valuable 
resources that sustained the community and supported its development was community 
cohesion and determination that resulted from decades of resistance, and which led to a 
defiance of formal planning processes, in different ways both during and after the 
apartheid era. 
At Schmidtsdrift, where the community tended to conform to planning procedures pre-
and post- 1994, their status as a Presidential Lead Project did not help to 'fast-track' 
their development either. Efforts by the planning consortium appointed and 
commissioned by the community to meet the RDP planning requirements from 1994 to 
1999 for both participation and business planning appear to have made little, if any, 
development progress. It was only when amendments were made to the legislation and 
revised provincial procedures were put in place, that meaningful development began on 
the ground at Schmidtsdrift. Throughout this time, the community maintained an 
apparent passivity as ANCRA initiated the land claim on their behalf and later worked 
with the scattered community, facilitating their participation in the planning 
consortium's Planning Convention. The only time that the community appeared to 
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initiate something significant was when relatively small groups invaded the land to 
force the authorities to take action. 
While an enduring image of the Bakwena ba Mogopa was of an independent 
community actively resisting all official planning procedures and determinedly 
following their own plans, that of the BaThlaping was of a community that did not 
resist, but accepted the law of the land, becoming passive recipients of the planning and 
development processes of the day. In this respect, their responses reflect their reaction 
to the removals process - the BaThlaping had been dispersed in 1968 to a number of 
different locations, and this divide-and-rule tactic may have succeeded in crushing any 
resistance. 
The idea of the Presidential Lead Projects as fast-tracking and trying out new forms of 
development was abandoned early on by the authorities and replaced with more 
formalised principles of business planning under GEAR and with it a change in 
orientation in rural development to one which focussed on the support of black 
commercial farmers. But the communities in this study were not informed of this 
change of heart and policy, and still believed that they were due for targeted assistance. 
Long after GEAR had replaced the RDP, members of the two case study communities 
(as well as members of the public elsewhere) continued to refer to the RDP, its 
principles and specifically to 'RDP houses' that were being built around the country and 
to which they felt entitled. While the principles of participation were fundamental to 
the RDP, the new provincial and local government structures and procedures under 
GEAR soon relegated participation to a form of tokenism: something done by 
committee and in committee. 
In some respects therefore, participation in planning by the communities of Mogopa and 
Schmidtsdrift appears to have failed, but not necessarily because of the methods that 
were used or because the communities lacked the will or ability to participate. Rather, 
participation failed because of timing (the institutional structures were not in place) and 
capacity (the trained staff were not in post), but particularly because in spite of the RDP 
rhetoric, the authorities were not yet ready to give up control of even elements of the 
planning process to those communities. Nor were they able to take into account the 
views - the different rationalities - of other groups involved in the planning process. 
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The following chapter will reflect in greater detail on the processes of panicipation in 
the two case study communities, and draw further conclusions from the research 
regarding the way in which community participation in planning in rural South Africa 
was construed and effected. 
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9. REFLECTIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF PARTICIPATORY 
PLANNING IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1994-1999 
9.1 Introduction 
At the outset of this research, I hoped to tackle a number of tasks. In particular, I set out 
to investigate and document the extent to which some of South Africa's rural 
communities were being affected by changes to planning policies. I was conscious of 
the fact that most of the history of planning in the country had been written from the 
limited perspective of the dominant planning culture, and that few, if any of the many 
stories of how rural communities had been affected by planning, had been told. By 
undertaking the fieldwork for this research, I hoped to contribute in a small way to the 
country's planning historiography. In doing so, my intention was to focus primarily on 
the communities' experiences of planning - their responses to it and to examine their 
participation in it. While the previous chapter summarised the two case studies, this 
chapter will draw some conclusions from them about participation in rural development 
planning in South Africa by referring to the key research questions that were presented 
in section 5.2. It will conclude with reflections on some of the issues that were faced in 
carrying out fieldwork in rural South Africa during the course of the research. 
9.2 What changes occurred in rural development planning practice in South 
Africa from 1994 - 1999? 
Chapter 2 gave a brief outline of the profound nature of discrimination in planning that 
resulted from the policy of apartheid: the specific development path historically 
followed in South Mrica's rural areas virtually eliminated indigenous subsistence 
farming and established overcrowded black homelands and dormitory towns. Policies 
of 'black spot removal' transferred the large majority of black farmers and their families 
who had legitimately owned land outside the reserves into homelands or bantustans 
characterised by extreme poverty, tenure restrictions, high population density and lack 
of jobs. From a planning perspective, participation by these communities in decisions 
about their lives was non-existenl 
While many of the discriminatory Acts were repealed in 1993, the momentous task of a 
comprehensive reversal of these policies and their consequences was left to the new 
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ANC government following the 1994 elections. In attempting to do so, this government 
had to contend not only with the extremely unequal land distribution, but also the lack 
of any local government structure and a widespread absence of administrative capacity, 
all of which were the legacies of apartheid. 
Thus, where rural development had been systematically neglected during the apartheid 
era, in the first five years of the new government changes in a number of broad areas 
were made to redress that neglect. 
• Changes to planning legislation: There was a comprehensive and complete overhaul 
of planning legislation in South Africa as the new government demonstrated its 
commitment to ridding itself of the legacies of apartheid planning. 
• Changes to planning structures: Provincial and local government reorganisation 
followed changes that were implemented in central government departments, and 
the demarcation of new provincial boundaries. While these changes took time to 
come into effect, the new planning structures were designed inter alia to devolve 
planning to local government level and facilitate participation by communities 
previously excluded from the process. 
• Changes in planning personnel: A large number of planners was needed to populate 
the new positions created in the planning structures, and experienced professionals 
for these posts were sometimes in short supply. But there were other, more subtle 
changes that occurred, as was evident from the three broad categories of planners 
encountered in this study: 
Local government planners: many were inexperienced, if not in the planning 
profession, then in the posts to which they were appointed. They were certainly 
new to the structures and legislation that were introduced in the country. In 
many cases, there were delays in the appointment of staff to local government 
planning posts, and the findings of this study have shown that for local 
government planners, the need for control of the process (and perhaps to be 
regarded as the planning experts under the new system) appeared to be more 
important than participation by communities in it. 
204 
Professional consultants: many were working for the first time with rural 
communities and with the new legislation and Jocal government structures. 
They needed to adjust their practices to the requirements of the new state 
planning system when it came into operation. Through adhering to its 
requirements, they were aware of the need for participation, although some did 
not have experience of the range of methods that could be used. In the case of 
Schmidtsdrift, the planning process applied was reminiscent of a modernist 
procedural planning process. 
Development practitioners who worked for and with NGOs: Many of these 
planners and practitioners had worked with communities before 1994, and the 
continued to embrace the notion of participation. But their roles changed from 
that of advocacy or resistance to state planning, to one that tried to facilitate 
development. Ultimately in both case studies, their roles were phased out as the 
new state planning system carne into operation and the new structures of local 
government established their own forms of representation. 
The way in which the different groups of planners approached the issue of participation 
shed some light on whether they viewed participation as an end in itself - a fundamental 
right - or as a means to some other end. In post-apartheid South Africa, and in terms of 
the RDP, participation was conceived as a fundamental right that the majority of the 
population had been denied for decades and could thus perhaps be seen as an end in 
itself. It was seen as necessary not only for democracy to grow in the country, but also 
for communities to grow. 
But the case studies have shown that when it came to the practicalities of planning for 
land restitution and development, participation was 'done' on the government's tenns, 
and through the imposition of the government's rationality on the process. For the 
provincial and local government planning authorities, the ideal of democracy and 
participation in planning appeared to be less important than getting new institutions and 
structures in place, and of recruiting and training appropriate staff. The formalised, 
controlled participation that was practised by local government planning officials 
continued to facilitate the exercise of control by the planning authorities. Participation 
in planning in South Africa's rural areas - where it occurred - became the means to 
achieve other ends. These ends were those of the institutions of the state for efficiency -
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'ticking the boxes' to show that at least some consultation (Arnstein, 1969; Pretty, 
1995) or even diplomacy (Choguill, 1996) had taken place according to RDP 
requirements - for mobilisation to get things done (Abbott, 1996), or in Moser's (1993) 
terms, or to ensure the success of a particular project (as at Mogopa with the community 
hall). 
For the communities in this study, participation in planning was not primarily about 
democracy, or a restored right which they could exercise. They embraced the planning 
process and tried to participate in it for one fundamental reason: to get their land back 
and to get some compensation - in the fonn of development - for what they had gone 
through under apartheid. Where such development did occur in the first five years after 
1994 in the two case studies, it tended to be because of the tenacity of the community 
members and NGO staff - as exemplified by those at Mogopa - and not because 
democratic procedures had been set up officially by the formal planning process. As 
part of the democratic project, participation may have been conceived of as an end in 
itself. The communities, however, saw participation as a means for restitution and the 
restoration of that which had been taken away. 
Changes may have occurred in legislation, in planning structures and in planning 
personnel, but differences persisted in the way in which participation was construed. 
Both groups - the communities who wanted their land back, and the government 
departments charged with the successful implementation of land restitution policies -
saw participation not as an end in itself, but as a means to achieve certain ends. But 
there was a difference in the way in which those ends were perceived, or as Watson 
(2003) described it, a clash of rationalities between the way in which government 
planners and the communities saw participation. The result was that in spite of the other 
very significant changes, the suspicions that the communities had harboured about 
planners and planning during the apartheid era persisted after the change in government. 
9.3 Did the democratic process in the country lead to a greater awareness of 
participation in planning in South Africa? 
Even before the 1994 change of government, the Mogopa community was aware of and 
exercised what it believed was its right to have a say in the planning process, albeit by 
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way of resistance, protest and insurgent planning (Sandercock, 1998). But the wave of 
expectation and excitement that swept the country as people were taught how to vote in 
preparation for the first democratic elections was palpable. Whole communities were 
able to have their say, and expected to be able to have their say, particularly in regard to 
land restitution. And when they exercised that right, they expected to be heard and 
listened to. Hence, when the Bakwena ba Mogopa requested that action be taken and 
that allocated resources be spent on classrooms at the school, they expected that their 
petition - reached communally and in a participatory forum - would result in action. 
They were aware of their right to participate in the planning process and were more than 
ready to exercise it, having had the support of TRAC for a number of years and having 
participated in their own form of planning while resisting removal. 
For TRAC and other NGO workers, the democratic process brought a change, not 
necessarily in their awareness of participation in planning, but in the way in which they 
worked with the communities whose rights to participation were now entrenched. Prior 
to 1994, NGOs and progressive planners had represented the communities as they 
resisted apartheid planning. Their roles changed from that of support and facilitation of 
resistance, to that of facilitating participation in development; but their awareness and 
the centrality of the notion of participation did not change. 
But did tbe democratic process in the country lead to a greater awareness of 
participation on the part of the planning authorities? The legislative and other changes 
to the planning system meant that provincial and local government officials could have 
been in no doubt of the right of communities to have a say, and their awareness of this 
and the potential impact on the planning process was certainly raised after 1994. But 
the case studies show that while these officials might bave been aware of the need for 
participation in planning, their view of participation and the role it might play was 
different from that of the communities or the development practitioners who worked 
with them. They regarded themselves as the experts and sought to keep control of all 
aspects of the planning process. 
Some of the literature on participation discussed the dualities that exist between 'us' (or 
the 'baves', the dominant formal planning process) and 'them' (or the 'have-nots'; the 
beneficiaries of planning). Arnstein (1969) defended the use of these extremes in the 
duality by stating that in many cases the 'have-nots' really did perceive the powerful as 
a monolithic system, and the 'haves' sometimes really did view the have-nots as a sea of 
'those people'. Taking this view of participation underscores the observation that in the 
formal planning process in rural areas in post-apartheid South Africa, the authorities 
conceived of participation as 'them' (a monolithic group of communities) participating 
in 'our' formal, state controlled and managed RDP planning process, not the other way 
around, as envisaged in some texts, where the principles of mutual learning (Friedmann. 
1992) and 'us' participating in 'their' planning processes were proposed (Muller, 1982). 
Where the latter occurs, it, results in what Hague et al (2003) termed 'participatory 
planning' . By their definition, participatory planning represented a communicative 
approach in which local knowledge and multicultural planning contexts were 
acknowledged and embraced. 
The tacit acceptance of this duality of 'us' and 'them' placed the 'expertise' firmly in 
the hands of the government planners. Preceding chapters have shown that under both 
apartheid planning and post-apartheid planning, the measures introduced were those of 
government planning 'experts' and were initiated by them. Some of the measures had 
been devised in a context of a modernist rationalism, some perhaps with paternalistic 
notions of planning for people. Almost all of them confined planning to an activity 
carried out by these designated 'experts' at various levels of government, or by their 
consultants. The apartheid 'project', which had used planning as a fundamental tool of 
its social engineering, may have been brought to a halt as a political idea (Healey, 
1992), but it appeared that -many of the planning practices instituted by it, remained. 
The 'thought-world' of post-apartheid planning, devolved to provincial and municipal 
level and in the case of Communal Property Associations, to village level, remained 
bureaucratic and constrained by regulations and notions of control. This meant that the 
provincial and local government planners working in the new planning structures were 
constrained by their institutional contexts, and the priorities placed on them by their 
employers had to override Jocal priorities (Abram, 2000). 
By contrast, some of the development practitioners in this study attempted to introduce 
more participatory planning. They helped to identify their development priorities and 
worked to build the capacity of community members. In so doing, they tried not to 
relegate participation to a token activity, but in fact made it the focus of the work they 
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did. By their approach, they attempted to participate in 'their' (the communities') 
planning processes. 
And what was the result? All of the development practitioners spoken to were 
disillusioned, not with 'their' (communities') process, but with the fact that 'our' 
( formal, dominant) process was so powerful and assertive, and with the fact that, in the 
face of bureaucratic procedures and requirements, they had had to abandon the work 
that they started. The development practitioners had tried to participate in the 
communities' process, to treat the communities as 'experts' and respect their local 
knowledge, but they had been frustrated by lack of co-operation by the authorities. The 
context of conflicting rationalities meant that it was impossible for these planners to 
facilitate the participation of the communities in the way that the literature envisaged. 
One of the implications of this is that before South African planners can even begin 
their work in multicultural contexts, they may need to bridge the gaps that exist. 
Planning students will need to be prepared for working in such contexts and to learn 
how to recognise and respect difference (Forester, 1989). 
Another group of 'experts' were the consultants who, as professional planners, worked 
within the formal processes at Mogopa and Schmidtsdrift. They sought to conform to 
the requirements of the RDP and at times had to exercise extreme patience as provincial 
departments were understaffed. In some cases, their plans were implemented (the 
community h8.ll at Mogopa), in others they were not (the Master Plan at Schmidtsdrift). 
In interviews, both expressed frustration - if not disillusionment - with their experiences 
(procedural delays, staff shortages and incompetence, funding shortages and changing 
budgets) of working within the requirements of the land reform programme. 
But the communities were also experts, and their expertise lay in the local knowledge 
that they brought to the process. It was this knowledge that the development 
practitioners sought to tap into and build upon in their participatory work with the 
communities. At Schmidtsdrift, however, this work appeared to come to nothing as the 
BaThlaping reverted to their pattern of submission in the face of planning authority. 
The Bakwena ba Mogopa, on the other hand, who had asserted themselves in the past, 
continued to show their independence in their dealings with the new government and its 
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officials. They continued to assert their expertise over their own affairs, to find their 
own way to benefit their village through the new policies and regulations, and to run 
their own affairs, refusing to constitute a Communal Property Association and 
preferring their own version, the Mogopa Development Trust. 
Thus there existed dualities between 'us' and 'them' in both case studies. But even 
within the communities themselves, there were dualities. It was simplistic for state 
planners or consultants to think of the communities as single entities that could be 
planned for or engaged in the process - in reality the communities themselves were at 
times fractured, as land restitution opened up tensions and differences. At 
Schmidtsdrift, a number of different groups staked their claims for the land, and the 
BaThlaping showed marked antagonism towards the !Xu and the Khwe, themselves 
victims of apartheid. At Mogopa, the youth reacted violently to the implementation of 
the clinic proposals that other members of the community had been persuaded to accept. 
Mogopa Development Forum meetings were occasions where differences were aired but 
not always resolved, and discussions about the school became particularly heated. At 
one meeting there were tensions over who would be allowed to return to settle in the 
village. At stake in both villages was not only funding and the implementation of 
development projects, but also the restoration of that which, for African communities is 
the essence of their traditions: land 
9.4 To what extentwBS participation incorporated into the rural development 
process in South Africa? 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme, the ANC's manifesto for the 1994 
elections, had been drawn up in a'highly participatory way, and the notion of democracy 
and participation in development was central to the RDP. But as this study has 
illustrated, once elected, the new government continued to follow a centralized 
implementation and decision-making structure. This was understandable in the context 
of the upheavals of change, but it meant that the integration of participation into the 
broader context of local planning and policy making did not succeed: the perceived 
need for control greatly reduced effective beneficiary participation. 
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The strategic shift in the implementation of the RDP in 1996 did not improve matters. 
From being a centralised, specialised programme, reconstruction and development 
became a function of line and provincial departments. Targets were set for these 
departments to ensure that they complied with the macro-economic strategy of GEAR. 
In a context of such further major restructuring, the focus remained one of control. and 
effective participation in planning could take place only on the tenns allowed by the 
provincial departments. It was not abandoned as a concept, but it was relegated further 
down the order of priorities. Participation was still regarded as a good thing, and indeed 
as the right thing, but for the authorities it was not the most important thing. It was not 
central to the bureaucratic requirements, nor, by the evidence presented, was it given 
priority during that period. The case studies have shown that the official planning 
machinery paid lip service to the notion of participation: in practice it was unable or 
unwilling to take account of the aspirations of the communities, or their expectations for 
participation. From the evidence of the case studies, no attempts were made by the 
authorities to introduce participatory techniques to the official planning process. 
Instead, provincial and local government planners relied on consultation, co-operation, 
co-optation, and even manipulation (Arnstein, 1969 and Choguill, 1996) to meet the 
requirements for participation. 
It is tempting to try to establish 'what did work' in different situations and at different 
times for each of the communities, and what 'did not' work. Such an examination leads 
one to conclude that it was only participation in the official planning process that 
'worked', in the sense of resulting in tangible action and the implementation of 
development in the respective villages (e.g. the community hall at Mogopa). What 
apparently did not 'work' were the informal, participatory planning exercises that were 
carried out by planning practitioners with the two communities. These did not result in 
tangible development action, but rather in frustration and disillusionment (e.g. the 
Master Plan at Schmidtsdrift, the school at Mogopa). But this should not discount the 
hard lessons learned, for example through the informal and insurgent processes at 
Mogopa and the skills acquired within the Mogopa Development Forum that proved 
valuable to the Bakwena Ba Mogopa, who have consequently been able to take a far 
more active and confident role in that village's development 
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Participation can be seen as a toolbox, from which the players (planners and 
community) can select the appropriate tool for the 'job'. If participation becomes 
formulaic, entrenched in 'our' planning procedure, it becomes inflexible, monolithic, 
even a time consuming constraint, not a tool. The Bakwena ba Mogopa showed that it 
was 'their' process that mattered: for the community to be able to participate, an array 
of tools and skills were needed. These were used to varying effect in different situations 
and in the community's own informal planning process. But the tools had to be there 
and there had to be a willingness and ability to use them i.e. there had to be a 
fundamental perspective and rationality of choice, mutual learning and openness to 
multicultural differences. This was not apparent in the formal, mainstream planning 
processes observed in the case study communities. Instead, what was observed was 
akin to the 'tyranny' of control (Cooke and Kothari, 2001) as participation was 
effectively shut out of the planning process. 
At Schmidtsdrift, participation was really about the continued facilitation of power and 
control by the authorities over the community. As planning policies moved from 
national to provincial and then to locally devolved authority, the BaThlaping 
community members became even less directly involved and members were appointed 
to committees. 'More' participation - more bureaucratic layers where participation 
should and could have occurred - effectively became 'less' participation by members of 
the community (Desai, 1996). Participation in the official planning process had become 
reduced to Arnstein's (1969) tokenism or ChoguiIJ's (1996) dissimulation, of 
engineering the support of the community, or of getting committee members to rubber 
stamp local government decisions, while the communities themselves remained passive 
(Pretty, 1995). The BaThlaping had historically been subjected to a tyranny of decision 
making, whereby community wishes had been systematically overridden by the 
authorities. This appeared to continue after 1994, albeit perhaps in a more subtle form. 
However, if, in the name of the RDP or post-apartheid planning, this community was 
able to take part only in 'our' formal planning process (and by extension the planning 
authorities did not take into account or were not prepared to learn from 'their' process) 
then it may be that such participation constituted a continuing fonn of subjection. 
In the literature, the critics of participation in planning held that it had become a set of 
ad hoc techniques, isolated from the mainstream of planning (Cooke and Kothari, 
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2001). In the case studies described in this research, criticism is not directed at 
participation for being a set of ad hoc techniques - participation had to be open to a 
range of techniques that need to be appropriately adapted to different contexts. The 
experiences at Mogopa showed that participation did take place in different contexts -
each with different players, different resources available, different problems to 
overcome, and different potentials that could be exploited. But it also showed that 
meaningful participation (in the sense of engaging with a wide range of community 
members) really only occurred outside the formal planning processes. So in this sense, 
the findings of this study endorse what the critics of participation said: that 
participation, where it occurred, was isolated from mainstream planning. 
9.S How did development practitioners and other planners view their roles and 
responsibilities? 
The planning consultants in both case studies worked to what they understood was their 
brief. Where the client was the community, participation was an important part of the 
planning process that was followed. Indeed the planning process required by the post-
apartheid planning system stipulated this. Where the consultant's client was not the 
community (the Regional Services Council in the case of the community hall at 
Mogopa), community participation appeared to be less important (even though it was 
required by the planning process), and token consultation was used to endorse plans that 
had already been fonnulated. 
For the development planning practitioners and NGO workers, the community was 
central to the work that they did. Accordingly, the roles they undertook could be 
classified as advocates (when they represented the communities in meetings with 
provincial planning authorities); facilitators (when they explained new planning 
procedures and requirements, or where they helped the communities to draw up their 
lists of development priorities); or even boundary spanners (where they attempted to 
bridge the gap between the conflicting rationalities of state planners and the 
communities). They appeared to have seen their responsibility as ensuring that the 
voices of the communities were heard in the planning process. 
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For provincial and local government officials - when they were appointed after a 
number of years - their role was as agents and representatives of their departments. This 
meant ensuring that correct procedures were followed in the planning for and allocation 
of resources for development. The way in which participation was construed by local 
government planners was different from the way in which others involved in the process 
construed it. Among other things this clash meant that in practice at Mogopa, one of the 
roles of the local government planners was to try to persuade the community to conform 
to provincial / district view of what was required. 
Participation in the democracy of the 'new' South Africa was (and still is) a 
fundamental right. But it is suggested here that in the realm of rural development 
planning, it may still be a circumscribed right When the Bakwena ba Mogopa set out 
their priorities for development (among them a clinic), nothing happened. When a 
state-supported contractor suggested that a community hall might be 'better' for them 
and offered to build it, it got built after 'consultation' meetings had been held with the 
community to persuade them. In this case, state funding had been allocated for the 
building of community halls, rather than for the implementation of community 
priorities. The 'consultation' had merely occurred to justify the decisions and funding 
allocations that had already been made externally. The participatory planning that had 
gone on before was cast aside, despite protestations of the community. 
When the BaThlaping held a community conference and their appointed consultants 
drew up a Master Plan, it was 'too early' in the planning process for the provincial 
authorities to take account of or to implement. But instead of going back to that 
document when they were 'ready', the authorities appointed a second set of consultants 
who drew up a new plan. This time there was little consultation of the community, and 
indeed, the community representative interviewed in 2001 did not even know how the 
new plan had come to be drawn up. To the sceptic, this duplication could be seen as a 
waste of valuable resources and the extension of control of the state over the planning 
process in Northern Cape Province. By these actions, the provincial planners certainly 
did not acknowledge the importance of the local community's contribution, nor that of 
the planners who had been appointed by them. 
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Both case study communities embarked on the post apartheid planning process with 
enthusiasm, and as PLPs their cases were to be used as pathfinders for the restitution 
process. But in reality, they were PLPs in name only, and were hardly fast-tracked 
along the planning process, let alone the implementation process. The concept of PLPs 
was quietly phased out as GEAR was phased in. The communities had no power -
apart from to invade their own land and embarrass the authorities - to bring about any 
real changes to their plight 
The way in which participation was construed in the two case studies will be explored 
further in this section by asking: 
• What did the communities participate in? 
• Who participated? 
• At what stage did they participate? 
• For whose benefit? 
• At what cost? 
• By whose criteria was participation measured? 
What did the communities participate in? The planning process in post apartheid South 
Africa was supposed to be different, and legally and officially it was, but in terms of 
having a voice and their voices being heard, nothing seemed to have changed for the 
two case study communities. For fifty years they had been planned for and 
disenfranchised from both the electoral and planning processes. Now they could vote 
and attend meetings, but it appears that their voices were not listened to by the planning 
authorities. 
Who participated? Communal meetings had traditionally been held in both 
communities, in the kgotla. Political changes brought changes to the kgotla and 
heralded an opportunity for the young, the old, the illiterate, and even the women, to 
have their say. This applied to meetings to discuss planning issues as well. By 1999, at 
Mogopa, communal meetings were still being held, but pragmatically most meetings 
with provincial planners were attended by elected representatives only. Many of the 
strategic, provincial level planning decisions were being made by district or provincial 
planners, but those directly affecting the village were taken in close consultation with 
the community's elected representatives. At Schmidtsdrift, the local planning function 
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had been taken over by the wider Siyancuma Municipality, and few communal meetings 
were held. Some would say that this representation through an elected Ward Councillor 
was no different from what happens elsewhere and in fact should have been welcomed 
as a 'normalisation' of the process. They might add that it was wrong to expect 
disadvantaged communities to participate to any greater extent in their own affairs than 
the more advantaged members of society. But the difference lay in choice, and in the 
extent to which the authorities took cognisance of the views of communities when they 
~ expressed. In the 'developed' world, community members have a choice whether 
or not to participate and express their views, and, when they do, they expect their voices 
to be heard - the authorities are usually obliged to respond. This did not appear to 
happen at Schmidtsdrift 
Following the restructuring of local government and the formalisation of provincial 
planning processes, no community conferences or other gatherings of the wider 
community have taken place in either community. All participation in planning has 
been delegated to a limited number of representatives. 
At what sta&e did the communities particiPate? Both communities sought to participate 
from the earliest stages, facilitated by NGOs. But those who held power were 'not 
ready', and the contributions made in those early stages (when priorities were set) 
gathered African dust. When the authorities were 'ready' (following the reorganisation 
of local government), the communities were 'consulted', or individuals were appointed 
. to represent the community or liaise with government / provincial departments, to 
collect data. 
For whose benefit did participation take place? There can be no doubt that both 
communities benefited from their involvement in planning, but they started at such a 
low level (i.e. their villages and homes destroyed, their community disenfranchised and 
dispossessed) that assessing less tangible benefits was difficult. Some may consider 
that the material benefits gained by the communities were considerable, but at the same 
time these constitute no more than very basic facilities and amenities (shelter, water, 
health services). Some sbott-termjobs were created in the road construction and in the 
laying of the water pipes at both Mogopa and Schmidtsdrift, and villagers gained skiUs 
to maintain this basic infrastructure. All of the children benefited from having their 
own schools, and despite the fact that a community hall was constructed instead of a 
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clinic at Mogopa, a regular (weekly) clinic is now run from within that building by 
visiting nurses. Less visibly, at Mogopa, there were early gains for the women who 
were empowered in the absence of many of the men (Laburn-Peart, 1997), and all 
members of both communities benefited from the actions of the few who invaded the 
land in defiance of the government planners. 
Consultant planners benefited financially and professionally as they played their part, 
and. when working within the formal planning process, were paid from the RDP and / 
or provincial planning budgets. The work done by NGOs and development 
practitioners in a more advocacy role was not remunerated. For both groups, the work 
undertaken with the communities under study provided valuable professional 
experience. 
Measuring the benefit to the government planners is more difficult. After 1994, they 
were battling within a system in the turmoil of change. For a long time, staff were not 
appointed to positions, and when they were, doubts were cast on their competence. 
Under such circumstances, it is small wonder that inexperienced staff were not able to 
operate flexibly and the planning regulations were rigidly applied. Planning has 
traditionally been about prediction and control. Government planners (where they were 
in post) were working under conditions of change and challenge, and kept control only 
by rigidly following the planning regulations and procedures. 
What was the cost of participation? The outworking of participation in both case study 
communities was at the cost ofa certain level of disillusionment, certainly on the part of 
some of the planners and consultants involved, and probably also on the part of some of 
the community - especially those at Mogopa. They expressed disappointment and their 
criticism that TRAC and the university planners did not deliver anything tangible for all 
the time and effort expended. While this did not lead to overt resentment of the 
individuals involved, the community and their leaders did shift to co-operate more 
closely with the authorities. This may have been a strategic switch of allegiance, and 
the end result was that funding was allocated. But this represented yet another example 
of planning officialdom dictating planning and the pace of the process: at both Mogopa 
and Schmidtsdrift, the community-based proactive planning that had taken place Was 
disregarded by the state and provincial planners. Both communities effectively had to 
wait until the government was ready to work with and help them. 
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Despite their early attempts to plan and to set the pace for themselves in their own 
planning process (albeit with the assistance of NGOs and progressive planners), there 
was little, if any, action. But when the government planners and the formal planning 
process were ready, then (and only then) were the communities allowed to participate in 
'our' (planners') process, on 'our' circumscribed procedural terms and within 'our' 
constrained timing schedules. Some might say that the only real cost of such planning 
is to liberal-minded progressive planners, and that the lessons to be learned about trying 
to undermine and speed up the formal planning processes revolve around unnecessarily 
raising the expectations and hopes of communities. 
By whose criteria was participation measured? The communities' priorities of getting 
their land back, of resettling on their land and of reconstructing their homes and lives 
were clearly of fundamental importance and were the purposes of and the criteria by 
which they measured their participation. The new government's priorities of getting 
legislative reforms and regulations in place and the staff to administer them were also 
valid, as were the planners' criteria of carrying out participatory planning in accordance 
with and / or in the spirit of the RDP. The case studies have shown that of these three 
sets of criteria, the latter were not of the same order as the first two, and the planners 
had to be patient and pragmatic. One of the sobering lessons learned by planners 
working with the Bakwena ba Mogopa and the BaTblaping was that there was little 
point in trying to force the pace of local government or in trying to do things differently. 
This period of transition was not the time for insurgent planning: the officials and 
bureaucrats would allow participation to occur ~t a stage and pace controlled by them. 
Figure 15 attempts to summarise the way in which participation appears to have been 
construed in the two case study communities. It concludes that at Mogopa, participation 
was construed by the authorities as something that could be used to justify official 
planning decisions and funding allocations that had been made. For the community, 
participation prior to 1994 had meant successfully contesting and resisting official plans 
and processes, and this continued through much of the period under study. However, 
despite their at times vociferous mobilisation, the community ultimately had only 
limited power within the formal planning process, since the administration of planning 
and decisions about priorities for funding continued to be made by officials outside the 
village. At Schmidtsdrift, planning appears to have been construed as an extension of 
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state control. Both before and after 1994, the community remained passive, ultimately 
disconnected from the planning process. 
Hoppa SchmidtBdrift 
What did they Their 'own' planning process at first, later State / provincial planning processes 
participate in? on their terms in the provincial process. only. 
Good representation and consultation Limited representation 
Who participated? The community actively participated at At first a few community meetings 
meetings; later tended to be by elected were held, later through an elected 
representatives only Ward Councillor for Siyancuma 
Municipality 
At what stage? limited input, when official process Not until provincial authorities were 
permitted, although village committee 'ready' after local government 
remains active restructuring 
Who benefited? Community, but from a very low starting Community, from a very low starting 
point A few temporary jobs, only basic point Only basic amenities, no 
amenities, schools, weekly clinic. RDP formal houses yet 
houses now built 
NGO planners were not paid Consultant planners were eventually 
Provincial planners were inexperienced, paid 
challenged by MDF members Provincial planners were 
inexperienced 
At what cost? Community's planning disregarded by Consortium's Master Plan 
officials disregarded by the province 
Disillusionment on the part of the Community confused; lack of 
community, who made a strategic shift of knowledge about what was going on 
allegiance to the formal planning process 
Planners disillusioned Planners disillusioned 
By whose criteria? Provincial planning authorities' need for control; reforms aDd recruitment of staff 
to implement them came first in both cases 
·Community priorities came second 
Participatory planning criteria camethird 
How was As a requirement of the state plBllDing process 
participation By local government pl8DJlCl"S - to justify official planning decisions and funding 
construed? allocations 
By development practitioners aDd communities - as a right 
The community bad own active Appears to have been an extension of 
camnittee, butwitb limited power within state control. Community passive, 
the formal _. :1JIOCCSS bad no real power 
Figure 15: Summary: howparticipatioDw8S construed at Mogopa and 
Schmidtsdrift, 1994-1999 
9.6 Conclusions: reflections on participation atMogopa and Schmidtsdrift 
For Cboguill (1996), a lesson learned from the evaluation of community participation in 
development projects was that there seemed to be far more constraints in the 
'underdeveloped' world compared to the 'developed' world. These were not just 
political and financial, but also technical and motivational. In the two cases studies 
presented here, technical skills and motivation for participation (on the part of the 
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communities) were not found wanting. The major constraint revolved around the 
importance of land in South Africa, and the politics surrounding its distribution. 
This research has shown that, in the cases discussed, it was not possible to set aside 
political and institutional interests in South African planning. Rather, they continued to 
dominate the context in which planning occurred. Planners in apartheid South Africa 
had found it all but impossible to work outside the apartheid ideological mindset. 
Apartheid was the 'thought-world' in which order would be maintained inter alia 
through the control over land and the use of land; that 'thought-world' or rationality in 
tum gave rise to the policies, procedures and practices that helped to maintain the 
apartheid system. 
In post-apartheid South Africa, the mindset is different the official 'thought-world' bas 
changed to one that - in theory - embraces democracy, and communicative notions of 
consensus-building and participation. But in spite of this, the case studies showed that 
planners at the provincial and local government levels were unable to give preference to 
any contributions that had been made by the communities themselves. There still 
appear to be deep cleavages in the multi-cultural context of planning in South Africa, 
and the profession itself, while fully engaged in the changes to the state planning system 
(and having changed the way in which the profession is organised in the country), is not 
yet representative of the country's demographics. Given the history of planning in the 
country and the deep suspicion of planning that had resulted from,past practices, much 
needs to be done to overcome rather than entrench differencesl4• 
Professional planners and government departments were not the only ones that planned 
- in Mogopa, the community planned outside the formal state planning structures, and 
did so with some effect, exemplifying Sandercock's insurgent planning. But ultimately 
their effectiveness was limited. This research has shown that the official planning 
process did not take such community planning efforts seriously. Historically, many of 
the actions taken in the name of apartheid planning had treated these communities with 
contempt Ultimately, this led to a breakdown of trust between communities and 
planners, with the result that many communities that had suffered apartheid planning 
continued to treat planners with suspicion and scepticism. even after 1994 and the 
14 See for example Klein et ai, 2001, who discuss land related CODfljct resolution procedures and 
mechanisms and the need for capacity to work within multicultura1 contexts. 
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adoption by the new government of its policies of Reconstruction and Development and 
GEAR. Unfortunately, many of the actions taken in the name of post-apartheid 
planning in the early years of the new South Africa appear to have continued to 
disregard the views of the communities under study. 
Participation as conceived in the planning literature and by the RDP did not 'work' in 
either of the two case study areas, in the sense of the communities playing an active and 
effective role in determining their developmental priorities and working in co-operation 
with the authorities to achieve these. Further, participation could not 'work' in these 
two rural areas, for three main reasons: 
• It appears that in the early years, the authorities lacked the political will to allow 
participation to work, and subsequently (with the provincial and local government 
reorganisation) were not ready or did not have the skills for it to work 
• The wide-ranging changes to legislation, but especially the restructuring and 
rebuilding of local and provincial government. meant that even where the political 
will might have existed, the institutional structures were not in place to facilitate or 
support meaningful participation by communities 
• Conflicting rationalities meant that even at Mogopa, where there was a community-
initiated participatory planning process, provincial and local government officials 
felt unable to co-operate, let alone embrace or promote the community's efforts. 
What then do the case studies tell us about the effectiveness of participation in 
planning? It would be too simplistic to say that the Bakwena ba Mogopa were 
empowered by their experiences, while the BaThiaping were not. But the conclusions 
from the case study findings must be that in the former, the community actively 
participated in the various planning processes that they faced over a long period of time, 
even if this involved resisting such processes, and their participation often occurred in 
spite of the planning procedures, not because of them. They (with the help of NGOs) 
developed and led the participatory process. They believed they could get their land 
back. and this drove them. At Schmidtsdrift, participation in the planning process was 
in almost all instances (the exception being the land invasions) developed and required 
by those in power, and led by external consultants. 
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Where the process was essentially community-led (as at Mogopa) the community has 
shown a commitment to long-term involvement in planning for its future. Where 
participation was formulaic (as at Schmidtsdrift) it occurred sporadically and 
selectively, and on many occasions only at the behest of those in control of the process. 
That community was - and remains - essentially disengaged from the planning process. 
9.7 Reflections on the research process and methodology 
The case study approach that was used for this study meant a long process of gathering 
data from a range of sources; interviewing people who had been part of the rural 
planning process in South Africa or who had a perspective on it; taking photographs at 
different times between 1994 and 1999; obtaining relevant documents; attending 
community meetings or meetings with officials; and spending as much time as possible 
listening to the stories of those involved. And yet it is almost too soon to draw 
conclusions about the effects of participation by the communities in the planning 
process, as the provincial and localgovemment structures and procedures, and staff 
fully competent to administer them, have not long been in place. The stories told here 
have not ended, and there is much work that must still be done before either community 
feels that the land and the villages that were taken from them have been fully restored. 
Thus there is scope for valuable research in these two communities to continue. 
But Mogopa and Schmidtsdrift were only two of hundreds of vilJages that were 
destroyed by the apartheid government in its forced removals programme. The stories 
of other rural communities and the part they have played in the land restitution and rural 
planning process should also be told, not just because this will make an important 
contribution to the planning historiography in South Africa, but also to be able to further 
compare and contrast their experiences with those of other communities. It is only in 
this way that the findings of this study will be verified and a more complete picture of 
participation by communities in the development process in rural South Africa will be 
painted. 
From a research point of view, I was at an advantage when this study began, for I had 
been involved professionally with the communities as they started their negotiations 
with the government as part of the land restitution process. But this professional 
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involvement stopped when I moved to live in the UK at the end of 1995. My role and 
the nature of my relationship with the communities changed. I had been a participant 
advisor and facilitator, but became a non-participant observer. I had been in periodic 
but face-to-face contact with the communities. but now researched from a remote 
distance in the UK. making only annual visits to South Mrica. My professional work 
had been oriented towards the practical constraints of development and implementation. 
but became instead oriented towards the constraints of the research objectives and 
methods of this undertaking. Similarly, my relationship with those involved in the rural 
development process changed. There was a high turnover of staff in many of the 
organisations that were involved with both communities. Colleagues in TRAC and the 
Schmidtsdrift Planning Consortium became interviewees and themselves the subject of 
my research, and my relationship with government officials became one of courteous 
researcher and interviewer, compared to the more adversarial relationship that had 
existed during the years of apartheid. 
There are both advantages and disadvantages to this situation. My acquaintance with 
both of the communities and my familiarity, in 1994, with their recent histories placed 
me in an advantageous position. As qualitative research, this was not going to be an 
objective, dispassionate exercise, and my experience of working with the communities 
meant that my research approach sought to be communicative, exploratory, and also to 
be revelatory. There is no doubt that I was in a position to document and analyse 
something that only a few planners in South Africa had experienced. When the 
opportunity came to reflect on these experiences from a research perspective, my 
position became even more unique: colleagues in the country working with rural 
communities had expressed frustration at the slow pace of delivery and some bad felt 
overwhelmed by the challenges of development that they faced. I had the advantage of 
being able to reflect on these from a distance. On the other hand, the distance made 
communication difficult and held its own frustrations, as the country pressed forward 
with post-apartheid changes. 
My move to the UK resulted in some frustration and concern that the professional and 
academic work that had begun had not resulted in any meaningful change for either of 
the communities by the end of 1995. By undertaking an in-depth analysis of the 
participation of these communities in the planning process as it affected them - by 
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telling their stories - I hoped that some input. albeit indirect. might be made back into 
the communities. 
Some may be cynical of this motivation. but Piantanida and Garman (1999: ]45) 
provided encouragement: 
"What gives you the right to create this portrayal is that you've been there. You 
have done the study. If others don't agree with your understanding of the 
phenomenon, if they don't find it meaningful or useful, they are at libeny to create 
a portrayal that works for them. That's the way the discourse evolves. But for 
now. you are the one who has spent time living this study. You are the only one 
who can say what meanings you have come to as a result of being immersed. And 
... there are probably a lot of people out there ... who will probably be very 
grateful that you invested the time, energy, and thought to investigate this 
phenomenon. They don't have the resources or inclination to do what you've 
done. But they can benefit from your work, even if their experience or the way 
they would explain their experience is very different from yours. The synergy 
generated by complementary perspectives and the tension between disparate 
perspectives helps to further the discourse. It's the way knowledge is generated 
discursively". 
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APPENDIX 1 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND TOPICS 
Interviews were semi-structured and focussed on a number of broad topics. In each 
case, interviewees were encouraged to talk about their role, their experiences and area 
of expertise, whether this was as a planner, an NGO practitioner, a government 
official, or a community member. The questions listed are wide-ranging and were 
therefore used as a guideline, nor were the topics necessarily covered in the order 
given below. 
General! Ice breakin2 Questions: 
• My interest is in the Land Reform Programme in the country in the first 5 years of 
the new government, and I would like to talk about your experiences and the role 
that you have played. 
• How did you get involved with the Bakwena ba Mogopa ! BaThlaping? 
• For community members, interviews started by asking about their experiences of 
the removal and the return to their land. 
The Plannjn& Process: 
• In your experience, how bas planning practice changed in South Africa since 
1994? 
• What is your understanding of the planning process - how does it work at present? 
• What is the role of consultants? Of NGOs? Of communities? 
• What have been your experiences of participation in planning in South Africa? 
• (How) do the authorities monitor the translation of RDP principles into action? 
Participation: 
• How do you derme participation in planning? 
• In your view, has participation been incorporated into the planning process (or 
does it remain token! peripheral)? 
• What are people participating in? Priority setting! information gathering I 
decision making! implementation? Is this satisfactory? 
• Should there be greater I lesser participation? By whom? Politicians I local 
activists / representatives / individuals / groups I civic organisations / others? 
• What steps are being taken to ensure that participation is built into projects? What 
structures exist! are in place to ensure I facilitate participation'? 
• How are planning decisions made? Who makes them? What has to be taken into 
account? 
• Who gets included! excluded from planning decision making? By whom? Under 
what circumstances? How? 
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• What hinders participation in planning? What are the constraints on participation 
in post-apartheid South Africa? 
• What works to favour participation in planning? 
• Does participation necessarily / always lead to action? Why / why not? 
• In your experience, do people want to participate? Or do they want public 
servants / the state to make decisions and to provide for them? To what extent do 
residents seem unwilling / unable to 'trespass' into the 'domain' of officialdom? 
• Has the democratic process in the country over the last number of years led to a 
greater awareness of participation in planning? Has it led to an expectation for 
participation in planning, either by the communities themselves, or by officials? 
Has this expectation been satisfied? 
• Do you think that the democratic process has facilitated the inclusion in planning 
of previously disadvantaged groups? 
• Do you regard participation as a right, or as a concession by the government and 
planning profession? 
RPP / GEAR / Presidential Lead PrQjects: 
• From your experience in planning, what changed when the RDP was replaced by 
GEAR? 
• Status of PLPs: Have they empowered local communities? Have they had the 
desired impact? 
• Have lessons been learned from the process? What are these lessons? 
Development Forums: 
• What is the role of development forums? 
• Do they represent communities, or are they constellations of certain interest 
groups / outspoken individuals? 
• Are they better at representing communities than the elected local government 
representatives? Is there a difference? 
• Are they the delivery agents of the RDP? 
Implementation: 
• What has been your experience of the implementation of planning policies and 
projects at Mogopa / Schmidtsd.rift? 
• What is your organisation's / department's role in the implementation process? 
• What is the nature of the relationship between you / your department and the 
planning professionals and NGOs working with communities? 
• What is the nature of the relationship between you / your department / your 
organisation and the community of Mogopa / Schmidtsdrift? 
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